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1Foreword
No part of Peter Taylor’s The Relation between Classical and Quantum Mechanics
was ever published in journals. It has been available in the Bodleian Library
of the University of Oxford, as any other Oxford DPhil thesis, since 1984, but
there it has lain unread and unknown. In the subsequent decades there have
been several crucial advances in the understanding of the relation between
classical and quantum, most notably in the field of decoherence theory, but
there remain aspects to this relation that are far from certain: in inter-theory
reduction, localisation, controls over approximations, and what I would loosely
call the ’axiomatics’ of quantum theory.
Peter Taylor, in his Introduction, highlighted two of these foci: approximations
and localisation. The first he addressed with the full rigour of the methods
as recently perfected by Michael Reed and Barry Simons in their remarkable
Methods of Modern Mathematical Physics, published in 4 volumes in the mid to
late 1970s. The second he expressed in terms of a compactness condition on sets
of pure states. The two others listed are ’well-defined theories....as a necessary
precursor to inter-theoretic reduction’, and ’pure states: the assertion of realism
in physics by employing pure states as primitive abstractions’. He addressed
both by providing a new lattice-theoretic axiomatization of quantum mechanics,
using ideas introduced by Veeravalli Varadarajan in his magisterial Geometry of
Quantum Theory, published in 1968, buttressed by an analysis of inter-theory
reduction that is original and, after more than three decades, timely. The thesis
does not solve the measurement problem, but it does not aspire to: it is concerned
with the circumstances in which quantum Hamiltonians drive evolutions well-
approximated by classical Hamiltonian flows, not those, as in measurement
processes, that do not.
This theory of reduction is accompanied by an account of dimensional constants,
and a detailed evaluation of the proposal, by the mathematical physicist Klaus
Hepp in 1974, on a definition of theory-reduction (and in particular the classical
limit of quantum mechanics) in terms of a family of quantum theories with
decreasing magnitude of Planck’s constant. As set out in Appendix 4.2, this is
one of several sections that would in my view have merited a journal publication
in its own right – and that still does. As for the lattice-theoretic realism – an ally
of the quantum logic approach to quantum foundations – its time may yet come:
the quantum information-theoretic approach to the axiomatisation of quantum
theory, despite some initial successes, has languished, its prospects for realism
dim.
2The ideas and methods here set out in lattice theory, theory reduction, dimen-
sional analysis, and particle localisation, are impressive taken in isolation: much
more so taken in unison. The monograph is restricted to non-relativistic the-
ory, but within that orbit combines philosophical scope, axiomatic method, and
mathematical rigour, to an extent that I have seldom seen.
Work of this calibre is not easily completed within the time-scale of a funded
graduate degree. Peter Taylor left academia to begin a successful career in the
London insurance markets in 1981. He was able to take out sufficient time
to finish the thesis in 1984, but did no more with it. His premature death in
November 2015, at the age of 61, has forever put to an end his efforts to clarify
the foundations of quantum mechanics, but may mark the beginning of their
influence, as only now made available to wider communities: in foundations
of physics, mathematical physics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of
physics.
Thanks are due to Ian Nicol, Thomas Mo¨ller-Nielsen, and David Shipley, for
editing and resetting of the monograph in TeX. Without them its publication
would not have been possible.
Simon Saunders
Merton College, Oxford
June 2018
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4Abstract
This thesis examines the relation between classical and quantum mechanics
from philosophical, mathematical and physical standpoints.
It first presents arguments in support of “conjectural realism” in scientific theo-
ries distinguished by explicit contextual structure and empirical testability; and
it analyses intertheoretic reduction in terms of weakly equivalent theories over
a domain of applicability.
Familiar formulations of classical and quantum mechanics are shown to follow
from a general theory of mechanics based on pure states with an intrinsic prob-
ability structure. This theory is developed to the stage where theorems from
quantum logic enable expression of the state geometry in Hilbert space. Quan-
tum and classical mechanics are then elaborated and applied to subsystems and
the measurement process. Consideration is also given to space-time geometry
and the constraints this places on the dynamics.
Physics and Mathematics, it is argued, are growing apart; the inadequate treat-
ment of approximations in general and localisation in quantum mechanics in
particular are seen as contributing factors. In the description of systems, the
link between localisation and lack of knowledge shows that quantum mechan-
ics should reflect the domain of applicability. Restricting the class of states
provides a means of achieving this goal. Localisation is then shown to have a
mathematical expression in terms of compactness, which in turn is applied to
yield a topological theory of bound and scattering states.
Finally, the thesis questions the validity of “classical limits” and “quantisations”
in intertheoretic reduction, and demonstrates that a widely accepted classical
limit does not constitute a proof of reduction. It proposes a procedure for
determining whether classical and quantum mechanics are weakly equivalent
over a domain of applicability, and concludes that, in this restricted sense,
classical mechanics reduces to quantum mechanics.
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Introduction
What is an atom? Simple, as everyone knows it is a small ball-bearing (the
nucleus) orbited by even smaller ball-bearings (electrons). Further investigation
casts doubt on the smaller ball-bearings; no matter, replace them by a cloud
of energy subject to little jumps in excitation. Allow further that very little
ball-bearings can behave like waves and that light waves are prone to behave
like ball-bearings and the mental furniture of the pragmatic scientist is nearly
complete. Know which equations to turn on and the theory works.
It is in the spirit of molecules as balls joined together by flexible sticks that this
thesis is written. The simple fact remains that to understand chemistry needs
only minor modifications to the classical mechanical picture. Yet, we are told,
quantum theory is true and to quote Dirac’s famous words from 1928:
“The underlying physical laws necessary for the mathematical the-
ory of a larger part of physics and the whole of chemistry are thus
completely known...”
The quantum theory of atoms and molecules is remarkable. Mathematically
abstruse, difficult to visualise, still a hub of controversy but successful - and
with no serious contender in nearly sixty years. In short, quantum theory has
revealed little but delivered much.
So here are two apparently conflicting views of chemistry; on the one hand a
conceptual framework based on classical mechanics, on the other the mystery
of quantum theory. Put another way, how can chemists have so few qualms
in practising their science when, as highlighted by Primas (Pr 2), quantum
mechanics is at odds with many of the chemist’s assumptions?
The aim of this thesis is to reconcile the classical conceptual framework to
the quantum reality by examining the relation between classical and quantum
mechanics.
Four themes underlie the presentation of ideas in the thesis:
9
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• Well-defined theories: the full explication of theories as a necessary pre-
cursor to any demonstration of intertheoretic reduction.
• Pure states: the assertion of realism in physics by employing pure states
as primitive abstractions.
• Approximations: the role of proved approximations in identifying theories
over a certain domain.
• Localisation: the use of compact sets of pure states to express localisation.
In summary, Chapter 1 sets the scene by reviewing the nature of scientific the-
ories and their interrelationship. Chapter 2 presents a self-contained axiomatic
theory of mechanics which includes classical and quantum mechanics as special
cases. Chapter 3 exploits the analogy between compactness and localisation and
takes a new look at scattering theory. Finally, Chapter 4 brings these ideas to-
gether to provide a clear method for determining if classical mechanics reduces
to quantum mechanics.
Chapter 1
The Structure of Scientific Theories
This thesis investigates the relation between two individually successful and
sophisticated theories, classical and quantum mechanics. Some basic questions
pose themselves at the outset:
• What is a theory?
• Why are theories important?
• How are theories related?
This first Chapter examines these questions with the aim of providing a reasoned
framework for the more specific topics which follow.
11
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1.1 Abstractions and Understanding
“And we extend our concept...as in spinning a thread we twist fibre upon
fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some
fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.”
Wittgenstein
Both as a methodology and a body of knowledge science is considered by
many to provide our most profound understanding of the world. Yet what is
understanding?
We understand or can claim to understand many things - words, sentences,
poetry, politics, scientific theories, mathematics and so on. Each requires a level
or type of understanding which may be precise or vague, shallow or profound,
concerned with a particular aspect of a subject or the subject as a whole. Such
diversity suggests a return to basics. These basics, the categories with which we
distinguish and organise experience, will be termed ‘abstractions’. For example,
a component of communication such as a gesture is understood by someone to
the extent of its meaning to them and this will assuredly evoke that individual’s
experience. Immediately, this leads to not only a discussion of meaning but
also the prospect that the ‘meaning’ of an abstraction rests on people sharing
the same experience. To avoid such connotations we shall abandon the word
‘meaning’, with its suggestion of uniqueness and absolutism, and adopt instead
the less emotive word ‘significance’. Take a simple abstraction - the name of
a person. Although a person’s name may evoke different experiences for each
individual, a simple test demonstrates common understanding: one individual
brings forward the person to whom he believes the name belongs and associates
the relevant symbols to this person. There may be some temporary confusion
but the response from other individuals will soon be a mimicry of the association
or some conventional expression of agreement such as a nodding of heads.
Proper names have, in this way, primarily perceptual significance, yet they
also admit of understanding through their relation to abstractions for which
denotation is accepted or presumed. Thus, in the absence of the person, we
could refer to a photograph or construct sentences such as “Churchill was the
Prime Minister of Great Britain during the Second World War”, passing the
denotative buck. This leads us to distinguish two ways in which an abstraction
attains significance: firstly, by an agreement on the denotation of individual
experience, which, we call denotative significance, and secondly, by the relation
to other abstractions through language conventions, which we call contextual
significance.
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The distinction between denotative and contextual significance is not, as might
have been hoped at first sight, clear cut. Consider again an individual’s experi-
ences denoted by a proper name. These experiences inevitably contribute to the
denotation of other abstractions and induce an association of abstractions facil-
itating, for example, their conjunction in a sentence of verbal communication.
We do not, therefore, attribute meaning solely by denotation.
Contextual significance, on the other hand, yields more readily to analysis. By
placing an abstraction in context we are identifying it as an element of a structure
- a set of auxiliary abstractions bearing well-defined relations to one another.
Particular contexts may be isolated by choosing particular combinations - or
patterns - within such a set. This appeal to a reference structure can be viewed
as an act of abstraction which may be implicit, as in metaphor, or explicit, as
in the axiomatising of logical argument. Moreover, a variety of reference struc-
tures may be employed and the process of abstraction repeated. In summary,
the contextual significance of an abstraction derives from the structure of which
it is deemed to be a component. If we view the branches of pure mathematics
as reference structures, (even though motivation for their formulation may well
reside in features of the experienced world), meaning is derived solely through
axioms, rules of inference and theorems of the structure. We therefore distin-
guish logical and mathematical abstractions, in the above sense, and call them
contextual, whilst we term the others descriptive.
Contextual abstractions do not as they stand denote anything, though associa-
tions may be made to other structures (models) yielding interpretations of one
string of symbols in terms of others. A large part of mathematical activity may
be looked upon as the analysis of such interrelation of structures. Now suppose
that the ‘model’ for a set of symbols in a logical system is a set of words in ver-
bal language. If, by reference to his accustomed usage (based on denotation),
an individual accepts this association, the words derive enhanced contextual
significance from the logical structure. But we should not conclude from this
that there exists a fixed correspondence between sets of words and (strings of)
contextual abstractions. In fact, we shall argue that the usefulness of descriptive
abstractions resides in their non-allegiance to any such fixed mapping.
We began by considering abstractions as components of communication, whose
denotative significance is determined by social agreement on the symbolisation
of each individual’s experience. What, then, of a society with only one mem-
ber; what of the ‘personal understanding’ of an individual? In discriminating,
organising and inspiring various experiences, ‘personal’ abstractions conform
to the analysis given above. We can go further; the fact that any organism must
interact with its environment requires that certain external stimuli will trigger a
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form of internal signal, which ‘abstracts’ the stimulus and will, in turn, induce
certain responses. Allowing that the organism is capable of storing signals, then
it will naturally form an image of its environment. The individual act of abstrac-
tion associated with the formation of such an image may thus be considered a
basic biological function, rather than a sophisticated facility of higher mammals.
Yet it is only through communal abstractions that any personal understanding
may be revealed. The mere expression of an idea does not guarantee that other
people will understand it in the sense intended, for discussion and elaboration
may be needed to make it comprehensible. However, any claim that a ‘personal
understanding’ is, in principle, inexpressible at once sets it beyond discussion
and thereby also outside the scope of this chapter.
That experiences are distinctive enough to be abstracted by humanity en masse
leads to the belief that there exists an independent objective world structured
in accordance with the abstractions we use to describe these experiences. But
it is neither necessary nor desirable to presuppose such existence, convenient
though this proves in normal discourse. Instead ‘reality’ and its ‘existence’ can
be treated as a conjecture, a point of view which will be elaborated shortly.
By so abandoning Naive Realism and indeed any claim to the existence of a
universal underlying ‘truth’, the fundamental distinction between subjectivity
and objectivity evaporates, to be replaced by a recognition that understanding
is primarily interactive.
It is natural to suppose that the use of a communal abstraction - such as ‘apple’
- implies a shared identity between certain experiences of different individuals.
Yet, given the diversity of our perceptions, such an assumption is unwarranted.
Can my experiences of ‘apple’ ever be said to strictly coincide with anyone
else’s? Although there is a loose identity of significance following from our
conventional agreement on denotation, we must allow individual’s experiences,
and thereby their denotations and associations of abstractions, to differ.
For proper names the agreed denotation of distinct sets of experiences is usually
unambiguous, so to this extent denotation is independent of context. But for
most descriptive abstractions it is the context which determines denotation and
this, in turn, induces strings of associations peculiar to each individual. Thus
any strict demarcation between contextual and denotative significance is lost. It
is not, perhaps, surprising that the further away from proper names one goes
the greater the risk of ambiguity, and the greater the reliance upon context. The
more diverse the denotation, the less applicable become either/or classifications
as shown, for example, by descriptions of states of mind or emotions. The net
result is an inherent woolliness of meaning, standing in marked contrast to the
categoric contextual significance imposed by symbolic logic.
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We propose that the various compromises in the conflict between contextual
precision and denotative woolliness are responsible for the diversity of under-
standing noted at the beginning of this Section. This should certainly not be
taken as an approval of woolliness per se, since ambiguity is usually undesir-
able (especially when describing experiences), but two points deserve emphasis.
Firstly, acceptance of the difference of each individual’s experience entails an
intrinsic imprecision in denotation of descriptive abstractions, and a diversity
of their contextual significance. Secondly, the flexibility of usage of descriptive
abstractions, and their evocation of various associations to each individual, fa-
cilitates the generation of opinions, conjectures and theories. This flexibility, far
from being undesirable, is a characteristic of language responsible for its fertility.
A feature of human understanding following from these considerations is its
reliance upon metaphor, that is, the (implicit) recognition of a reference structure
common to two or more denotatively disparate sets of organised descriptive
abstractions. Indeed, identification of such structures prompts the formulation
of logical systems.
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1.2 Appearance and Reality
“The principle that everything is open to criticism (from which this principle
itself is not exempt) leads to a simple solution of the sources of knowledge”.
Popper
It is common sense to view the world as comprising independently existing
objects, with immediate perception merely our transient experience of their
various aspects. Who, for instance, would seriously doubt that the furniture in
a room continues to exist and remain organised when the light is switched off?
Reality is ascribed, though usually uncritically, to a variety of abstractions; after
all, are electrons and protons any more real than cups and saucers, or these more
real than love and hate? On the other hand, we learn to distinguish appearance
from reality: dreams, fairies and optical illusions all, in their different ways,
occur as experiences yet they, or what they signify, fail to qualify as real.
To clarify the notion of reality, we must step away from existence in isolation. We
shall call the set of mental data arising from experiences, coded and co-ordinated
by abstraction and association, a world-picture. (It is not unreasonable to allow
that some of these experiences, criteria for abstraction and patterns of associa-
tion may be hereditary). The ‘reality’ of an abstraction may be loosely defined
as the status of this abstraction in the world-picture. Although such a definition
does not prohibit one individual’s reality from corresponding to another’s illu-
sion, the constraint of social existence in aligning world-pictures removes most
confusion. Still, this does not amount to a claim of independent existence which
is the chief assertion of Realism. It is the repeatable distinguishability of cer-
tain experiences and their conjunctions which make it natural to presume that
just as abstractions denote and relate to other abstractions, so the experiences
of immediate perception are but part of the denotation of independent entities
bearing various relations to one another. The distinction between Idealism (as
the doctrine of only accepting existence ‘in the mind’) and Realism is this switch
from world-picture to world. Never a clear distinction, it can be abandoned if
we view a world-picture as a conjecture on the structure of experience, both that
of the individual and, through the use of communal abstractions, that of others.
Taking this view, which may be called ‘Conjectural Realism’, there can be no
absolute reality - or knowledge of that reality - hiding, as it were, behind the
mask of appearance, only more or less adequate conjectures for co-ordinating
experience. Through its relation to the rest of a world-picture, the adequacy of
a conjecture may be assessed by subjecting it to criticism and tests. Such a ‘call
and response’ approach to epistemology will be examined in Section 1.3.
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In connection with these conclusions, let us briefly consider two well-known
philosophical problems:
1) The Problem of Universals
In putting forward the doctrine that the objects we identify through perception
are but the imperfect impressions on matter of universal ‘Ideas’ - such as the
universal ‘cat’ - Plato claims to see beyond appearances to a world of ultimate
truth. However, his arguments, and those for ‘Essentialism’, are just elaborations
of the argument for reality, namely:
We use abstractions to denote objects and attributes, but only perceive their
aspects; these abstractions refer to something, therefore there exists an ultimate
reality comprising the entities of abstraction which, due to human frailty, we
cannot directly apprehend.
With its immediate appeal as an ’explanation’ of our verbal categorisation of
experience, the world of ‘Ideas’ or ‘Essences’ consists of whichever abstractions
are deemed fit for immortality (irrespective of consistency), at the same time im-
munising itself against empirical criticism by reserving the right to reject as mere
appearance the inconvenient ‘reality’ apprehended through the senses. Accord-
ingly, the theory of Universals is an unnecessary and unfalsifiable conjecture
which is only a problem if we are gullible enough to accept it.
2) The Problem of Induction
This is simply stated as the problem of justifying reasoning from singular em-
pirical statements to general laws. The logical part of the problem is solved,
following Popper, if we note that laws, as conjectures, may be refuted; that is,
whilst no number of confirming instances can ever render a general law ‘true’,
just one falsifying instance makes it false. However, this recourse to the math-
ematical technique of disproof by counter-example does not entirely banish the
‘Problem of Induction’, as it reveals two new difficulties: the first concerns the
‘truth’ of singular empirical statements, and the second the relative importance
we may attribute to non-false laws.
Even if we interpret empirical truth as ‘correspondence with the facts’ and
suppose a statement of the ‘facts’ to be understood, these ‘facts’ may still be
denied; for example, the claimed experience could be disregarded as being
an hallucination, fabrication or misinterpretation. For this reason, the sceptic
requires independent corroboration before accepting ‘facts’, and faced with such
possible denials the most acceptable laws are those amenable to testing by
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repetition so that anyone in doubt may observe for himself the consistency of
the ‘facts’.
Now suppose that there is a law for which there are no accepted falsifying
instances or, as is more often the case, one that has been modified to exclude
falsifications. There do not appear to be any explicit criteria for estimating the
importance of such a non-false law but confidence in it will be influenced by
its applicability under diverse circumstances, and how it accords with the rest
of a world-picture. This is of particular interest when more than one law is in
competition as an ‘explanation of the facts’ - a case which will be considered in
detail below.
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1.3 The Structure of Scientific Theories
“Theories put phenomena into systems”.
N. R. Hanson
In marked contrast to the confident Logical Positivist explication of the features
required of a scientific theory, philosophers of science have more recently given
up devising categoric distinctions between science and other forms of knowl-
edge preferring, in Suppe’s words (Su 1 p.618) “The examination of historical
and contemporary examples of actual scientific practice”. Just as any hope of
characterising a generic ‘scientific theory’ appears to founder on the entangled
diversity of the varied collections of knowledge and method we call ‘science’ so,
similarly, the corpus of mathematical structures, computational recipes, iconic
models, paradigms, experimental procedures and verbal associations to other
theories constituting Quantum Theory, defeats isolation of what we usually
suppose to be the Quantum Theory. However, this need not condemn us to
the bland scepticism evinced in the following quotation from Achinstein (Ac 1
p.129):
“T is a theory, relative to the context if, and only if, T is a set of
propositions that...is...not known to be true or to be false, but be-
lieved to be somewhat plausible, potentially explanatory, relatively
fundamental, and somewhat integrated”.
There are several readily identifiable characteristics of all sciences and, more
than this, if we concentrate on analysing the claims made by a scientific theory -
particularly one employing explicit logical or mathematical structures - we may
distinguish and typify its major ingredients. We therefore propose the following
three characteristics of science:
1. ‘Call-and-response’ epistemology: the ‘call’ being a conjecture on the oc-
currence and conjunction of certain distinguishable experiences (relating
to the ‘reality’ of our world-pictures by use of descriptive abstractions); the
‘response’ being an arbitration on the validity of the conjecture by appeal to
perception under conditions broadly specified by descriptive abstractions.
2. Explanatory: each conjecture of science constitutes part of a system-
atic classification and organisation of experience, (communally expressed
through abstractions); implicitly, therefore, this system conforms to some
logical or mathematical principles.
3. Predictive: novel conjectures may be deduced, thereby extending the ex-
planatory capabilities of science.
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These characteristics are shared by the particular systematisations of knowledge
and conjecture we call ‘scientific theories’. A theory is never a completely
demarcated and static body of knowledge, and, whilst not quite all things to
all men, different people will, according to their various needs and motives,
emphasise different aspects. With a view to forming an opinion on how a
scientific theory should be explicated, let us call attention to four components
(or aspects) of its structure:
1. Fundamental Model: sets of logical or mathematical axioms, rules of in-
ference, and theorems, often described - and derided - as the ‘formalism’.
2. Phenomenology: a body of experimental data, organised through cor-
relations called ‘experimental laws’, the description of which is based on
ordinary language (communal abstractions). Loosely, the phenomenology
constitutes the ‘facts’.
3. Co-ordinative Definitions: associations between the contextual abstrac-
tions of the fundamental models, and sets of descriptive abstractions in the
rest of the world-picture (which may include other theories); co-ordinative
definitions provide both the empirical interpretation of the fundamental
models and the relation between the phenomenology and the fundamental
models.
4. Recipes: formal rules, not necessarily derivable from the fundamental
model, for going from one set of data to another. The data may be phe-
nomenological or in the form of fundamental constants and parameters;
a collection of recipes may be sufficiently coherent to qualify as a subthe-
ory, employing some of the symbols of the main theory and with similar
co-ordinative definitions, but need not be consistent with the fundamental
model.
In practice, any theory is a hotchpotch of these ingredients, with various alterna-
tives for fundamental models, implicit dependencies on other theories, numer-
ous subtheories and analogies, and recipes varying from algorithms through
paradigms to overt experimental procedures. Just as the woolliness of descrip-
tive abstractions makes their meaning difficult to pin down, so the chief culprits
responsible for the confusion about what constitutes a scientific theory are the
co-ordinative definitions. It is to these that we now look for resolution of the
debate between the ‘Received View’ and ‘Weltanschauung’ analysis of scien-
tific theories. By categorising the many philosophies of science in this way we
are adopting the terminology of (Su 1). Familiarity with this reference will be
assumed in what follows.
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Let us first make a few remarks concerning the observational-theoretical dis-
tinction on the meaning of terms in a scientific theory. The motivation for di-
viding the descriptive abstractions of a scientific theory into ‘observational’ and
‘theoretical’ is to distinguish the names, attributes and relationships of objects
available to direct observation, such as ’a red brick’, from those which are not,
such as ‘a wave function’. Although consideration of any list of scientific terms
will reveal that there is no tenable sharp distinction between ‘observational’
and ‘theoretical’ in normal usage, adherents of the ‘Received View’ proposed
that a clean division could be effected which would retain, indeed reinforce, the
scientific significance of the abstractions used in a theory. Allied to this is a refor-
mulation of Kant’s notion of ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ sentences (propositions,
judgements), where a sentence is called analytic if it is true because of its logical
form and the explicitly defined meaning of its terms, or called synthetic if it is
true due to its observed validity as a ‘fact’. Both distinctions break down because
of, firstly, the elusiveness of ‘meaning’ (other than logical) for analytic sentences
and theoretical terms and, secondly, the problem of demarcating ‘observable’
for synthetic sentences and observational terms. In view of our previous dis-
cussions of abstractions it is not surprising that any attempted enforcement of
these distinctions leads to a highly artificial language with ad hoc meanings.
Implicit in the observational-theoretical distinction is the presumed existence
of a ‘neutral observation language’, that is, a theory-independent language
describing the objects, and their attributes and relationships, observed by direct
perception.
Proponents of the various ‘Weltanschauung’ analyses deny the theory-independence
of perception, arguing that science is part of a perspective on the world of experi-
ence and that the structure of scientific theories will be revealed by characterising
their context within this perspective, in particular, by focusing attention on how
science is actually done and evolves rather than what it is, or should be, as a
finished product. However, the ‘Weltanschauung’ soon becomes a metaphys-
ical panacea for all philosophical ills, an intangible bag of paradigms, social
attitudes, historical conditioning and individual dispositions. If we choose not
to pursue the ‘Weltanschauung’ we are still left to deal with the dependence
of facts and observations on the theories which are supposed to describe them.
Taken to the extreme, if the world is what we decide (or what our language
constrains) it to be, how then can there be objective knowledge, and are we not
forced to retreat into a subjective Idealism? The root of this difficulty with the
‘Received View’ is, we propose, an unwarranted faith in Realism, resulting from
the desire for a categoric distinction between theoretical description (reality) and
its manifestation in perceptual terms (appearance). If the arguments of Section
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1.1 are accepted, then we can do no better than employ descriptive abstractions
whose contextual meaning derives from the logical systems to which they are
assigned, so the ‘Weltanschauung’ objection is justified but only insofar as it
inevitably applies to all descriptive abstractions (and, therefore, co-ordinative
definitions). As far as anything can be, ordinary language (and its technological
elaborations) is a ‘neutral observation language’ designed for unambiguously
demarcating and relating communal experiences, with logic lending precision
to its organisation. In conclusion, therefore, if the ‘observational-theoretical’ dis-
tinction is replaced by a ‘descriptive-contextual’ awareness, the main argument
for the ‘Weltanschauung’ evaporates.
A key feature of science is that it self-consciously turns the tables on everyday
understanding, and begins with a logical or mathematical structure which has
to be related to ordinary language through co-ordinative definitions involving
descriptive abstractions. However, in providing denotative significance, the co-
ordinative definitions cannot be perfect, if by perfect is meant logically precise,
in the experiences they specify; they can only, at best, be unambiguous.
Muddled though a scientific theory may be in practice, the conjectural status
of knowledge demands that the claims involved in a theory be made clear so
that it can ‘stand up and be counted’. In terms of the components mentioned
above this requires explication of, in particular, the fundamental model and
co-ordinative definitions.
Switching attention from the structure of theories to their function in scientific
enquiry brings out the primary role of recipes in understanding. After all, the
acceptability of a theory is judged not so much by its aesthetic purity as by the
adequacy of its canonical divisions, associations and predictions of phenomena.
The doctrine of Instrumentalism espouses this hard-nosed attitude by viewing a
scientific theory as a set of rules for:
1. Identifying certain features of experience (which we call ‘experimental
categories’).
2. Inferring one set of experimental categories from another.
Instrumentalism approaches the world phenomenologically, with theories the
instruments for dealing with experience, and knowledge the use of these instru-
ments. In this way, questions concerning the ’reality’ of theoretical terms, or
their translatability into observational terms, become meaningless.
Modern science, with its proliferation of exotic mathematical structures which
do not admit commonplace analogies and its use of involved experimental
techniques, is considerably less amenable than ordinary experience to Naive
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Realism. Couple this with the many unresolved controversies over interpreta-
tion, notably in Quantum Mechanics, then Instrumentalism becomes the default
epistemology for the practically-minded sceptic.
The Instrumentalist view of theories as mere ‘leading principles’ undoubtedly
characterises a substantial part of scientific practice, although deduction from
conjectured universal laws, (together with singular statements), is also widely
used. Both draw attention to the implicit logic of Instrumentalism, namely, that
laws are transformed into rules of inference. To take Nagel’s example, (Na 1
p.67):
“The conclusion that a given piece of wire a is a good electrical
conductor can be derived from the two premises that a is copper
and all copper is a good electrical conductor....However, that same
conclusion can also be obtained from the single premise that a is
copper if we accept as a principle of inference the rule that a statement
of the form ’x is a good electrical conductor’ is derivable from a
statement of the form ‘x is copper’.”
Here the law (universal premise) “all copper is a good electrical conductor” is
replaced by the rule of inference (universal conditional) “For any x, if x is copper,
then x is a good electrical conductor”. This example indicates a principal weak-
ness of Instrumentalism: by reducing theories to lists of rules of identification
and inference the unity of understanding accrued by the hypothetico-deductive
view of theories is not merely confused, it is disavowed. Whilst many specific
scientific claims are Instrumentalist, a theory is the unification of such diverse
claims under an explanatory umbrella of deduction from explicit assertions. By
denying that its rules are conclusions, Instrumentalism can avoid questioning
the validity of these primitive theoretical assertions.
But to espouse Instrumentalism is not just to express oneself circumspectly, it is
also to resurrect the observational-theoretical distinction since the experimental
categories are presumed available to direct observation. If we accept that ob-
servational terms are theory-laden then, as a dogma on the exclusive ’reality’ of
experimental categories, Instrumentalism must be abandoned.
Finally in this Section, a word about the use of analogies in a theory. In Section
1.1 the important role of metaphor in human understanding was viewed as the
recognition of a common logical structure in two or more denotatively disparate
sets of organised descriptive abstractions. It should not be surprising, therefore,
to find that metaphors are used in scientific theories where, being more extensive
and explicit, they can be given the status of ‘analogies’. Analogies vary in preci-
sion from areas of ordinary experience through substantive (‘iconic’) models to
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detailed mathematical structures, and what is being analogised ranges in extent
from parts of the phenomenology through recipes, or particular applications of
a theory, to identifiable subtheories. By associating parts of a novel or complex
or highly abstract theory to more familiar systems of knowledge, analogies be-
came a key component in the development and understanding of the theory,
but their function as heuristic and pedagogical aids should not overshadow the
proper interpretation claimed for the theory. Analogies are allegorical, and as
Erich Heller puts it when distinguishing between symbol and allegory (albeit
referring to denotative significance with undertones of Universals):
“The symbol is what it represents; the allegory represents what, in
itself, it is not.”
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1.4 Intertheoretic Reduction
“Yet the postulate that lies at the root of every scientific enquiry, the act
of faith which has always sustained scientists in their unwearying search
for explanation, consists in the assertion that it must be possible - though
perhaps at the heavy cost of ideas held for long and concepts of proved use-
fulness - to reach a synthetic view uniting all the partial theories suggested
by the various groups of phenomena, and embracing them all despite their
apparent contradictions.”
Louis De Broglie
By intertheoretic reduction, or reduction for short, we mean the doctrine that
one theory (the ‘secondary theory’) can be subsumed under another theory (the
‘primary theory’). To avoid a confusion about reduction present in the literature,
we are here concerned with neither the historical circumstances of reductions
nor, directly, the reasoning patterns actually used in scientific enquiry. Instead,
this Section addresses the requirements which need to be satisfied in order that
one theory or set of theories be considered a special case of another theory.
If, following Section 1.3, we accept that scientific theories are logically or mathe-
matically organised sets of abstractions (descriptive through co-ordinative def-
initions) employed to explain diverse bodies of empirical fact, then the impor-
tance of reduction is evident if we interpret ‘empirical fact’ to be the correlation
of certain experiences through experimental laws and accord to it the status
of a theory. Intertheoretic reduction is thus the natural extension, from a phe-
nomenology to a distinct theory, of this explanatory unification. Since there is no
ground other than the general success of science to suppose that some univer-
sal all-embracing theory lies just beyond the horizon, reduction should not be
viewed as an inevitably true, even self-fulfilling, prophecy. Like any conjecture,
a reduction has to be explicated and subjected to logical and empirical canons
of validity.
It is often argued that in the hierarchical ordering of knowledge, which Reduc-
tionism purports to explain, there are ‘properties’ and ‘objects’ at each level of
organisation in the hierarchy not deducible from the supposedly explanatory
level above. Confining attention to the theories involved rather than invoking
any Essentialism about entities or their attributes, this ‘Gestalt’ view of emergent
features, often called Holism, asserts that certain (sets of) descriptive abstractions
in a secondary theory cannot be identified with or derived from combinations
of terms in the primary theory. However, the arguments for Holism are plagued
by confusion of the meaning of abstractions in the various theories so, although
The Structure of Scientific Theories 26
not rejecting it out of hand, we shall reserve Holism as a default in favour of
considering reduction for theories in the mathematical sciences.
A necessary condition for reduction is that, for the circumstances correspond-
ing to the experimental domain under consideration, the empirically relevant
propositions of the secondary theory may be deduced from the fundamental
model of the primary theory. We call this task the analytic problem of reduction.
What constitutes a ‘deduction’ has to be considered carefully: we take it to be the
proof, in the fundamental model of the primary theory, of a set of propositions,
denoted P(1), which can be identified, through certain criteria, with the empir-
ically relevant propositions, denoted ERP(2), of the secondary theory. That is,
we require a solution, which need not be unique, of the analytic problem of
reduction, to specify:
1. Conditions of Deducibility, denoted CD: the mathematical conditions
given by the theorems which deduce P(1) in the primary theory.
2. Identifications, denoted I: an association between the symbols, and com-
binations of symbols, in ERP(2) and in P(1).
3. Criteria of Identity, denoted C(.,.): a set of criteria for according the propo-
sitions in P(1) equivalence to those identified from ERP(2).
Denoting the fundamental models of the primary and secondary theories by
M(1) and M(2), respectively, the relations between the various quantities may
be illustrated by:
Figure 1.1: The Analytic Problem of Reduction
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The analytic problem of reduction is solved if, for each b ∈ ERP(2) there exists a
∈ P(1) such that C(a, I(b)) are satisfied. For fixed fundamental models M(1) and
M(2), and criteria of identity C, a solution is then the pair (CD, I).
An application of these principles is given in Section 4.2, to which the reader
may turn for an example.
Now suppose a solution of the analytic problem of reduction has been found,
then we propose that the specifications 1), 2), and 3) must satisfy the follow-
ing three requirements, respectively, before the reduction of theories can be
considered acceptable:
1’) Applicability: the conditions of deducibility should include, when
interpreted through the co-ordinative definitions, the circumstances
appropriate to the application of the secondary theory.
2’) Connectability: the identifications should not lead to a contradic-
tion in the meaning - given by co-ordinative definitions - of descrip-
tive abstractions in both theories, under the conditions of deducibil-
ity.
3’) Indistinguishability: the criteria of identity should be consistent
with the experimental resolutions in the domain of applicability of
the secondary theory.
Thus, if a reduction is acceptable, both the primary and secondary theories will
accommodate the empirical facts equally well for the domain of applicability of
the secondary theory. In such a case we call the choice of theoretical explanation
weakly conventional, and the theories weakly conventional alternatives, where
‘weakly’ signifies that one of the theories is primary with respect to the other.
In practice, it is the secondary theory which is usually chosen for explaining its
own domain, since the constraints imposed by the conditions of deducibility
make the primary theory too cumbersome.
In the case where the fundamental models of two theories can be demonstrated
to be equivalent - for trivial criteria of identity - we call the choice of theoretical
explanation strongly conventional. An example of strong conventionality can be
found in the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg pictures of Quantum Mechanics. This
stronger form of Conventionalism does not, as some have thought, relegate all
physical laws to the status of ‘concealed definitions’; rather, it determines which
propositions can be taken, conventionally, as laws or as definitions.
In practice, it is rarely the case that if two or more theories account for the ’facts’
they are, as they stand, demonstrably weakly conventional alternatives. All that
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can be said is that for the domain under consideration - typically an experiment
or class of experiments - the theories are empirically equivalent. However, it may
be possible to formulate a primary theory to which the empirically equivalent
alternatives, restricted to the particular domain, reduce, where either the ‘facts’
already constitute a phenomenology common to the theories, or they can be
acceptably reinterpreted in the primary theory. We are drawing a distinction
here between the ‘domain’ and the ‘facts’; the former refers to the general
ordinary language description of the experimental circumstances, whereas the
latter includes singular empirical statements which may well be expressed in
terminology peculiar to the theory in question.
Even if it is agreed that intertheoretic reduction, as described above, is a worth-
while ambition, its demonstration - if, indeed, it can be demonstrated for a pair
of theories - is a major undertaking. Nevertheless, secondary theories have often
been incorporated into primary theories and given the name ‘subtheories’, so
let us finally introduce some terminology for these in line with the discussion
of reduction. Although, as part of a more extensive body of knowledge, the
meanings of terms are inevitably modified, subtheories usually retain their own
auxiliary symbols, hypotheses, co-ordinative definitions, analogies and recipes,
and remain the principal explanatory tool for their, often well-demarcated, ex-
perimental domains. So suppose that a subtheory is sufficiently autonomous to
be explicated separately - as far as any theory can be - from the full theory, then I
shall call it an approximation if it is rigorously reducible to the full theory, and an
idealisation if it is not. This distinction carries over to the various mathematical
structures, often called ‘models’, conjectured for circumstances covered, in prin-
ciple, by the full theory but apparently too complicated to be amenable to direct
analysis in terms of the fundamental model. In order that the mathematics be
tractable, a model typically suppresses certain features, and ‘idealises’ others,
of the full theory. Whilst it is undoubtedly convenient to accept an idealisation
or model as a subtheory in the fond hope that it is ‘really’ an approximation,
simply calling a lemon a peach does not make it taste sweet. If the ideal of a
unified theoretical explanation, and with it the gain of greater understanding, is
to be preserved, this act of faith must be replaced by an acceptable proof.
Chapter 2
A Theory of Mechanics
The main purpose of this Chapter is to state the theories of Classical and Quan-
tum mechanics. Unfortunately, the two theories are usually formulated in quite
different terms, both conceptually and mathematically. For this reason we de-
vote considerable effort to determining a common foundation of the theories
and, in particular, the extent to which they share the features of a more general
theory of mechanics. Such a programme has been attempted before, but pri-
marily from the point of view of quantum logic. For a recent review see (B & C
1). Although we draw heavily on these results our approach, and subsequent
emphasis, is different. In essence, we adopt the ‘state of a system’ as a primitive
concept in mechanics.
Classical mechanics was based on the notion of a material object in independent
possession of properties which it was the business of theory and experiment
to uncover. Quantum Theory, rising out of the statistical mire of atomic phe-
nomena, changed all that. Very small objects - or their theoretical counterparts
- would not conform to the ‘classical’ principles which governed everyday ob-
jects. The reality-status of theoretical terms, notably the state of a system, became
obscure and contentious causing physicists to sound the retreat from Realism.
Observed results - ‘what we know’ - became the focus of attention and from
this apparently secure footing evolved modern Quantum Theory as a theory
of ‘observables’. Yet the status of observables, especially their relation to ex-
perimental results, is not clear. Observables (or ‘propositions’) we take to be
theoretical quantities which represent measuring devices (or statements about
measurements) with respect to a system. Three considerations motivate our
abandonment of these quantities as primitive concepts:
1. Experiments and measurements are highly involved physical processes
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which are not in general amenable to simple analysis. Notable by their
rarity are specific choices of observable for particular measurements and
systems.
2. The observables that actually are specified do not represent actual instru-
ments but are, instead, kinematic (or space-time) properties - for example,
position, momentum, angular momentum, free particle energy.
3. The ‘observables’ approach does not correspond to scientific practice where
it is invariably the state of a system which is taken to be fundamental.
The third of these is, perhaps, the most important - how, for example, does a
chemist conceive of atoms and molecules if not as objects in particular states?
Our aim, therefore, is to re-establish Realism in mechanics - in the sense of
Conjectural Realism using the state of a system - with observables, and what is
observed, deduced rather than assumed.
Unlike subsequent Chapters, the mathematical development has been placed
with the main text. The format is, as a consequence, somewhat monolithic but
will, we hope, satisfy the more mathematically minded reader.
Note: Since the Chapter was written there has appeared an up-to-date review
of the logic of quantum mechanics by Beltrametti and Cassinelli (B & C 1). In
the terminology of this review we have used a ‘transition-probability space’ and
fulfilled part of the programme they refer to (on p. 241) as
“ ... more a hope than an immediate possibility.”
The review does, however, provide much of our development in Section 2.1
albeit with different terminology. The additional feature of our work which
enables us to utilise Piron’s Theorem (2.47), namely Axiom 4 on the existence of
a ‘closest element’, might provide a key to further research in this area.
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2.1 Systems, Pure States, and Intrinsic Probabilities
A hallmark of the experimental method is its careful selection of particular expe-
riences from the diversity of those available. I shall call any such set of particular
experiences a domain, its theoretical counterpart a system, and all the rest of ex-
perience the environment. Were it the case that domains could not be rationalised
without reference to the environment then scientific explanation would be a tall
order indeed; fortunately, however, some domains, and I shall call these isolated,
may be rationalised irrespective of the condition of the environment, whilst for
many others, which I shall call separated, the environment can be accommodated
by employing only a few auxiliary quantities. Perhaps the most noteworthy fea-
ture of theories of mechanics, and the one responsible for their wide range of
applicability, is their capacity for describing both domains and subdomains as
separated. Not that the notion of a separated domain (or system) is without
difficulties, especially in quantum mechanics; but let us for the moment assume
domains (and systems) to be separated.
The fundamental notion to be elaborated in this Chapter is that of a pure state of
a system - this we take to be a mathematical object which provides a complete
description of the preparation or condition of the system, and we assume such
a description is possible in the theory even if experimentally attainable only as
some form of limit of operations. It is here that we are applying the philosophy
of Conjectural Realism. We are conjecturing that we may think of the existence
of a system’s condition, just as we normally think of the state of an everyday
object such as a chair. Throughout this Chapter a system will be denoted by Σ,
and the set of pure states of Σ by S. Suppose, then, that s ∈ S provides a com-
plete description of a condition of a system. Although in a classical theory there
would be no chance of any different pure state providing the description given
by s, in quantum mechanics there is such a possibility, which may be expressed
by saying that whilst a pure state is a complete description, it need not be an
exclusive description. Accordingly, we introduce an intrinsic probability function
ps associated to each pure state, where ps(s′) is the probability that the descrip-
tion of the system by s can be given by s′ ∈ S. Loosely, a system in the pure
state s has a probability ps(s′) of being in the pure state s′. The word ‘probability’
in these motivating remarks may be cause for some discomfort; justifiably so,
and we shall consider its interpretation - upon which the interpretation of me-
chanics depends - in Section 2.2. In this Section, ‘probability’ should be viewed
mathematically; elucidation, if needed, of any guiding verbal descriptions can
be found in Section 2.2.
Whereas a system is a verbal, and necessarily rather nebulous, notion, pure
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states and intrinsic probability functions can be given contextual meanings:
A pure state is an element of a set S. To each s ∈ S associate a positive function
ps, the intrinsic probability function, on S which satisfies:
2.1 Axiom 1
For each s, s′ ∈ S:
ps(s′) ≤ 1 with equality iff s = s′.
2.2 Axiom 2
ps(s′) = ps′(s) ∀ s, s′ ∈ S.
An immediate consequence of Axiom 1 is:
2.3 Lemma
ps = ps′ ⇔ s = s′ ∀ s, s′ ∈ S.
Proof
⇐ is obvious, so suppose⇒ is false. Then ∃s, s′ ∈ S s.t.:
ps = ps′ ; s = s′.
ps(t) = ps′(t) ∀t ∈ S, so in particular ps(s) = ps′(s), then by Axiom 1 s = s′, which is
a contradiction and proves the Lemma.
Let 2S denote the power set of S, then define:
2.4 Definition
Let T ∈ 2S, then the annihilator set of T is defined as the set:
T⊥ ≡ {r ∈ S | pr(t) = 0 ∀ t ∈ T}.
2.5 Definition
Let T ∈ 2S, then the superposition set of T is defined as the set:
T¯ ≡ {t ∈ S | pt(r) = 0 ∀ r ∈ T⊥} ≡T⊥⊥ .
The next Lemma summarises some simple properties of annihilator and super-
position sets. The usual notation of set theory is employed.
2.6 Lemma
Let T, R ∈ 2S, then:
(i) T⊥ = T
⊥
= T⊥
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(ii) T ⊆ T = T
(iii) T ⊆ R⇒ R⊥ ⊆ T⊥⇔ T¯ ⊆ R¯
(iv) T⊥ ∪ R⊥ ⊆ (T ∩ R)⊥
(v) (T ∪ R)⊥ ⊆ T⊥ ∩ R⊥.
Proof
Note first that the inclusion in (ii) is obvious.
(i) First equality: let x ∈ T⊥ then by Definition 2.4 px(t) = 0 ∀t ∈ T hence px(t) = 0
∀t ∈ T which makes x ∈ T⊥; conversely, let x ∈ T⊥ then by Definition 2.5 px(t) = 0
∀t ∈ T so that x ∈ T⊥. The second equality is trivial.
(ii) Clearly T ⊆ T, so let x ∈ T then px(u) = 0 ∀u ∈ (T)⊥ = T⊥ by (i).
(iii) First implication is obvious, and the second follows from the first using (i).
(iv) Let x ∈ (T⊥ ∪ R⊥) then either px(y) = 0 ∀y ∈ T or px(z) = 0 ∀z ∈ R (or both),
hence px(w) = 0 ∀w ∈ T ∩ R and so x ∈ (T ∩ R)⊥.
(v) Let x ∈ (T ∪ R)⊥ then px(u) = 0 ∀u ∈ T ∪ R so x ∈ T⊥ and x ∈ R⊥ hence
x ∈ T⊥ ∩ R⊥.
2.7 Proposition
(i) T ∩ R ⊆ T ∩ R = T ∩ R
(ii) T ∪ R ⊆ T ∪ R = T ∪ R = T ∪ R
Proof
(i) The inclusion follows immediately from (ii) of Lemma 2.6. From (iv) and (iii)
of Lemma 2.6 we obtain T ∩ R ⊆ (T⊥ ∪ R⊥)⊥, but by (i) and (v) of Lemma 2.6 we
also have (T
⊥ ∪ R⊥)⊥ = (T⊥ ∪ R⊥)⊥ ⊆ T ∩ R. Clearly T ∩ R ⊆ T ∩ R, so (i) of the
Proposition is proved.
(ii) To prove the inclusion notice that T ∪ R = T⊥⊥ ∪ R⊥⊥ ⊆ (T⊥ ∩ R⊥)⊥ by (iv) of
Lemma 2.6. But applying (v) and (ii) of Lemma 2.6 gives (T⊥∩R⊥)⊥ ⊆ (T∪R)⊥⊥.
This proves the inclusion and leaves us to prove only that T ∪ R ⊆ T ∪ R. But
obviously T ∪ R ⊆ T ∪ R, which, with the inclusion gives T ∪ R ⊆ T ∪ R = T ∪ R
by (ii) of Lemma 2.6.
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2.8 Proposition
(i) (T ∪ R)⊥ = T⊥ ∩ R⊥
(ii) (T ∩ R)⊥ = T⊥ ∪ R⊥.
Proof
(i) By (v) of Lemma 2.6 it is sufficient to prove T⊥∩R⊥ ⊆ (T∪R)⊥. Using various
combinations of the foregoing results we obtain:
T⊥ ∩ R⊥ = T⊥ ∩ R⊥ = (T⊥ ∩ R⊥)⊥⊥ ⊆ (T ∪ R)⊥ = (T ∪ R)⊥ = (T ∪ R)⊥.
(ii) ⊆ : (T ∩ R)⊥ = (T⊥⊥ ∩ R⊥⊥)⊥ ⊆ (T⊥ ∪ R⊥)⊥⊥.
⊇ : T⊥ ∪ R⊥ = T⊥ ∪ R⊥ ⊆ (T ∩ R)⊥ = (T ∩ R)⊥.
2.9 Definition
Let T,R ∈ 2S, then T and R will be said to be orthogonal, denoted T⊥R, if:
pt(r) = 0 ∀t ∈ T and ∀r ∈ R.
2.10 Lemma Let T,R ∈ 2S, then the following are equivalent:
(i) T⊥R
(ii) T ∩ R⊥ = T
(iii) T⊥ ∩ R = R
(iv) R ⊆ T⊥
(v) T ⊆ R⊥
(vi) T⊥R.
Proof
All are trivial except for (vi). Clearly if T⊥R then T⊥R, so suppose T⊥R. Using
the other equivalences we get: T⊥R⇔ T ⊆ R⊥ ⇒ R ⊆ T⊥ ⇔ T⊥R⇒ T⊥R.
2.11 Proposition
Let Q,T,R ∈ 2S, then:
(Q⊥T and Q⊥R)⇔ Q⊥(T ∪ R)⇔ Q⊥(T ∪ R).
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Proof
(Q⊥T & Q⊥R) ⇔ (Q ⊆ T⊥ & Q ⊆ R⊥) ⇔ Q ⊆ T⊥ ∩ R⊥ ⇔ Q ⊆ (T ∪ R)⊥ ⇔
Q⊥(T ∪ R)⇔ Q⊥(T ∪ R).
2.12 Definition
Let the empty set, (which is an element of 2S but not of S), be denoted by Ø, then
the annihilator of Ø is defined as:
Ø⊥ = S.
2.13 Proposition
(i) S = S
(ii) S⊥ = Ø = Ø
(iii) Let T ∈ 2S then T ∩ T⊥ = Ø
(iv) Let T ∈ 2S then T ∪ T⊥ = S.
Proof
(i) S = S⊥⊥ = Ø⊥ = S.
(ii) Let x ∈ S⊥, then px(s) = 0 ∀s ∈ S. But by Axiom 1 this means
that x < S, hence that S⊥ = Ø. For the second equality we have
Ø = Ø⊥⊥ = S⊥ = Ø.
(iii) Let x ∈ T ∩ T⊥, then px(t) = 0 ∀t ∈ T, but x ∈ T so x < S hence
T ∩ T⊥ = Ø.
(iv)T ∪ T⊥ = T⊥⊥ ∪ T⊥ = (T⊥ ∩ T)⊥ = Ø⊥ = S.
2.14 Definition
The set of superposition sets is defined as:
LS ≡ {T ∈ 2S | T = T}.
LS is a poset under the ordering relation of set inclusion.
2.15 Definition
Let T,R ∈ 2S, then their join is the subset of S defined as:
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T ∨ R ≡ T ∪ R = T ∪ R.
2.16 Definition
Let T,R ∈ 2S, then their meet is the subset of S defined as:
T ∧ R ≡ T ∩ R = T ∩ R.
2.17 Theorem
(LS,∨,∧,⊥) is an orthocomplemented complete lattice.
Proof
Under the operations ∨ and ∧, LS is clearly a lattice with zero element Ø and
unit element S. It is also complete since the join and meet of an arbitrary family
of elements of the lattice can be defined from their set-theoretic counterparts:
Let I be any index set, then:
∨
i∈I
Ri = ∪
i∈I
Ri and ∧
i∈I
Ri = ∩
i∈I
Ri.
The mapping:
⊥ : LS → LS; R→ R⊥
taking each superposition set to its annihilator set is clearly an automorphism
of LS which is involutive and satisfies:
R ⊆ T⇒ T⊥ ⊆ R⊥; R⊥⊥ = R; R ∩ R⊥ = Ø
and is therefore an orthocomplementation of LS.
2.18 Corollary
Let Q,T,R ∈ 2S, then:
(i) R ∨ (T ∧Q) ⊆ (R ∨ T) ∧ (R ∨Q)
(ii) (R ∧ T) ∨ (R ∧Q) ⊆ R ∧ (T ∨Q).
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Proof
These are well-known properties of any lattice. Proof in our case is easy using
the distributivity of the set operations:
(i) R∨ (T ∧Q) = R ∪ (T ∩Q) = (R ∪ T) ∩ (R ∪Q) ⊆ (R ∪ T)∩ (R ∪Q).
(ii) (R∧T)∨ (R∧Q) = (R ∩ T) ∪ (R ∩Q) = R ∩ (T ∪Q) ⊆ R∩ (T ∪Q).
A lattice of superposition sets is all very well but there is as yet no guarantee that
the pure states are even in LS, nor any explicit justification for distinguishing LS
from other possible collections of subsets of S. To satisfy these criticisms another
condition has to be placed on the intrinsic probability functions.
If, for some s, there exists an s′ , s such that ps(s′) > 0 then there is an obvious
problem interpreting sums of intrinsic probability functions since, for example
ps(s)+ps(s′) > 1. It would seem, then, that the number ps1(s)+ps2(s) for s, s1, s2 ∈ S
cannot be interpreted as the probability that s is in s1 ∪ s2. A similar difficulty
arises in the usual theory of probability for: p∆1(s) + p∆2(s) if ∆2 * S r ∆1 where
∆1,∆2 are measurable, which is overcome by simply requiring ∆2 ⊆ Sr∆1 ≡ ∆c1.
Clearly, the problem arises from the possibility of s1 being s2 and vice-versa, so
it is natural to require s1⊥s2. Thus, for s1⊥s2, we look for a set s1© s2, say, and a
function
ps1©s2 : S→ [0, 1]
expressible in terms of the psi such that:
ps1©s2(s) = 1 iff s ∈ s1© s2 ∈ 2S
where ps1©s2(s) is to be interpreted as the probability that s is in the subset
s1©s2. That such sets exist follows from the following conditions on the intrinsic
probability functions:
2.19 Axiom 3
Each ps can be uniquely extended to a function on 2S satisfying, for R,T,Q ∈ 2S:
R⊥T⇒ ps(R) + ps(T) + ps((R ∪ T)⊥) = 1
and
R ⊆ Q⇒ ps(R) ≤ ps(Q).
From now on I shall assume Axiom 3 is satisfied (in addition to Axioms 1 and
2). Immediately we have:
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2.20 Lemma
For each s ∈ S and R,T ∈ 2S:
(i) ps(Ø) = 0, ps(S) = 1, and 0 ≤ ps(R) ≤ 1
(ii) ps(R) + ps(R⊥) = 1
(iii) ps(R) = ps(R)
(iv) R⊥T⇒ ps(R ∪ T) = ps(R ∨ T) = ps(R) + ps(T).
Proof
(i) By Axiom 3 we have: ps(Ø) ≤ ps(R) ≤ ps(S) ∀R ∈ 2S, so in particular ps(t) ≤
ps(S) ∀t ∈ S, hence ps(S) = 1, which implies ps(Ø) = 1.
(ii) Put T = Ø in Axiom 3 and use (i).
(iii) By (ii): ps(R⊥) + ps(R⊥⊥) = 1, hence ps(R) = ps(R).
(iv) By (ii): ps(R ∪ T) + ps((R ∪ T)⊥) = 1 = ps((R ∪ T)⊥) + ps(R ∨ T) hence result.
(iv) and (iii) are the key results of Lemma 2.20, interpretable as: the probability of
a pure state being in a subset R or a subset T of S, where R and T are orthogonal,
is the same as its probability of being in their join; and the probability of it being
in a subset is the same as the probability of being in the superposition set of the
subset.
2.21 Proposition
Let R,Q ∈ 2S and t ∈ S, then:
(i) pt(R) = 0⇔ t⊥R
(ii) R = {u ∈ S | pu(R) = 1}
(iii) ps(R) = ps(Q) ∀s ∈ S⇔ R = Q.
Proof
(i)⇒ : suppose false, then ∃r ∈ R s.t. pt(r) > 0, but pt(r) ≤ pt(R) = 0, hence R⊥t
which provides a contradiction.
⇐: If t⊥R then R ⊆ t⊥, so pt(R) ≤ pt(t⊥). But pt(t) + pt(t⊥) = 1, so pt(t⊥) = 0 and
hence pt(R) = 0.
(ii) Define R = {u ∈ S | pu(R) = 1}.
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If r ∈ R then 1 = pr(r) ≤ pt(R) = pr(R), so pr(R) = 1 and r ∈ R.
If u ∈ R then pu(R) = 1, hence pu(R⊥) = 0. But then, by (i): u⊥R⊥ so u ⊆ R⊥⊥ = R.
(iii) Obviously R = Q⇒ ps(R) = ps(Q) by Axiom 3. For the other implication let
r ∈ R. Since pr(R) = 1 then pr(Q) = 1 so by (ii) we conclude that r ∈ Q. Similarly
for the proof of Q ⊆ R.
2.22 Corollary
LS is an atomic lattice.
Proof
It is clearly sufficient to show that each s ∈ S is an element of LS, that is, s = s.
But by Proposition 2.21 (ii):
s = {u | pu(s) = 1} = s by Axiom 1.
Stepping aside from the general development for a moment, the next Proposition
gives an interesting condition on the elements of a superposition set:
2.23 Proposition
Let R ∈ 2S then:
R = {u ∈ S | ps(u) ≤ ps(R) ∀s ∈ S}.
Proof
Define R0 ≡ {u | ps(u) ≤ ps(R) ∀s ∈ S}.
If u ∈ R then ps(u) ≤ ps(R) ∀s, so u ∈ R0. Let u ∈ R0 and suppose u < R.
Clearly ∃t ∈ R⊥ s.t. pt(u) > 0 (if there didn’t then u would be in R⊥⊥ = R). But
pt(u) ≤ pt(R) = 0 which is a contradiction and proves the proposition.
2.24 Definition
Let R,T ∈ 2S. If R ⊆ T then their difference is defined as:
T − R ≡ {u ∈ S | ps(u) ≤ ps(T) − ps(R) ∀s ∈ S}.
2.25 Proposition:
For each s ∈ S:
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ps(T − R) = ps(T) − ps(R) = ps(R⊥ ∧ T).
Proof
If R ⊆ T then clearly R⊥T⊥.
Since: ps(R⊥ ∧ T) + ps((R⊥ ∧ T)⊥) = 1 then:
ps(R⊥ ∧ T) = 1 − ps(R ∨ T⊥) = ps(T) − ps(R).
Applying Proposition 2.23 then we conclude that T −R = R⊥ ∧ T, and the result
then follows from Proposition 2.21 (iii).
2.26 Lemma
Let R,T ∈ 2S. If R ⊆ T then:
(i) T = (R⊥ ∧ T) ∨ R
(ii) R = (T⊥ ∨ R) ∧ T.
Proof
(i) Clearly R⊥(R⊥ ∧ T) so:
ps((R⊥ ∧ T) ∨ R) = ps(R⊥ ∧ T) + ps(R) = ps(T)
⇔ T = (R⊥ ∧ T) ∨ R by Proposition 2.21 (iii).
(ii) ps((R ∨ T⊥) ∧ T) = 1 − ps(((R ∨ T⊥) ∧ T)⊥) = 1 − ps((R⊥ ∧ T) ∨ T⊥) clearly
(R⊥ ∧ T)⊥T⊥ hence:
ps((R ∨ T⊥) ∧ T) = 1 − ps(R⊥ ∧ T) − ps(T⊥) = ps(R)
⇔ R = (R ∨ T⊥) ∧ T by Proposition 2.21 (iii).
For R = R and T = T, (i) of Lemma 2.26 is known as weak modularity, whilst (ii) is
sometimes called orthomodularity; the more familiar orthomodularity condition
(which is, as is well known, equivalent to (i) or (ii)) is contained in the following
Proposition, which strengthens Corollary 2.18:
2.26 Proposition
Let Q,R,T ∈ 2S. If Q⊥R and R ⊆ T then:
(Q ∨ R) ∧ T = (Q ∧ T) ∨ R.
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Proof
Call Y = (Q∧T)∨R and Z = (Q∨R)∧T. By Corollary 2.18, we have Y ⊆ Z. Form
Z−Y = Y⊥∧Z. Clearly: Z−Y ⊆ Z ⊆ Q∨R and Z−Y ⊆ Y⊥ = (Q∧T)⊥∧R⊥ ⊆ R⊥,
hence: Z − Y ⊆ (Q ∨ R) ∧ R⊥ = Q by Lemma 2.26 (ii) (since Q ⊆ R⊥). Also:
Z − Y ⊆ Z ⊆ T so Z − Y ⊆ Q ∧ T ⊆ Y. But Z − Y ⊆ Y⊥ so Z − Y = Ø and Z = Y.
Putting this result together with Corollary 2.22 and Theorem 2.17 gives:
2.27 Theorem
LS is a complete orthomodular atomic lattice.
The terminology ‘superposition set’ arises from the next definition:
2.28 Definition
Let R ∈ 2S, then t ∈ S is said to be a superposition of elements of R if:
ps(R) = 0⇒ pt(s) = 0, s ∈ S
2.29 Lemma
Let R ∈ 2S then:
pt(s) = 0 ∀s ∈ R⊥⇔ t ∈ R.
Proof
⇐ is obvious from pt(s) ≤ pt(R⊥) = 0. Suppose⇒ is false, then ∃t < R such that
pt(s) = 0 ∀s ∈ R⊥, but if t < R = (R⊥)⊥ then ∃u ∈ R⊥ such that pt(u) > 0.
Thus we conclude (as was, perhaps, obvious) that any state which is a super-
position of states in R is in R, that is, the set of states of superposition of R is
precisely the superposition set of R.
The ‘Superposition Principle’ familiar from quantum mechanics is of a rather
different nature, and may be formulated as:
2.30 Definition
A subset R of S is said to satisfy:
(a) The Weak Superposition Principle (WSP) if, for some pair of elements
r1, r2 ∈ R there exists a distinct r3 ∈ R such that:
r1 ∨ r2 = r3 ∨ r2 = r1 ∨ r3.
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(b) The Strong Superposition Principle (SSP) if, for every pair of ele-
ments r1, r2 ∈ R there exists a distinct r3 ∈ R such that:
r1 ∨ r2 = r3 ∨ r2 = r1 ∨ r3.
Clearly SSP ⇒ WSP. SSP is rather too strong a condition for the
deduction of useful results from its negation, so I treat WSP first:
2.31 Lemma
Let R,T ∈ 2S with R ⊆ T and R , T, then there exists t ∈ T with t⊥R such that:
t ∨ R ⊆ T.
Proof
Form R⊥ ∧ T; by Lemma 2.26 this must be non-empty (for otherwise T = R), so
choose any t ∈ R⊥ ∧ T to satisfy the Lemma.
2.32 Lemma
Let s1, s2 ∈ S with s1⊥s2. For any t1, t2 ∈ s1 ∨ s2 with t1 , t2 then: t1 ∨ t2 = s1 ∨ s2.
Proof
We first prove that if t1⊥t2 then t1 ∨ t2 = s1 ∨ s2. Clearly t1 ∨ t2 ⊆ s1 ∨ s2. Suppose
not equal, then by Lemma 2.31 ∃t3 such that t3⊥(t1 ∨ t2) and t1 ∨ t2 ∨ t3 ⊆ s1 ∨ s2.
But then:
ps(s1 ∨ s2) ≥ ps(t1) + ps(t2) + ps(t3).
In particular, putting s = s1 and s = s2 and adding them together gives:
2 ≥ pt1(s1) + pt1(s2) + pt2(s1) + pt2(s2) + pt3(s1) + pt3(s2)
But then, since s1⊥s2, the right hand side of the inequality is:
pt1(s1 ∨ s2) + pt2(s1 ∨ s2) + pt3(s1 ∨ s2) = 3
which is a contradiction, hence t3 = Ø and t1⊥t2 ⇒ t1∨ t2 = s1∨s2. Now suppose
t1 6⊥ t2. Then, by Lemma 2.31, ∃t4 s.t. t1⊥t4 and:
t1 ∨ t4 ⊆ t1 ∨ t2 ⊆ s1 ∨ s2
but we have just shown that for such a t4, t1 : t1 ∨ t4 = s1 ∨ s2.
Unfortunately, the converse of Lemma 2.32 does not seem to hold; that is, if
s1 6⊥ s2 then it is not necessarily the case that there exist t1, t2 ∈ s1 ∨ s2 with t1⊥t2
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such that t1 ∨ t2 = s1 ∨ s2. Thus we cannot deduce the ‘size’ of s1 ∨ s2 (we could,
for example, have s1 ∨ s2 = S). Hence the next definition:
2.33 Definition
A set R ∈ 2S will be said to be covered if, for any r1, r2 ∈ R there exist (not
necessarily distinct) r3, r4 ∈ R with r3⊥r4 such that r1 ∨ r2 ⊆ r3 ∨ r4.
2.34 Proposition
Let R ∈ 2S be covered, and let r1, r2 ∈ R with r1 , r2, then:
(i) For any distinct r3, r4 ∈ r1 ∨ r2 : r1 ∨ r2 = r3 ∨ r4
(ii) For any distinct r ∈ r1 ∨ r2 : r ∨ r1 = r ∨ r2 = r1 ∨ r2.
Proof
Immediate from Lemma 2.32 and Definition 2.33.
2.35 Proposition
Let R ∈ 2S be covered, then the following are equivalent:
(i) R does not satisfy the Weak Superposition Principle.
(ii) For any r1, r2 ∈ R : r1 ∨ r2 = r1 ∪ r2.
(iii) For each r ∈ R : pr(r′) = 0 ∀r′ ∈ R r r.
Proof
(ii)⇒ (i) is obvious. The others are proved by contradiction:
(i) ⇒ (ii): Suppose false, then ∃r3 ∈ R s.t. r1 ∪ r2 ∪ r3 ⊆ r1 ∨ r2. But then, by
Proposition 2.34 (ii): r1 ∨ r3 = r2 ∨ r3 = r1 ∨ r2, so WSP is satisfied.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Suppose false, then ∃r1, r2 ∈ R s.t. pr2(r1) > 0, so, by Lemma 2.31,∃t ∈ r1 ∨ r2 with t⊥r1.
(iii)⇒ (ii): Suppose false, then ∃r′′ ∈ R s.t. r ∪ r′ ∪ r′′ ⊆ r ∨ r′, hence by (iii) and
Axiom 3:
ps(r ∨ r′) ≥ ps(r) + ps(r′) + ps(r′′).
But if pr(r′) = 0 ∀r, r′ ∈ R with r , r′, then:
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ps(r ∪ r′) = ps(r) + ps(r′) = ps(r ∨ r′),
hence ps(r′′) = 0 and r′′ = Ø. Note that (ii)⇔ (iii) irrespective of whether R is
covered.
2.36 Theorem
Let R ∈ 2S be covered, then the following are equivalent:
(i) (LR,∨,∧) is a Boolean lattice.
(ii) R does not satisfy the Weak Superposition Principle.
(iii) LR = 2
R.
Proof
(ii) ⇒ (iii): If WSP is not satisfied, then by Proposition 2.35: r1 ∨ r2 = r1 ∪ r2
∀r1, r2 ∈ R which implies and is implied by: LR = 2R with ∨ ≡ ∪ and ∧ ≡ ∩.
(iii)⇒ (i): 2R is obviously Boolean.
(i)⇒ (ii): Suppose false, but then, for distinct r1, r2, r3 ∈ R satisfying r3 ∈ r1 ∨ r2,
the distributive law:
r3 ∧ (r1 ∨ r2) = (r3 ∧ r1) ∨ (r3 ∧ r2)
implies that r3 = Ø.
Noting, from Proposition 2.23, that:
R = {u ∈ S | ps(u) ≤ ps(R) ∀s ∈ S}
we are led to a condition on intrinsic probability functions, holding in both
classical and quantum mechanics, which is sufficient for S to be covered:
2.37 Proposition
If, for each R ∈ LS, s ∈ S, there exists (a not necessarily unique) u ∈ R such that:
ps(u) = ps(R)
then S is covered.
Proof
Suppose false, then for some s1, s2 ∈ S with s1 6⊥ s2 @s3, s4 with s3⊥s4 such that
s1 ∨ s2 ⊆ s3 ∨ s4. But, from:
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ps1(s2) + ps1(s2
⊥) = 1
there exists by hypothesis u ∈ s2⊥ such that:
ps1(s2) + ps1(u) = 1
Hence s1 ∈ s2 ∨ u, so, with s2 ∈ s2 ∨ u we have:
s1 ∨ s2 ⊆ s2 ∨ u
which is a contradiction and proves the Proposition.
As will be shown shortly, the condition in Proposition 2.37 is sufficient for us
to draw far-reaching conclusions about LS if SSP is satisfied. Consequently, we
shall elevate it to an Axiom:
2.38 Axiom 4
For each R ∈ LS and s ∈ S there exists (a not necessarily unique) u ∈ R such that:
ps(u) = ps(R).
Axiom 4 will be assumed to hold for remainder of this Section. Notice that the
uniqueness of our extension of the intrinsic probability functions from S to LS is
now guaranteed since we have by definition that:
ps(R) = max
r∈R
ps(r).
Axiom 4 can be viewed as providing ‘closest elements’, for which reason we
shall term it a ‘completeness condition’. In order to eventually identify the
lattice of superposition sets as a projective geometry, let us now make precise
the notion of ‘size’ alluded to earlier.
2.39 Definition
A partition of R ∈ LS is any set {ri} of mutually orthogonal elements of R such
that:
R = ∨iri.
2.40 Lemma
Let {ri} mi=1 and {ti} ni=1 be any two finite partitions of R ∈ LS, then:
m = n.
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Proof
Construct the array:
pr1(t1) . . . . . . prm(t1)
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
pr1(tn) . . . . . . prm(tn)
then each row and each column sums to 1. Also, the sum of all the summed
rows adds up to n, and the sum of all the summed columns adds up to m. But
these two must be equal, hence m = n.
2.41 Definition
Define the function:
d : LS → Z+ ∪ {∞}
by: d(R) = m where {ri} mi=1 is any finite partition of R.
=∞ otherwise (that is, if no finite partition exists).
If d(R) < ∞ then R will be said to be finite.
It is obvious from this Definition that if R⊥T then d(R ∨ T) = d(R) + d(T), and if
R ⊆ T then d(R) ≤ d(T).
2.42 Lemma
If R ∈ LS be finite, then for any t < R:
d(R ∨ t) = d(R) + 1.
Proof
By Axiom 4 ∃u ∈ R⊥ such that pt(R) + pt(u) = 1. Hence R ∨ t ⊆ R ∨ u and
d(R∨t) ≤ d(R)+1. Since t < R then by Lemma 2.31 ∃v ∈ R⊥ such that R∨v ⊆ R∨t.
Hence d(R) + 1 ≤ d(R + t).
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2.43 Lemma
Let R ∈ LS be finite. Let k ∈ S with k < R. If:
s ∈ R ∨ k
then there exists z ∈ R such that s ∈ z ∨ k.
Proof
Define an orthogonal complement ∗ in (R ∨ k) by:
For Q ∈ (R ∨ k) then Q∗ = (R ∨ k) ∧ (Q⊥).
Notice that if we call d(R ∨ k) = N then d(Q∗) = N − d(Q). If s ∈ R or s = k
the Lemma is trivial, so suppose s < R and s , k. We claim that (k ∨ s) ∧ R is
non-empty. To see this suppose that it is empty. Form: Y = (k∨ s)∗ ; x = R∗, then:
d(Y) = d(R ∨ k) − d(k ∨ s) = N − 2 by Lemma 2.42 and d(x) = 1.
So if Y∗ ∧ x∗ = (Y ∨ x)∗ = Ø, then:
N = d(Y ∨ x) ≤ d(Y) + 1 = N − 1
hence Y∗ ∧ x∗ = Ø.
Let z ∈ (k ∨ s) ∧ R, then by Proposition 2.34: k ∨ z = k ∨ s (since z ∈ R and k < R),
so s ∈ k ∨ z as required.
2.44 Lemma
Let R,T,∈ LS be finite, then for each s ∈ R∨T there exists (not necessarily unique)
r ∈ R and t ∈ T such that:
s ∈ r ∨ t.
Proof
The result obviously holds if R and T are atoms. The general proof will be by
induction. Suppose Lemma 2.44 is satisfied for R0,T0 ∈ LS then it is sufficient to
show that it is also satisfied for R0, (T0 ∨ k) where k < R0 ∨ T0.
Let s ∈ R0 ∨ T0 ∨ k, then by Lemma 2.43 ∃z ∈ R0 ∨ T0 s.t. s ∈ k ∨ z. But, by
hypothesis, z ∈ r ∨ t for some r ∈ R0, t ∈ T0, hence:
s ∈ k ∨ r ∨ t.
Applying Lemma 2.43 again: ∃y ∈ k ∨ t s.t. s ∈ r ∨ y, as required.
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2.45 Proposition
Let R,T,Q ∈ LS be finite with Q ⊆ R, then:
R ∧ (T ∨Q) = (R ∧ T) ∨Q.
Proof
⊇ is trivial; for ⊆ let s ∈ R ∧ (T ∨ Q), then by Lemma 2.44 there exist t ∈ T and
q ∈ Q such that s ∈ t∨ q, so, by Proposition 2.34, either s∨ q = t∨ q or s = q. If the
former, then t∨ q ⊆ R so that t ∈ R, but then t ∈ R∧ T and hence s ∈ (R∧ T)∨Q.
If the latter, then s ∈ (R ∧ T) ∨Q trivially.
Thus the set of all finite superposition sets (and S) constitutes a modular sublattice
of LS. This modularity will be used to prove a well-known representation
theorem, but first a few definitions:
2.46 Definition
Let H be a vector space over a division ring (i.e. a skew field) D. Let θ be
an involutive anti-automorphism of D (i.e. θ2 = 1 and θ(d1 + d2d3) = θ(d1) +
θ(d3)θ(d2). Let 〈·, ·〉 be aD-valued, symmetric (i.e. 〈x1, x2〉 = θ(〈x2, x1〉)), definite
(i.e. 〈x, x〉 = 0 ⇔ x = 0), θ-bilinear (i.e. 〈d1x1, d2x2〉 = θ(d1)〈x1, x2〉d2) form on
H × H. Then the quadruple (H,D, θ, 〈·, ·〉), or, loosely, just H, will be called
Hilbertian if and only if:
H = M0 ⊕M00 for every M ∈ 2H
where: M0 ≡ {x ∈ H | 〈m, x〉 = 0 ∀m ∈M}.
M ∈ 2H will be called 〈·, ·〉-closed if and only if M = M00.
2.47 Theorem (Piron)
Let d(S) ≥ 4, then the following are equivalent:
(i) S satisfies the Strong Superposition Principle.
(ii) There exists a Hilbertian quadruple (H,D, θ, 〈·, ·〉) such that LS is
isomorphic to the lattice of all 〈·, ·〉-closed linear manifolds of H.
Proof
Provided we can show that LS is a complete projective logic (defined on p. 176
of (Va 1)), we can use the proof of Theorem 7.40 of (Va 1) which, it should be
noted, does not depend on H being finite-dimensional. In Lemma 2.57 below we
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show that SSP is equivalent to irreducibility, so, since LS is complete and atomic
by construction, and by Lemma 2.31 and Proposition 2.34 we have that for any
s ∈ S and R ∈ LS with Ø , R , S ∃r ∈ R and t ∈ R⊥ such that s ∈ r ∨ t, then
it remains to verify that if R , Ø is the lattice sum of a finite number of atoms,
then the set: {T ∈ LS | Ø ⊆ T ⊆ R} is a complemented modular lattice. But it is
clearly a sublattice of LS and, by Proposition 2.45, modular. A complement is
T∗ = R ∧ T⊥.
2.48 Remarks
The division ringD is determined up to isomorphism by the distinct elements in
any ‘line’ (i.e. set of the form s1∨s2) of LS, addition and multiplication inD being
defined by means of certain special and general projectivities, respectively, of
the line (see (Va 1) p. 86 for details). The involutive anti-automorphism θ of D
arises directly from the orthocomplementation on LS. Conditions for the vector
space H to be a Hilbert space are provided by:
2.49 Corollary
Let d(S) ≥ 4; let D be one of R (reals), C (complex numbers), Q (quaternions),
and letθ be continuous (which is only a restriction forD = C), then the following
are equivalent:
(i) S satisfies the Strong Superposition Principle.
(ii) LS is isomorphic to the set of all closed linear manifolds of a
Hilbert space overD.
Proof
Use Theorem 2.47 above together with Lemma 7.42 (which proves that H is
complete) of (Va 1).
The final task of this Section is to demonstrate, following Jauch (Ja 1), that a
general S may be decomposed into the union of a collection of superposition
sets each of which satisfies SSP. Noting that if s1∨ s2 satisfies WSP it also satisfies
SSP, we define:
2.50 Definition
Let s1, s2 ∈ S. s1 will be said to be perspective to s2 if s1 ∨ s2 satisfies WSP. Each
s ∈ S is defined to be perspective to itself.
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2.51 Lemma
Perspectivity is an equivalence relation on S.
Proof
Reflexivity is taken care of in the definition, and symmetry is obvious. For
transitivity we need to show that if s1 ∨ s2 and s2 ∨ s3 satisfy WSP then so does
s1 ∨ s3. If s3 ∈ s1 ∨ s2 then the result is trivial, so suppose that s3 < s1 ∨ s2.
By hypothesis there exist distinct t ∈ s1 ∨ s2 and r ∈ s2 ∨ s3. Repeating the
dimensionality argument used in the proof of Lemma 2.43, it is immediate that:
(s1 ∨ s3) ∧ (r ∨ t) , Ø.
In fact d((s1 ∨ s3) ∧ (r ∨ t)) = 1 so the required element to satisfy WSP for s1 ∨ s3
is (s1 ∨ s3) ∧ (r ∨ t).
2.52 Definition
Let R,T ∈ LS. R will be said to be compatible with T, written R↔ T, iff:
(R − (R ∧ T))⊥T.
The centre, ZS, of LS is then defined to be the set:
ZS ≡ {R ∈ LS | R↔ T ∀T ∈ LS}.
The following Lemmas are mostly well-known; we include Proofs for the sake
of completeness.
2.53 Lemma
Let R,T ∈ LS, then the following are equivalent:
(i) R↔ T
(ii) T↔ R
(iii) R↔ T⊥
(iv) R and T generate an orthocomplemented Boolean sublattice of
LS. We also have that:
R ⊆ T⇒ R↔ T, and R ⊆ T⊥ ⇒ R↔ T.
Proof
(i)⇔ (ii): T⊥(R∧ (R∧ T)⊥) & (R∧ T)⊥⊥(R∧ T)⇒ T ∧ (R∧ T)⊥⊥(R∧ (R∧ T)⊥)∨
(R ∧ T)⇔ T ∧ (R ∧ T)⊥⊥R.
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(i)⇔ (iii): Sufficient to prove that R⊥(T⊥∧ (R∧T⊥)⊥): R⊥R⊥ & R∧ (R∧T)⊥⊥T⇒
(R∧(R∧T)⊥)⊥(R⊥∨T), but (R∧T)⊥T⊥, so ((R∧(R∧T)⊥)∨(R∧T))⊥(T⊥∧(R⊥∨T))⇔
R⊥(T⊥ ∧ (R⊥ ∨ T))⇔ R⊥(T⊥ ∧ (R ∧ T⊥)⊥).
(i)⇒ (iv): Form the superposition sets:
R1 = R − (R ∧ T); R2 = R ∧ T; R3 = T − (R ∧ T); R4 = (R ∨ T)⊥. Clearly,
S = R1 ∨ R2 ∨ R3 ∨ R4, and, by (i), Ri⊥R j for i , j. Hence, defining the set:
B(R,T) ≡ {∨
j∈J
R j | ∀J ∈ 2{1,2,3,4}}
we see that B(R,T) is an orthocomplemented sublattice of LS; it is trivial to use
orthogonality to prove that the distributive laws hold in B(R,T), hence B(R,T)
is Boolean, and clearly the smallest such containing R and T.
(iv)⇒ (i): Let B be any Boolean sublattice of LS containing R and T for which ⊥
is an orthocomplementation. Then R − (R ∧ T), T and T⊥ are in B, so:
R − (R ∧ T) = (R − (R ∧ T)) ∧ (T ∨ T⊥)
= ((R − (R ∧ T)) ∧ T) ∨ ((R − (R ∧ T)) ∧ T⊥)
= (R − (R ∧ T)) ∧ T⊥ ⊆ T⊥.
2.54 Corollary
ZS is an orthocomplemented Boolean sublattice of LS.
Proof
Immediate from Lemma 2.53.
2.55 Lemma
Let T ∈ LS. Let {Ri}, i ∈ I for any index set I, be any subset of LS, then T ↔ Ri
∀i ∈ I implies that:
T↔ ∨
i∈I
Ri and T↔ ∧
i∈I
Ri.
Proof
Call R = ∨
i∈I
Ri. By Lemma 2.53 it is sufficient to prove R↔ T. Now
T ∧ Ri ⊆ T ∧ R, so T − (R ∧ T) ⊆ T − (T ∧ Ri) ∀i ∈ I, but then, since T ↔ Ri:
T − (T ∧ R) ⊆ R⊥i ∀i ∈ I, hence: T − (T ∧ R) ⊆ ∧i∈IRi
⊥ = R⊥.
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It is now a simple matter to make the desired decomposition: denote the per-
spectivity equivalence classes of S by Qi, i ∈ I for some index set I, then, by
construction, each Qi satisfies SSP. Moreover, we have:
2.56 Lemma
Let {Qi}i∈I be the perspectivity equivalence classes of S, then:
(i) S = ∨
i∈I
Qi and Qi⊥Q j ∀i, j ∈ I with i , j.
(ii) Each Qi satisfies SSP, and each Qi ∈ ZS.
Proof
(i) Clearly S = ∨
i∈I
Qi since every s ∈ S is in one of the Qi. Suppose Qi 6⊥ Q j for
some i, j where i , j, then there exist r ∈ Qi and t ∈ Q j such that pr(t) > 0.
But then, by Lemma 2.31, r ∨ t satisfies WSP, so r and t are perspective which
contradicts the definition of the Qi as distinct perspectivity equivalence classes.
(ii) Each Qi satisfies SSP by transitivity of perspectivity. To prove that Qi ∈ ZS
we have to show that Qi ↔ T ∀T ∈ LS. Write T = ∨ jT j where T j = T ∧ Q j, then
evidently Qi ↔ T j ∀ j ∈ I (from orthogonality), so by Lemma 2.55: Qi ↔ T.
2.57 Lemma
Let R ∈ LS, then the following are equivalent:
(i) R satisfies SSP.
(ii) ZR = {Ø,R}.
Proof
(i) ⇒ (ii): Suppose false, then ∃Q ∈ ZR, Q , Ø or R. So, in particular, Q ↔ r
∀r ∈ R. But Q↔ r iff either r⊥Q or r ∈ Q (by definition). Pick any t ∈ R−Q, and
form t ∨Q, then we have a contradiction if there exists r ∈ Q ∨ t such that r < Q
and r 6⊥ Q. To find such an element, pick any q ∈ Q and form q ∨ t, then by SSP
∃ distinct r ∈ q ∨ t with r 6⊥ q and r 6⊥ t. Now r < Q since r 6⊥ t, so it remains to
prove that r 6⊥ Q. Suppose that r ⊥ Q, then r ∈ (Q∨ t)−Q, hence ∃u ∈ r∨ t such
that u⊥t, but then u⊥(Q ∨ t) which is a contradiction. Hence r 6⊥ Q and we are
done.
(ii)⇒ (i): Suppose false, then ∃r1, r2 ∈ R such that @ distinct t ∈ r1 ∨ r2. Hence
r1∨r2 = r1∪r2 and r1⊥r2. But if [r1] and [r2] denote the perspectivity equivalence
classes of r1 and r2, respectively, then [r1]∧ [r2] = Ø (since if it did not then r1∨ r2
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would satisfy WSP). But now, by Lemma 2.56 (ii), [r1] and [r2] are in the centre
of R, which is a contradiction.
2.58 Proposition
ZS is an orthocomplemented Boolean atomic sublattice of LS. The atoms of ZS
are precisely the perspectivity equivalence classes in S.
Proof
By Lemma 2.55 and Corollary 2.54 it is clearly sufficient to prove that {Qi}i∈I are
atoms of ZS. Let Q ∈ ZS with Q ⊆ Qi. Since Qi satisfies SSP then, by Lemma
2.57, ZQi = {Ø,Qi}, but Qi ⊆ S ⇒ LQi ⊆ LS (if not, then ∃T ∈ LQi s.t. T r T , Ø,
but x ∈ T⇒ px(y) = 0 ∀y ∈ T⊥ ⇒ px(y) = 0 ∀y ∈ R − T⇒ x ∈ T), so Q = Ø.
2.59 Theorem
S can be uniquely written as the union of mutually orthogonal superposition
sets, {Qi}, where:
(i) Each Qi satisfies SSP.
(ii) The Qi are the atoms of ZS, which is an orthocomplemented
Boolean atomic sublattice of LS.
The Qi are the perspectivity equivalence classes in S.
Proof
From the preceding results; uniqueness follows by our construction of the per-
spectivity equivalence classes.
Remarks
Theorems 2.47 and 2.59 can be combined to yield a powerful representation
result for any theory of mechanics whose pure states satisfy Axioms 1 to 4: if
d(Qi) ≥ 4 ∀i, then LS is associated to a vector bundle over the set of perspectivity
equivalence classes, though the dimensions of, and division rings associated to,
different fibres can, in general, be different.
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2.2 Probability in Mechanics
(a) Interpretation
Interpretations of ‘probability’ are diverse and controversial; however, to an
extent which we will make clear, we consider the choice to be irrelevant; thus
we will outline the chief contenders, leaving the reader to decide which, if
any, he prefers, and concentrate instead upon the status of the various types of
probability that occur in mechanics.
‘Probability’ arises in any theory which involves statistical assertions. We shall
throughout distinguish the probability functions used for describing the con-
dition of a system from the probability statements which assert the results of
measurements associated with the system. We start with the former, of which
there are two types in our theory of mechanics:
1. Intrinsic Probability which expresses the non-exclusiveness of descrip-
tions (pure states) of a system.
2. Avoidable Probability which expresses an incompleteness in the descrip-
tion of a system.
The reason for this terminology is that avoidable probability can be minimised
by a careful state preparation procedure, whereas both give rise to probability
statements for the possible results of a measurement. In classical mechanics the
pure state descriptions are exclusive, so that only avoidable probabilities are non-
trivial; moreover, no distinction between state preparation and measurement
need be made. Despite these simplifications there is still a problem, which we
shall consider later, concerning the interpretation of this avoidable probability
in classical mechanics.
Let us call the mathematical object that describes, even if incompletely, the
preparation or condition of a system the statistical state of the system. A statistical
state will be taken to be some form of ‘probability function’ on the set of pure
states, and every pure state will be identifiable as a statistical process through
the association s ↔ ps. We shall suppose that probability functions in the
fundamental model lead to probability statements of the form:
The probability that the statistical state v gives a value of the ‘observ-
able’ A in the range ∆ ⊆ R is the number Pr(v,A,∆) ∈ [0, 1].
The ‘observable’ A is that mathematical object in the fundamental model which
is taken to represent the measurement procedure, yielding numbers or small
ranges of numbers as results, in the experiment to which the probability state-
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ment implicitly refers. These probability statements are assertions on the out-
come of measurements, based upon the theory of the system, which are to be
compared with the results of one or a sequence of experiments. As such, it is
irrelevant whether the experiments are performed before or after the assertions
signified by the function Pr are made. We shall attribute to these assertions the
same status as the probabilities asserted for results of a game of chance (such as
the throwing of an initially symmetric, but not indestructible, die - for example,
one made of sugar), ‘idealised’ only to the extent of making explicit the set of
conjectures constituting the theory of the game. As an assertive device, a proba-
bility statement is open to empirical comparison with the statistical frequencies
obtained by repetition of the experiment, although its validation or not depends
upon the credence given to some statistical test of this comparison - thus, for
example, if a die yielded a hundred consecutive sixes we could, for this system,
produce a number expressing our confidence in the validity of the usual assump-
tion of randomness in the theory of die throwing. Although the significance of
probability statements as far as assertion is concerned is non-problematic, the
basis of the assertion - the choice of state - receives different emphasis accord-
ing to which of the following two general views of the wider significance of
probability statements is adopted (the terminology is due to Scheibe - see (Sc
1)):
1. Epistemic: the probability statement signifies the amount of knowledge
(or lack of knowledge) about an individual case.
2. Statistical: the probability statement denotes the relative frequencies of
components of a hypothetical infinite ensemble of individual cases.
This divergence of opinion on the significance of probability can be attributed
to the impossibility of strictly verifying or falsifying probability statements by
means of a single or, indeed, any finite number of experiments - which is why
“All Horse Players Die Broke”! Although many intermediate positions may
be held, the epistemic and statistical views can be considered to be aspects of,
respectively, the following two extreme interpretations of probability:
1. Subjective: probability ‘does not exist’; rather, it is invented to accom-
modate uncertainty about some domain of experience, and expresses, in
particular, each person’s knowledge and ignorance concerning an individ-
ual event. A probability statement is then an assertion of a person’s degree
of rational belief.
2. Objective: probabilities ‘exist’ as the limiting relative frequencies of oc-
currence of particular events in a sequence of repeatable experiments, and
are thereby empirically testable; a probability statement is an assertion
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about these relative frequencies in an infinite ‘ensemble’ of individual ex-
periments. (For elaboration of the objective interpretation of probability
see, for example, (Pr 1)).
Recalling that in Chapter 1 we argued that understanding is neither subjective
nor objective, but interactive, it is, perhaps, clear why we may reject both of these
extreme interpretations. In the subjective interpretation, the grounds for ‘ratio-
nal belief’ are suppressed by the expedient of using personal opinion, whilst
in the objective interpretation the theoretical basis of probabilistic assertion is
attributed to a hypothetical but at the same time empirically predetermined en-
semble. But if the grounds for probabilistic assertion are explicated in the form
of a theory about the domain under consideration, the question of subjectivity
or objectivity becomes irrelevant. lt is for just this reason that the practical ap-
plication of probability, especially in quantum mechanics, is unaffected by the
controversy which rages over its ‘meaning’. This should not, however, be taken
as showing that either interpretation is ‘wrong’, logically or otherwise, merely
that they are unnecessary if the theory has been explicated.
Operational arguments concerning the measurement of continuous parameters
may be readily advanced for the necessity of an incomplete specification of the
condition of a system in classical mechanics. This incompleteness appears, for
everyday magnitudes, to be avoidable to any required degree by improving
the precision of the state preparations (measurements) involved. A virtue of
this necessity is made in classical statistical mechanics, where the large number
of degrees of freedom and the limited information available combine to en-
force an incomplete description - although it should be noted that the system,
and its state, no longer refer to a point particle, but to an infinite collection of
point particles. These classical examples have familiar epistemic and statisti-
cal interpretations, and are often taken uncritically as visualisable bases for the
interpretation of probability in quantum mechanics. However, caution should
be exercised: the chief dangers in adopting an interpretation of probability for
quantum mechanics lie, firstly, in the aspiration that it provides ‘reasons’ for the
occurrence of probabilities, and, secondly, in the application of the interpreta-
tion not only to probability statements but also to the statistical and pure states
which give rise to the statements. Failure to recognise these dangers leads to
the unnecessary intrusion of classical analogies into quantum theory, generates
endless confusion about supposed ‘existence’ of various mathematical objects
in the theory - witness the many conflicting discussions of the epistemological
significance of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle - and can obliterate the im-
portant distinction of pure from other statistical states (for discussion of this
point see Section 2.6b).
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(b) Technical Problems
In probability theory one usually starts by specifying a space of alternatives, that
is, a set of possible ‘elementary events’ or ‘distinguishable outcomes’. Note that
the space of alternatives is not necessarily identifiable with the set of possible
results obtained by some measurement; however, the alternatives should be in
some way distinguishable by experimental procedures (even if only in some
limiting sense). In this approach, then, the space of alternatives is a set, denoted
S, of points, each point being an elementary event. S could, for example, be the
set of all intervals of the form (an, an+1] in R, where an+1 - an =  > 0; n ∈ Z, with
a0 = 0, say. In the next Section we shall consider an extension of this simple
notion of a space of alternatives which, by switching the emphasis away from
elementary events to distinguishable outcomes, considers the alternatives to be
a certain collection of subsets of a set; the points of the set need not then be
alternatives. For the moment, however, let me suppose that the ‘distinguishable
outcomes’ are points (atoms) in S.
The technical problems arise in trying to define functions which provide the
probabilities of the various alternatives. The problems are essentially concerned
with finding a suitable extension of the case where S is finite and the ‘probability
functions’ are (finitely) additive in the sense that, for distinct alternatives {ai}Ni=1,
the probability of a1 or a2 or ... aN is the sum of the probabilities of the ai. In
particular, the probability functions should be defined on some domain DS ⊆ 2s,
take values in the interval [0,1], and be at least finitely additive on any finite
partition of S for which the partition sets lie in DS. The obvious choice for this
extension to general S is to define the functions on 2S and require them to be
finitely additive, but this would restrict one to some form of Riemann integral
in subsequent analysis, with its problems of integrability and convergence. An
alternative approach, due to Kolmogorov, is to allow the probability functions
to be countably additive and defined on a σ-algebra, MS say, generated from
sets in S. Although the assumption of countable additivity is difficult to jus-
tify on operational grounds, it has the virtue of making available the abstract
integration methods associated with the Lebesgue theory, and we will accept
it on these, admittedly rather suspect, grounds of mathematical convenience.
Of more concern is the choice of σ-algebra MS. In particular, when S is un-
countable, the choice of MS = 2S yields only a restricted number of countably
additive functions, whereas the choice MS = the σ − algebra generated by the
points of S is, intuitively, too ‘small’. It seems that in order to find a suitable
candidate for MS lying between these two, it is necessary to look beyond the
probabilistic aspects. We leave the reader to decide whether or not he finds the
following argument convincing: suppose there is a topology on S providing a
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criterion for the ‘closeness’ of elementary events, then to specify ‘how many are
how close’ it is desirable for neighbourhoods to be measurable, which is accom-
plished by choosing MS to be the smallest σ-algebra on S containing the open
sets. This choice is obviously convenient mathematically, but where does the
topology come from? In classical mechanics the answer is clear: the topology
is determined by the geometry of space and time (see Chapter 3 for details).
Generalising, we offer the prescription that a topology for the set of values - for
example, real numbers - of random variables can be used to determine MS = DS
by requiring the random variables to be MS-measurable (relative to the σ-algebra
generated by the topology on the set of values).
The above remarks should be borne in mind in the next Sections, where the
theory of probability will be extended, following Mackey (Ma 1) to include
orthocomplemented lattices of elementary events.
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2.3 A Fundamental Model for Mechanics with In-
trinsic Probability
Although an axiomatic formulation of a theory suffers from the drawback of
choosing particular axioms from other sets of equivalent or more or less restric-
tive axioms, it has the virtue of isolating (what the axiomatiser considers to be)
the essential assumptions of the theory. Accordingly, the fundamental model
of mechanics detailed below will provide an axiomatic basis from which it will
be possible to derive familiar formulations of classical and quantum mechanics
as special cases, and in so doing will emphasise the features common to both
theories. Consideration is given in the following two Sections to the additional
assumptions required for classical and quantum mechanics, respectively. With
Section 2.7, where spatio-temporal notions are expressed in terms of mechanics,
the programme of determining the common ground of classical and quantum
mechanics is completed and the way made clear for resolution of their major dif-
ferences. This resolution, in the sense of a well-defined intertheoretic reduction,
is the content of Chapter 4.
(a) Motivation of Definitions
In Section 2.1, a pure state was defined to be a complete description of the
condition or preparation of a system, but what if it is not practical to fully
specify the preparation procedure, or otherwise determine the condition of the
system? Such a circumstance is familiar even from Newtonian mechanics, where
the idealisation that the condition of a system can be described by a finite set of
real numbers is not empirically attainable (this point will be considered in some
detail later on). The basic problem is to describe the condition of the system
in a manner that reflects the experimental limitations of state preparation. By
viewing these limitations as generating uncertainty (or ignorance), resort can
be made to probabilistic notions, and, as in Section 2.2, statistical states are
introduced as a species of probability function on the set of pure states. To make
this more precise, consider first the case where there are a finite number of pure
states, then a function v from S to [0, 1] will be said to be a probability function
if, for any partition {si} of S (see Definition 2), it satisfies:∑
i v(si) = 1 (finite additivity)
Clearly, each such v can be uniquely extended to a function on LS by defining:
v(R) =
∑
i v(ri) for R ∈ LS where {ri} is any partition of R. The use of the
orthomodular lattice structure of LS rather than that of 2S follows from the
selection, by intrinsic probability functions, of superposition sets as those subsets
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of S to which probabilities may be consistently assigned; broadly, therefore, we
are requiring that statistical states are no more discerning than pure states in
their assignment of probabilities to subsets of S. Although we should be wary
of interpretations, the following brief glossary may be useful: pure states are
‘elementary events’; superposition sets are ‘events’ ; v(R) is the probability that
the system described by v is in (or is describable by) a pure state belonging to
the superposition set R. Obviously each pure state can, as its associated intrinsic
probability function, be considered to be a statistical state.
To motivate the general definition, consider first two important special cases:
(i) S is countably partitioned: If every partition of S (and hence of any
superposition set in S) has only a countable number of elements, then
a probability function v is defined to be any function from S into [0, 1]
satisfying:∑
i v(si) = 1
for every partition {si} of S.
(ii) LS is Boolean: This is just the case considered in Section 2.2(b); if S
is uncountable, a probability function v is defined to be any countably
additive function from some fixed σ-algebra Ds, constructed from S,
into [0, 1] and satisfying v(S) = 1.
Thus, for the general case, we are led to propose that some σ-complete ortho-
complemented lattice DS must be constructed from LS. Probability function (or
measure) is then defined to be any function v from DS into [0, 1] such that, for
any countable collection {Ri} of mutually orthogonal sets in DS which satisfies
viRi = S:∑
i v(Ri) = 1 (countable additivity on DS)
In view of the countable additivity demanded for probability functions (and
hence for statistical states), it is appropriate to extend Axiom 2.3 by requiring
the intrinsic probability functions to be defined and countably additive on DS.
Now this may not be possible for an arbitrary DS (for example, if we make the
choice for DS discussed in the next paragraph), and thereby provides a useful
condition for DS to be suitable. In order that the intrinsic probability functions
be at least defined on DS, we shall eventually require DS ⊆ LS; but first, however,
an example where this is not true:
The problem of choosing DS is most notable in classical mechanics, for which
LS = 2S. Considering, for simplicity, the case of S ≈ R2n, a popular candidate for
DS is the quotient algebra of Borel sets in R2n modulo Lebesgue-null sets; let us
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denote this choice by Pop(S). Notice first that Pop(S) * LS, and second that pure
states are not statistical states. The basic idea is that Pop(S) represents the limi-
tation to experimental determination of pure states; indeed, Primas (Pr 1) terms
the associated statistical states epistemic, whilst the ‘inaccessible’ pure states he
calls ontic. There appear to be three criteria for choosing Pop(S); two - the exis-
tence of a natural topology and canonical measure on S - are mathematical, and
the third - the experimental inaccessibility of real numbers - is epistemological.
The mathematical criteria have no obvious counterparts in the general case, but
some appreciation (albeit unsympathetic!) of the epistemological criterion can
be obtained from the notion of a property of a system:
A property of a system may be simply thought of as a labelling of pure states by
numbers. Properties serve primarily two purposes: firstly, that of keeping nu-
merical track of certain features of pure and statistical states, and secondly, that
of a mathematical representation of measuring instruments (in the sense that
these associate numbers to states) - if used for this latter purpose, we shall call a
property an observable. The range of possible results of an experiment for a given
measuring instrument we shall term the set of values of the observable associated
to the instrument. In general, the set of values could be any set equipped with
a suitable structure such that both set and structure are deemed appropriate to
the measuring instrument’s display of results, but let us for simplicity restrict
the possibilities for the set to the real number line or subsets thereof; of more im-
portance is the ‘suitable structure’, and this will be considered below. Although
an observable strictly refers only to a particular measuring instrument in the
particular experiment under consideration, once determined it is available for
use as a bookkeeping device in domains not involving the instrument (provided
the set of pure states is the same). Under these circumstances we will still use
the term ‘observable’, even though as a property its measurement significance
is only a potentiality. Not every property need be an observable, indeed, it is
by no means evident that observables can be found at all. However, we shall so
define properties as to accommodate any ‘reasonable’ measuring instruments,
namely, those instruments which yield, for each statistical or pure state of the
system, probability measures on their respective sets of values. No general pre-
scription will be given for determining particular observables from particular
experimental arrangements - this is a matter either for ad hoc conjecture or for
analysis of the measuring process (see Section 2.6).
To define a property we need to find an appropriate labelling of pure states by
numbers; let us start by supposing that a property P is a function from E(R) into
2S, where the set E(R), constructed fromR, represents the set of values with some
‘suitable structure’. With the interpretation that if s ∈ P(E) then s has the property
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P with a value in E ∈ E(R), then, if s′ is another pure state, s′ has a probability
ps′(P(E)) of having the property P with a value in E. Thus we look for a P such
that ps(P(·)) is a probability measure on R for each pure state s ∈ S. Given that
the probabilistic aspects of the theory are committed to countable additivity, it is
clear that the ‘suitable structure’ of the set of values should include a σ-algebra
in the set of values. The key question, then, is which σ-algebra in R should
we choose? It seems not unreasonable to utilise the topology of R, and this
leads us to consider again the criteria for the ‘popular choice’ of DS in classical
mechanics referred to earlier; if the arguments put forward by proponents of the
popular choice are accepted, the σ-algebra should surely be the quotient algebra
of Lebesgue-Borel sets modulo Lebesgue-null sets. However, this choice would
not only prove an embarrassment for quantum mechanics (where point spectra
are notably useful) but it is also, in our opinion, epistemologically unsound. We
devise instruments to present results as finite strings of digits; the results might
be in a directly numerical, such as binary, form, or in an indirectly numerical
form, such as a graph, from which the numerical quantities can be derived.
The length of the string of digits depends upon the pre-specified degree of
precision, and each measurement may be viewed as a ‘call-and-response’, the
call being a specified precision, and the response the measured result. This
‘call-and-response’ view could, by itself, motivate the inclusion of each interval
and each real number in the set of values, but in fact our choice has already been
determined by the assumption of countable additivity. Each result, being a finite
string of digits, is an interval inRwith rational end-points, so, if the theory is to
include the wide variety of experimentally attainable precision, there are only
two alternatives available for the set of values:
(1) Accept countable additivity; the appropriate σ-algebra is then
that generated by all intervals in R with rational end-points. Hence
it is the σ-algebra of Borel sets in R, denoted B(R) , and includes, in
particular, each real number.
(2) Reject countable additivity; the set of values then simply consists
of all intervals in R with rational end-points.
(The intervals can be taken to be open, half-open or closed depending on one’s
preference. Note that it makes no difference if, in (1) or (2), we replace R by
some open interval in R appropriate to the range of a particular measuring
instrument, since changes of scale lead us back to R).
Naturally, we adopt alternative (1) and, accordingly, reject the ‘popular choice’
for DS in classical mechanics. So, with a clear conscience, we will assume that
DS includes the pure states. Thus, if CS denotes the σ-complete sublattice of LS
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generated by all the points of S, the requirement on DS is:
CS ⊆ DS ⊆ LS
Having chosen the domain of a property to be B(R), consider now its range. In
view of Lemma 2.20, the range should be contained in LS, but since it is desired
that statistical as well as pure states give rise to probability measures, the range
should be contained in DS. Overall, therefore, we look for functions:
P : B(R)→ DS; ∆→ P(∆)
such that pS(P(·)) is a countably additive probability function on B(R) for each
s ∈ S. This now determines the function P completely:
2.60 Proposition
Let each intrinsic probability function be countably additive, then pS(P(·)) is a
countably additive probability function on B(R) for each s ∈ S if and only if:
(i) P(Ø) = Ø and P(R) = S
(ii) For any countable collection {∆i} of mutually disjoint elements of B(R) then:
P(∆i) ⊥ P(∆ j) for i , j, and P(Ui∆i) = viP(∆i).
Proof
⇒ : (i): pS(P(Ø)) = 0, ∀s ∈ S⇔ P(Ø) = Ø
pS(P(R)) = 1, ∀s ∈ S⇔ P(R) = S.
(ii): first prove that if ∆1 ⊆ ∆2 then P(∆1) ⊆ P(∆2): since ps(P(·)) is a probability
measure, then ∆1 ⊆ ∆2 implies that ps(P(∆1)) ≤ ps(P(∆2))∀s ∈ S, so by Proposition
2.23, u ∈ P(∆1) implies that u ∈ P(∆2), which is the required result. Now, since
ps(P(·)) is additive, then for i , j we have:
ps(P(∆i ∪ ∆ j)) = ps(P(∆i)) + ps(P(∆ j))
but, since P(∆i) ⊆ P(∆i ∪ ∆ j) then we also have, by Proposition 2.25:
ps(P(∆i ∪ ∆ j)) = ps(P(∆i)) + ps(P(∆i)⊥ ∧ P(∆i ∪ ∆ j))
hence, by Proposition 2.21 (iii):
P(∆ j) = P(∆i)⊥ ∧ P(∆i ∪ ∆ j)
so that P(∆i) ⊥ P(∆ j).
From the countable additivity of ps(P(·)), we have:
ps(P(∪i∆i)) = ∑i ps(P(∆i))
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but we have just seen that the {P(∆i)} are mutually orthogonal, so from the
countable additivity assumed for each ps we conclude:∑
i ps(P(∆i)) = ps(viP(∆i))
⇐: If P satisfies (i) and (ii) then it is immediate that ps(P(·)) is a probability
measure on B(R).
A function from B(R) to DS which satisfies (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2.60 is said
to be a DS-valued measure on R (for the Borel σ-algebra on R), so we define a
property to be a DS-valued measure on R.
Now for each property P and each statistical state v, the function vP on B(R)
given by:
vP(∆) = v(P(∆))
is clearly a countably additive probability measure on R. vP(∆) may be given
the interpretation of the probability that the system described by v will yield a
value in ∆ of the property P. Notice that each pure state is a statistical state by
the identification v ≡ ps. Since vP is a countably additive measure, we can define
its mean value for any Borel set; if P denotes the set of all properties, andV the
set of all statistical states, then we introduce the expected value functional, E, for
the system as:
E : B(R) × P ×V ×R; (∆,P, v)→ E(∆,P, v)
where: E(∆,P, v) =
∫
∆
xdvP(x) will be called the expected value of the property P
in the state v for the Borel set ∆, and it has the usual probabilistic significance.
We define R = R ∪ {φ} where φ where is a null result assigned whenever the
integral is not defined.
Some properties are obtained by defining, for R ∈ LS:
PR(∆) =

R if {1} ⊆ ∆; and R⊥ if {0} ⊆ ∆
S if {0} ∪ {1} ⊆ ∆
Ø otherwise,
which be loosely interpreted as the property of the system being in a pure state
contained in R. Special cases are the identical property,
∏
= PS, and the pure
state properties, {Ps}s∈S. It does not seem possible, however, to find a property
corresponding to each statistical state.
Finally, some further remarks concerning DS: besides being DS-valued measures,
properties are also σ-homomorphisms of Boolean σ-algebras (see (Va 1) p.12
for definition), from which we conclude that Ran(P) is a Boolean σ-complete
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sublattice of LS for each property P. Now B(R) is the ‘largest’ of all separable
σ-algebras in the sense of the following Proposition:
2.61 Proposition
Let B be any separable Boolean σ-algebra, then there exists a σ-homomorphism,
h, from B(R) to B such that:
B = Ran(h).
Proof
This is the second part of Theorem 1.6 (i) in (Va 1).
2.61 Corollary
Let B be a Boolean σ-complete sublattice of LS, then in order that there exists a
property P such that:
B = Ran(P)
it is necessary and sufficient that B is separable.
Proof
Immediate from Proposition 2.61 and the previous remarks.
From these results it seems not unreasonable to require DS to be separable in the
sense of the following definition:
2.62 Definition
A σ-complete orthocomplemented lattice L will be said to be separable if, for
each Boolean σ-complete sublattice, B, of L there exists a countably generated
Boolean σ-complete sublattice, B′, of L such that B ⊆ B′.
Notice that this generalises to lattices the usual definition for σ-algebras of
separable as countably generated. A stronger type of separability for lattices
is adopted by some authors (see, for example, (Ja 1) or (Va 1)), namely, the
requirement that every Boolean σ-complete sublattice is countably generated;
however, this latter definition has the disadvantage of excluding the usual theory
of classical mechanics, where DS is the σ-algebra of Borel sets in phase space. To
see this, consider B(R): although B(R) is countably generated, the collection of
all sets with countably many elements together with the complements of these
sets is a σ-algebra contained in B(R) which is not, however, countably generated.
(I thank Dr. E. B. Davies for bringing this example to my attention).
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(b) The Fundamental Model
The definitions of Section 2.1 are retained, but in place of Axioms 1 to 4 there is
the following fundamental definition:
2.63 Definition
A set S will be said to be a set of pure states of a system
∑
if, for each s ∈ S,
there exists a positive function ps on S, called the intrinsic probability function of
s, satisfying:
(1) (i) ps(s′) ≤ 1, ∀s′ ∈ S with equality iff s = s′.
(ii) ps(s′) = ps′(s), ∀s′ ∈ S.
(2) ps(R) = maxr∈R ps(r) exists for each R ∈ 2S. (R defined in Definition 2.5).
(3) For any countable collection {Ri} of mutually orthogonal elements of 2S such
that viRi = S then:
∑
i ps(Ri) = 1.
2.64 Remarks
(a) (2) is the extension of ps from the set of all states to the set of all superposi-
tion sets, and can be viewed as providing the ‘closest elements’ to a state in a
superposition set.
(b) (1) and (3) are generalised probability axioms. Note that although we have
required countable additivity over 2S (or, equivalently, over LS), this could be
weakened to hold only over some DS where DS is defined - independently of (3)
- in the next definition.
2.65 Definition
DS is any separable σ-complete orthocomplemented sublattice of LS which con-
tains the points of S.
(By orthocomplemented sublattice we mean one with the inherited orthocomple-
mentation and lattice operations).
Choose DS, then:
2.66 Definition
A statistical state, v, of
∑
is any probability measure on DS; that is, a function:
v : DS → [0, 1]; R→ v(R)
satisfying, for any countable collection {Ri} of mutually orthogonal elements of
DS such that viRi = S:
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i v(Ri) = 1.
The set of all statistical states will be denotedV.
2.67 Remarks
(a) Clearly the set of all statistical states is a convex set.
(b) Each pure state is a statistical state by the identification s ≡ ps.
(c) Two auxiliary conditions, neither of which follow from the above definition,
are desirable on statistical states in order that v(R) may be consistently viewed
as the probability that
∑
is in (or is described by) a pure state in R. These are:
1. v(s) = 1 for some s ∈ S implies that v = ps.
2. For any countable collection {Ti} of elements of DS such that v(Ti) = 1, ∀i,
then:
v(∧iTi) = 1
It will not be necessary to impose these conditions in classical or quantum
mechanics, since, as shown in Sections 2.4 & 2.5, in these cases they are
satisfied for every statistical state of Definition 2.65.
(d) It is an interesting question as to whether or not the set of pure states coincides
with the set of all extreme points of the convex set W. Now if condition (1) of
Remark (c) is satisfied, then it is easy to show that every pure state is extreme,
but to show that every extreme statistical state is pure is harder: it is, however,
true under either of the following conditions:
(i) If DS is Boolean.
(ii) If conditions (1) and (2) of Remark (c) are satisfied and every
Boolean σ-complete sublattice of DS is separable.
(Both proofs are straightforward and use separability, although (ii) also needs
the Axiom of Choice (Hausdorff’s Maximality Principle)). A more general proof,
however, still seems to require extra conditions on either S or DS.
2.68 Definition
A property, P, of
∑
is any DS-valued measure on the σ-algebra, B(R), of Borel
sets in R; that is, a function:
P : B(R)→ DS; ∆→ P(∆)
satisfying, for any countable collection {∆i} of mutually disjoint elements of B(R)
such that ∪i∆i = R:
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1. P(∆i) ⊥ P(∆ j) for i , j
2. viP(∆i) = S.
The set of all properties will be denoted P.
2.69 Definition
The expected value functional, E, of
∑
is the function:
E : B(R) × P ×V→ R; (∆,P, v)→ E(∆,P, v)
where: E(∆,P, v) =
∫
∆
xdvP(x) is called the expected value of the property P in the
state v for the Borel set ∆, and vP is the measure on B(R) given by: vP(∆′) =
v(P(∆′)).
Clearly each vP is a probability measure on B(R), but notice there is no guarantee
that E(∆,P, v) is finite. Following Mackey ((Ma 1) p. 69) the set:
JP = {I | vP(I) = 0, ∀v ∈ V; I an open interval in R}
is open and contains every open set ∆ in R satisfying vP(∆) = 0. The set:
Sp(P) = R r JP, called the spectrum of P, is a closed set, and P is said to be
bounded iff Sp(P) is bounded; it is then obvious that if P is bounded then the
expected value of P is always finite, and similarly if the expected value of P is
indeterminate for some state and Borel set, then P is unbounded.
The following definitions and results are of interest in expressing space-time
geometry in the general theory of mechanics:
2.70 Definition
Let S and T be sets of pure states, then a morphism, α, from S to T is any mapping:
α : S→ T; s→ α(s)
such that:
(1) α is one-to-one and onto.
(2) ps1(s2) = pα(s1)(α(s2)), ∀s1, s2 ∈ S
If S = T then α will be called an automorphism.
2.71 Lemma
Let {Ri} be any collection of elements of LS. If α is a morphism, then:
(i) The inverse, α−1 : T → S, defined by α−1(α(s)) = s, ∀s ∈ S, is a
morphism.
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(ii) ps(R) = pα(s)(α(R))
(iii) α(R) ∈ LS
(iv) α(R⊥) = (α(R))⊥
(v) Ri ⊆ R j ⇔ α(Ri) ⊆ α(R j)
(vi) α(viRi) = viα(Ri) and α(∧iRi) = ∧iα(Ri)
(vii) Ri ↔ R j ⇔ α(Ri)↔ α(R j)
(viii) α preserves perspectivity equivalence classes.
Proof
(i) is trivial since α is a bijection.
(ii): ps(R) =maxr∈R ps(r) =
max
r∈R pα(s)(α(r)) ≤ pα(s)(α(R)) from which the required result
follows.
(iii) By definition of α(R) and from Proposition 2.23 we have:
α(R) = {α(r) ∈ T | ps(r) ≤ ps(R), ∀s ∈ S}
= {u ∈ T | pt(u) ≤ pα−1(t)(R), ∀t ∈ T}
= {u ∈ T | pt(u) ≤ pt(α(R)), ∀t ∈ T} = α(R)
(iv):
(α(R))⊥ = {u ∈ T | pu(v) = 0, ∀v ∈ α(R)}
= {u ∈ T | pα−1(u)(r) = 0, ∀r ∈ R}
= {α(x) ∈ T | px(r) = 0, ∀r ∈ R} = α(R⊥)
(v): From (i) it is obvious that α(α−1(t)) = t from which we conclude that if
Ri ⊆ R j then t ∈ α(Ri)⇒ t ∈ α(R j).
(vi) Now α(Ri) ⊆ α(viRi), ∀i, so, since we are, by (iii), dealing only with super-
position sets, we have: viα(Ri) ⊆ α(viRi) which, with (iv), is clearly sufficient.
(vii) and (viii) are immediate from the other results.
2.72 Remark
As might have been expected, a morphism preserves all the lattice structure
of the superposition sets; however, although it takes a given DS into some
DT, there is no guarantee that it gives a bijection between two pre-specified
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D’s. Consequently, when DS and DT are specified, we shall call a morphism
D-bimeasurable if it provides a bijection between DS and DT.
From Lemma 2.71 it is clear that a morphism not only effects a permutation
of perspectivity classes but also induces an isomorphism between the lattices
of superposition sets associated to each perspectivity equivalence class. De-
noting the perspectivity equivalence classes of S by {Qi}i∈I, where I is an index
set, then provided d(Qi) ≥ 4, ∀i, we have from Theorem 2.47 that each LQi is
isomorphic to the lattice, denoted L(Hi,Di), of 〈·, ·〉-closed linear manifolds of a
Hilbertian vector space Hi. Hence a morphism effects an isomorphism between
the L(Hi,Di).
2.73 Definition
By a semilinear transformation, F, between any two vector spaces H1 and H2 over,
respectively, the division ringsD1 andD2, we shall mean the pair:
(1) An isomorphism: f : D1 → D2; d→ d f
(2) An f-linear isomorphism, F, from H1 to H2; that is, a bijection such that for
any x1, x2 ∈ H1 and d ∈ D1:
F(x1 + dx2) = Fx1 + d f Fx2.
Now let H1 and H2 be Hilbertian, and let F be a semilinear transformation
between H1 and H2, then we define the mapping ξF from L(H1,D1), (the lattice
of 〈·, ·〉-closed linear manifolds of H1), into 2H2 by:
ξF(M) = {F(x) | x ∈M} for each M ∈ L(H1,D1).
The next Proposition relates isomorphisms of lattices of closed linear manifolds
to semilinear transformations of the underlying vector spaces:
2.74 Proposition
Let H1 and H2 be Hilbertian vector spaces of dimension ≥ 3.
(i) If ξ is any isomorphism L(H1,D1) to L(H2,D2) then there exists a semilinear
transformation, F, between H1 and H2 such that:
ξ = ξF.
Moreover, if F′ is another semilinear transformation between H1 and H2, then
the following are equivalent:
(a) ξF = ξF′ .
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(b) There exists 0 , c ∈ D2 such that: d f ′ = cd f c−1, ∀d ∈ D1, and
F′x = cFx, ∀x ∈ H1.
(ii) If F is a semilinear transformation between H1 and H2, then the following are
equivalent:
(a) ξF is an isomorphism from L(H1,D1) to L(H2,D2).
(b) ξF(M0) = (ξF(M))0, ∀M ∈ L(H1,D1).
(c) There exists 0 , k ∈ D2 such that: 〈Fx1,Fx2〉 = 〈x1, x2〉 f k, ∀x1, x2 ∈
H1.
Proof
The proof is based upon results for finite-dimensional, in particular 3-dimensional,
subspaces:
(i) Let V be any finite-dimensional sunspace of H1, then by the “Conversely,
if...” part of Theorem 3.1 of (Va 1) there exists a semilinear transformation F
such that ξ(V) = ξF(V). It is easy to show that F is a bijection and that f is
independent of V. Since ξ is an isomorphism from L(H1,D1) to L(H2,D2), then
for any M ∈ L(H1,D1) we have:
ξ(M) = {ξ(x) | x ∈M} = {ξF(x) | x ∈M} = {F(x) | x ∈M} = ξF(M).
Now let F′ be another semilinear transformation:
(a) ⇒ (b): ξF = ξF′ ⇒ ξF(V) = ξF′(V) for every finite-dimensional subspace V;
hence, by Lemma 3.15 of (Va 1) we have the required result holding for each V,
and it is easy to show that c must be independent of V.
(b)⇒ (a): obvious.
(ii) (a)⇒ (b) is obvious.
(b) ⇒ (a): ξF is, by supposition, a mapping from L(H1,D1) into L(H2,D2); to
see that it is a bijection, note that F is a bijection so that ξF−1 is well-defined
from L(H2,D2) into 2H1 , but then: ξF((ξF−1(P))0) = P0, ∀P ∈ L(H2,D2), so, since
ξF−1(ξF(M)) = M, then: ξF−1(ξF((ξF−1(P))0)) = ξF−1(P0) = (ξF−1(P))0, which makes
ξF−1 a mapping into L(H1,D1), hence ξF is a bijection. We can mimic the proof
of Lemma 2.21 (vi) to show that ξF is a lattice isomorphism by noting that
M ⊆ N⇒ ξF(M) ⊆ ξF(N).
(c)⇒ (b): Mimic the proof of Lemma 2.71 (iv).
(a) ⇒ (c): In particular, ξF is then an isomorphism for any finite-dimensional
subspace V, so the result follows by applying Lemma 4.8 of (Va 1) and noting
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that k must be independent of V.
2.75 Remarks
(a) This is essentially the fundamental theorem of projective geometry.
(b) In (Ja 1) p. 144, Jauch incorrectly omits conditions (b) or (c) in (ii).
(c) If R is a subfield of D, then D is one of R, C, or Q as is well-known. It is
then easy to show (see pp. 168-169 of (Va 1)) that f is continuous (whether or
not the associated Hilbert spaces are separable). The continuous isomorphisms
of these division rings are well-known, (continuity is a restriction only for C),
and allows us to state:
1. D = R: f is the identity and F is linear. (Note: θ can only be the identity).
2. D = C: either f is the identity and F is linear, or f is complex conjugation
and F is conjugate linear. (Note: if θ is continuous, it can only be complex
conjugation).
3. D = Q: f is an inner automorphism and F is linear. (Note: θ can only be
canonical conjugation).
(Proofs of these assertions can be found in (Va 1) pp. 45-49 & 62-65).
Notice also that if D = R, C or Q, then F is a bounded semilinear operator on
the associated Hilbert spaces.
Combining Proposition 2.74 with the remarks preceding it, we obtain:
2.75 Theorem (Wigner)
Let {Qi}i∈I, I a fixed index set, denote the perspectivity equivalence classes of
S. Let d(Qi) ≥ 4, ∀i. For each Qi let Ji denote a fixed isomorphism from Qi to
the Hilbertian vector space Hi associated to Qi by Theorem 2.47. Let α be any
mapping of S into itself, then the following are equivalent:
(i) α is an automorphism.
(ii) There exist:
(a) A permutation, also denoted α, of perspectivity equivalence
classes such that Qα(i) = α(Qi) for each i ∈ I.
(b) For each i ∈ I, a semilinear transformation Fi between Hi and Hα(i)
such that Fi(M0) = (Fi(M))0, ∀M ∈ L(Hi,Di), and Jα(i)◦α ◦ Ji−1 = ξFi .
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2.76 Definition
Let G be a group, then a realisation, α, of G in
∑
is defined to be a mapping:
α : G→ Aut(S); g→ αg
such that: (e is the identity of G):
(i) αe = ids (the identical automorphism of S).
(ii) αg2 ◦ αg1 = αg2 g1 , ∀g1, g2 ∈ G.
A realisation α will be called irreducible if and only if, for R ∈ LS:
αg(R) = R, ∀g ∈ G⇒ R = Ø or S.
If α is an irreducible realisation of G in
∑
, then
∑
will be called an elementary
system with respect to G.
2.77 Remarks
(a) As defined, α is a left action of G on S; right actions may also be defined
similarly, but we shall not need them.
(b) If α is an irreducible realisation, then we conclude from Theorem 2.75 and
Proposition 2.74 that:
(i) α acts transitively on the atoms of ZS.
(ii) All the Hilbertian vector spaces Hi associated with the perspec-
tivity equivalence classes Qi are isomorphic.
(iii) α provides a homomorphism from G into the group of isomor-
phisms ofD.
(c) In Section 2.7 we will describe the elementary systems when G is the Galilei
group; as such, G describes all spatio-temporally distinct observers, and it will
be argued that each associated elementary system:
(i) expresses spatio-temporal notions in mechanical terms by defining
a ‘free particle’ and a set of spatio-temporal (kinematic) properties;
(ii) determines a possible set of pure states of a system which is
interacting with an ‘external field’ or other systems.
(d) Extra conditions will be placed on a realisation if G is a topological or Lie
group; also, if DS , LS, then a realisation will be required to be D-bimeasurable.
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2.78 Definition
A flow, F, on
∑
is any mapping:
F : (a, b)→ Aut(S); τ→ Fτ
where (a, b) is some open interval in R.
For each flow F, we define an associated propagator, F by:
F(τ2, τ1) ≡ Fτ2 ◦ Fτ1−1.
F is thereby a mapping from (a, b) × (a, b) into Aut(S) such that:
F(τ2, τ1) = F(τ2, τ) ◦ F(τ, τ1), ∀τ1, τ2, τ ∈ (a, b).
2.79 Remarks
(a) In taking the flow rather than the propagator to be fundamental we are
implicitly choosing a base time; thus, for a fixed t0 ∈ (a, b) and propagator F we
may define the flow Ft0 by:
Ft0τ ≡ F(τ, t0).
(b) The idea of a flow is that for each s ∈ S the function:
τ→ Fτ(s)
is a one-parameter curve in S which describes the evolution of the pure state
s. Since we shall be viewing this evolution to be a feature of the system which
is independent of any particular observer’s spatio-temporal description, the
parameter τ will be called the proper time of the system.
(c) As defined, the curves arising from a flow need not be in any sense ‘contin-
uous’; extra conditions restricting flows to those that are suitably ‘continuous’
will, however, arise naturally from the structure of S in the special cases of
classical and quantum mechanics.
(d) Any flow on (a, b) may be extended to a flow on R; this will also be possible
when the flows are required to be ‘continuous’.
2.80 Definition
Let F be a flow on a system
∑
. A group G will be said to be a symmetry of the
pair (
∑
,F) iff there exists a realisation α of G on
∑
such that:
(i) α is an injection (that is, α is faithful);
(ii) For each τ ∈ (a, b) we have:
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αg ◦ Fτ = Fτ ◦ αg, ∀g ∈ G.
Although subsystems are of considerable in mechanics, it is somewhat artificial
to deal with them in the general theory, and as they will, anyhow, only be of
interest to us in quantum mechanics, we reserve appropriate definitions and
discussion for Sections 2.5 & 2.6.
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2.4 Classical Mechanics
Suppose that
∑
is an elementary system with respect to some group G, then
from the preceding Sections we have that LS is determined (up to isomorphism)
once we specify:
(i) A Hilbertian quadruple (H,D, θ, 〈·, ·〉), and
(ii) A set S′ (the set of atoms of ZS).
On the other hand, the theory of mechanics on
∑
requires us also to specify the
set DS. It is evident that this latter specification is a problem only if:
(i) H is not countably partitioned, (for example, if H is a non-separable
Hilbert space), and/or
(ii) S′ is uncountable.
In the next Section we shall consider H, but for the present Section we make any
one of the following equivalent assumptions:
(1a) The intrinsic probability functions are all trivial.
(1b) S = S′
(1c) LS = ZS
(1d) LS = 2S
(1e) The Hilbertian vector spaces Hi are all trivial.
(1f) S does not satisfy WSP.
It could be argued that in any non-trivial theory of mechanics there should exist
a ‘free flow’ on
∑
such that the automorphisms {Fτ}τ∈(a,b) are all distinct, from
which it follows that S should be uncountable. Hence we are faced with the
problem of choosing a suitable σ-algebra DS in 2S. For this purpose we make
the assumption:
(2) S is a (smoothly differentiable) manifold.
The obvious candidate for DS is then the Borel σ-algebra generated by the
topology on S. But where does this manifold structure come from? To this
question we have no answer other than that it arises from the manifold structure
of space-time which is imposed upon S by means of a realisation of a group of
(given) space-time transformations. Assumptions (1) and (2) are, however,
insufficient for us to conclude that the resultant Σ is a ‘classical mechanical
system’ in the usual sense; for this we also require that:
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(3) There exists a symplectic structure, (that is, a closed non-degenerate
2-form, ω) on S.
Symplectic structures usually arise in connection with cotangent bundles, but in
the absence of a ‘configuration manifold’ there does not appear to be any simple
justification of assumption (3) which, like (2), will therefore be treated as ad hoc.
With these remarks in mind, let us proceed to the definitions; throughout, ‘C’
will denote ‘classical’ so that, for example, ‘C-system’ should be read as ‘classical
system’.
2.81 Definition
A system
∑
will be called a C-system if and only if the set of pure states of
∑
is
the set of points of a symplectic manifold.
DS is defined to be the σ-algebra, B(S), of Borel sets in S.
Thus, for a C-system, V is the set of all probability measures on S, and the
extreme points of V are thereby just the Dirac measures of mass one on S and
may be identified with the pure states. P is the set of all B(S)-valued measures
on R .
2.82 Proposition
Let
∑
be a C-system. Let A be any function from B(R) into B(S), then the
following are equivalent:
(i) A is a property.
(ii) A = f −1 for some real-valued Borel function f on S.
Proof
(ii)⇒ (i) is easy. For (i)⇒ (ii) the construction of the Borel function f requires
some analysis, and this is provided in the proof of Theorem 1.4 of (Va 1).
Thus, Pmay be identified with the real-valued Borel functions on S.
2.83 Definition
A C-morphism, α, between C-systems
∑
1 and
∑
2 is a symplectomorphism, that
is, a diffeomorphism, α, from S1 to S2 such that:
α∗ω2 = ω1
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(where ω1 and ω2 are the symplectic forms on S1 and S2 respectively).
If S1 = S2 then the group of all symplectomorphisms will be denoted Aut(S1, ω).
Thus the C-morphisms are just the morphisms which preserve the extra (sym-
plectic) structure we have imposed on the pure states of C-systems. Since S is
a manifold it is of particular interest to consider the Lie transformation groups
on S:
2.84 Definition
Let G be a Lie group, and
∑
a C-system. A C-realisation, α, of G in
∑
is any
mapping:
α : G→ Aut(S, ω); g→ αg
such that:
(i) αe = idS.
(ii) αg2 ◦ αg1 = αg2 g1 , ∀g1, g2 ∈ G.
(iii) g→ ag(s) is smooth for each s ∈ S.
If G is a lie group with Lie Algebra =, let:
dα : = → LHV(S); A→ dα(A)
where dα(A)|S = ddt |t=0 αexp(tA)(s) (∈ TsS).
dα defines a representation of = in the Lie algebra of locally Hamiltonian vector
fields on S. It is readily verified that:
[dα(A), dα(B)] = dα([A,B]).
The range of dα is thus the Lie algebra of generators of the transformations on
S given by the realisation α of G. Since the generators are locally Hamiltonian
vector fields, they are each associated locally to a smooth function. To make this
association global, we introduce:
2.85 Definition
A C-realisation, α, of a Lie group G on
∑
will be called strict iff:
Ran(dα) ⊆ HV(S)
where HV(S) denotes the Hamiltonian vector fields on S.
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Denoting the smooth functions on S by C(S), (note: C(S) ⊂ P), then C(S) is a Lie
algebra under the Poisson bracket, {·, ·}, where:
{ f , g} ≡ ω(X f ,Xg)
and each Hamiltonian vector field X f is determined by f ∈ C(S) by:
ω(·,X f ) = d f (·).
Note, however, that each X f only determines f up to an additive constant.
If α is a strict C-realisation of a Lie group G in
∑
, then any linear mapping:
λ : = → C(S); A→ λ(A)
such that:
Xλ(A) = dα(A), ∀A ∈ =
defines a representation of the Lie algebra = of G in HV(S). It is readily verified
that:
X{λ(A),λ(B)} = [Xλ(A),Xλ(B)]
In general, however, λ is not a representation of = in C(S) since:
σ(A,B) ≡ λ([A,B]) − {λ(A), λ(B)}
is not zero, but defines a multiplier on =. It is by analysing the possible linear
mappings of the above type that all the C-elementary systems with respect to
the Galilei group may be determined, where:
2.86 Definition
A C-elementary system of a Lie group G is any C-system
∑
such that there exists
an irreducible strict C-realisation of G in
∑
.
Notice that a C-realisation of a group G is irreducible if and only if the action of
G is transitive on S.
2.87 Definition
A C-flow F, on a C-system
∑
is any mapping:
F : (a, b)→ Aut(S, ω); τ→ Fτ
for which there exists a smooth function:
h : (a, b) × S→ R; (τ, s)→ hτ(s)
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such that: ddt |t=τFt(s) = Xhτ |Fτ(s).
The C-propagator F associated to a C-flow F is defined by:
F(τ2, τ1) = Fτ2 ◦ Fτ1−1
and any function h as above will be said to generate F.
2.88 Remarks
(a) Since first order ordinary differential equations admit local solutions it is
easy to see that a vector field on S determines a local flow; if Uτt denotes this
flow for the vector field Xh, then the condition in Definition 2.87 is equivalent to
the requirement:
d
dt |t=τ(F(t, τ)(s) −Uτt (s)) = 0 for each s ∈ S.
Thus the condition may be viewed as following from an anticipation that any
flow on a C-system will, for small proper times, have similar features to the ‘free
flow’ (see Section 2.7) determined by a realisation of the time translation sub-
group of the Galilei group which, by the preceding remarks, will be generated
by a Hamiltonian vector field.
(b) It is readily verified (for example on p. 562 of (LS 1)) that Definition 2.87 is a
contact structure (in the sense used in (AM 1)), so we may take over the results of
the time-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi theory given in Chapter 5 of (AM 1). Note:
τ→ Fτ(s) is smooth.
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2.5 Quantum Mechanics
This Section considers the special case where ZS is trivial; that is, we make either
of the following equivalent assumptions:
(1a) ZS = {Ø,S}
(1b) S satisfies SSP.
Hence, when d(S) ≥ 4, LS is associated to a Hilbertian quadruple (H,D, θ, 〈·, ·〉).
Quantum mechanics is considerably less ad hoc than classical mechanics in that
it is only necessary to make additional assumptions relating to this quadruple.
We start with the requirement:
(2)D = C
The justification of this choice for the division ring is not, however, clear. On
the one hand, D is constructed from the distinct elements in each line in LS so
it might be possible to show that R is a subfield of D if, for each s ∈ s1 ∨ s2 and
each number x ∈ [0, 1] there exists s′ ∈ s1 ∨ s2 such that ps(s′) = x, (s1 , s2). The
non-uniqueness of such s′ might then determine D completely. On the other
hand, D must possess sufficient structure for LS to admit the automorphisms
required by an irreducible realisation of the Galilei group, (in this connection,
see (Jo 1)), and for a realisation to be non-trivial we would expect D at least to
include R .
Anyhow, given that the complex numbers have been chosen for D, then from
Corollary 2.49 and the remarks following Proposition 2.61 we have that θ must
be complex conjugation, H be a Hilbert space, and 〈·, ·〉be the usual inner product
on H.
The final assumption, which determines DS as LS, but is otherwise unjustified,
is:
(3) H is separable.
Assumptions (1), (2), and (3) now determine the intrinsic probability functions
completely:
2.89 Proposition
Let S be a set of pure states for which the assumptions (1), (2), and (3) above
hold. Suppose d(S) ≥ 4, and fix an isomorphism J, from LS onto L(H,C). Then:
ps(s′) = Tr[PJ(s)PJ(s′)], ∀s, s′ ∈ S
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where PT denotes the orthogonal projection onto T ∈ L(H,C).
Proof
Each ps is, by definition, a probability measure on LS, so, by Gleason’s Theorem,
(Proposition 2.91 below), there exists, for each s ∈ S, a positive operator, Bs say,
with trace one on H such that:
ps(R) = Tr[BsBJ(R)], ∀R ∈ LS
By the spectral theorem, Bs =
∑
n csnpsn for some countable set {csn} of numbers with
csn ≥ 0 and
∑
n msncsn = 1, where the multiplicity msn = dim Ran(Psn), and where
{Psn} is a countable set of mutually orthogonal projections on H with
∑
n Psn =
∏
.
Now, since s < R ⇒ Tr[PJ(R)PJ(s)] < 1, it follows that if J(s) < Ran(Psn) for any
n, then ps(s) <
∑
n msncsn = 1; hence J(s) ∈ Ran(Psn) for some n. But then, from
ps(s′) = 1⇔ s = s′, we can only have Bs = Psn = PJ(s), whence result.
For the definitions which follow, ‘Q’ will always denote ‘Quantum’.
2.90 Definition
A system
∑
will be a called a Q-system if and only if the pure states of
∑
are the
rays of a separable complex Hilbert space.
Thus, for a Q-system, LS is identified with L(H,C), where H is separable. Each
pure state s is a ray, (that is, a one-dimensional manifold), in H; so, if ψs denotes
any unit vector in s, and PR denotes the (orthogonal) projection onto the closed
linear manifold R ∈ LS, we have:
ps(s′) = Tr[PsPs′] = |〈ψs, ψs′〉|2
Our requirements on DS determine that DS = LS for a Q-system. It is possible to
characterise the convex set,V, of statistical states of a Q-system as precisely the
convex set, J+(H)1, of positive trace-class operators of unit trace in H.
2.91 Proposition (Gleason)
Let
∑
be a Q-system, with d(s) ≥ 3, then there exists a unique convex isomor-
phism:
ρ : V→ J+(H)1; v→ ρv
such that: v(R) = Tr[ρvPR], ∀R ∈ LS.
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Proof
See, for example, the article by Jost in (Jo 1).
2.92 Remarks
(a) That the above result also holds forD = R orQ is evident from the proof for
C (see (Va 1) Chapter 7.2).
(b) It is now easy to show (see Proposition 2.18) that for each s ∈ S, where we
denote ρps by ρs, then:
ρs = ps.
Thus, we may identifyVwith J+(H)1; it is clear that the extreme points ofV are
just the intrinsic probability functions, and may therefore be placed in one-to-
one correspondence with the pure states. The following result is well-known
from the spectral theorem:
2.93 Proposition
Let
∑
be a Q-system. Then for each v ∈ V there exists a unique countable set
{cvn} of distinct positive numbers, and a unique countable set {Pvn} of mutually
orthogonal projection operators on H with
∑
n Pvn =
∏
such that:
ρv =
∑
n=1 cvnPvn
(the sum converging in trace norm). Moreover, for each n with cvn > 0, Pvn has a
finite multiplicity, mvn, and
∑
n cvnmvn = 1.
In particular, therefore, we can find, for each v ∈ V, a complete orthonormal set
{ψvn} of vectors in H such that:
ρv =
∑
n cvn|ψvn〉〈ψvn|
although unless the multiplicities are each equal to 1, the cvn need to be repeated.
The set of vectors need not, of course, be unique.
For the properties, P, we can use the spectral theorem to prove the following
characterisation:
2.94 Proposition
Let
∑
be a Q-system. Let P be any function from B(R) into LS, then the following
are equivalent:
(i) P is a property.
Chapter 2: A Theory of Mechanics 84
(ii) P is a projection-valued measure.
(iii) There exists a self-adjoint operator, A, on H such that:
A =
∫
R
xdP(x)
(where the integral is defined in the sense that:
〈ψ,AØ〉 = ∫
R
xd〈ψ,P(x)Ø〉, ∀ψ ∈ H, ∀Ø ∈ D(A)
where D(A) is the domain of A).
Hence P may be identified with the set of all self-adjoint operators on H, and
to each property P we will associate the unique self-adjoint operator A given by
(iii) of Proposition 2.94.
We immediately have the following formula for expected values:
E(∆,P, v) =
∫
∆
xdTr[P(x)ρv]
so, if |P| denotes the property corresponding to the positive operator |AP|, and if
E(R, |P|, v) < ∞, then:
E(R,P, v) = Tr[APρv].
From the remarks following Proposition 2.61 we have that for each automor-
phism, α, of a Q-system there is an operator U on H such that:
α = ξU
and where U is a semilinear transformation of one of the following two types,
(ψ,Ø ∈ H):
(i) Unitary: U(λψ + Ø) = λUψ + UØ and 〈ψ,Ø〉 = 〈Uψ,UØ〉
(ii) Antiunitary: U(λψ + Ø) = λUψ + UØ and 〈ψ,Ø〉 = 〈Uψ,UØ〉.
Moreover, if U′ is any other operator on H such that:
U′ = cU for some c ∈ T = {c ∈ C | |c| = 1}
then we also have α = ξU′ ; and, conversely, if α = ξV for some operator V on H,
then c ∈ T exists such that V = cU. Clearly, if W is any operator on H such that
α2 = ξW, then W must be unitary.
With these remarks in mind, we define:
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2.95 Definition
Let
∑
be a Q-system and G a Borel group, then a Q-realisation, α, of G is any
mapping:
α : G→ Aut(S); g→ αg
such that:
(i) αe = idS
(ii) αg2 ◦ αg1 = αg2 g1 , ∀g1, g2 ∈ G.
(iii) g→ ps(αg(s′)) is (Borel) measurable ∀s, s′ ∈ S.
Recall that a projective representation, U, of a second countable locally compact
group G in a separable complex Hilbert space H is any weakly measurable
mapping:
U : G→ U(H); g→ Ug
into the group U(H) of unitary operators on H. U satisfies
Ug2Ug1 = σ(g2, g1)Ug2 g1
where the multiplier, σ, is some Borel mapping:
σ : G × G→ T.
The multiplier satisfies the cocycle conditions:
(i) σ(g3, g2g1)σ(g2, g1) = σ(g3, g2)σ(g3g2, g1), ∀g1, g2, g3 ∈ G
(ii) σ(g, e) = σ(e, g) = 1 ∀g ∈ G.
2.96 Proposition
Let
∑
be a Q-system, G a connected Lie group, and α any mapping from G into
Aut(S), then the following are equivalent:
(i) α is a Q-realisation.
(ii) There exists a projective representation, U, of G such that:
αg = ξUg ∀g ∈ G.
Proof
(ii)⇒ (i) is trivial. For (i)⇒ (ii) let Fg be any operator on H such that αg = ξFg .
Since G is a connected Lie group, then, for g sufficiently close to the identity,
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there must exist g′ such that g′2 = g and hence that αg = αg′2. Fg is therefore
unitary in the neighbourhood of the identity, and the group property allows us
to conclude this globally. We can now use Corollary 10.2 and Theorem 10.5 of
(Va 2), where it is proved that if G is a second countable locally compact group
then for any mapping F from G into U(H) such that Fg2Fg1 = ω(g2, g1)Fg2 g1 for
some set of numbers ω(g2, g1) ∈ T, and g→ |〈ψ,FgØ〉|2 is Borel ∀ψ,Ø ∈ H, there
exists a projective representation U of G in H satisfying: |〈ψ,UgØ〉|2 = |〈ψ,FgØ〉|2
∀g ∈ G. It is trivial to find such a mapping F for which αg = ξFg ∀g ∈ G, and we
conclude that the projective representation U satisfies αg = ξUg ∀g ∈ G which
proves the Proposition.
By analysing projective representations all the Q-elementary systems with re-
spect to the Galilei group can be determined, where:
2.97 Definition
A Q-elementary system of a Lie group G is any Q-system
∑
together with an
irreducible Q-realisation of G in
∑
.
The multiplier group of R is trivial, so a Q-realisation of R is some weakly
measurable one-parameter group of unitary operators {Ut}. By the theorems
of von Neumann and Stone concerning such groups, we conclude that Ut =
exp(−ith) for some self-adjoint operator h. Since ‘free flows’ will be determined
by the realisations of the time translation subgroup of the Galilei group, we
define:
2.98 Definition
A Q-flow, F, on a Q-system
∑
is any mapping:
F : (a, b)→ U(H); τ→ Fτ
such that, for each τ ∈ (a, b), there exists a self-adjoint operator hτ which satisfies:
d
dt |t=τFt(ψ) = −ihτFτ(ψ) for each ψ ∈ Fτ∗(D(hτ))
The Q-propagator F associated to a Q-flow F is defined by:
F(τ2, τ1) = Fτ2Fτ1
∗
and the set of operators {hτ} associated to F will be said to generate F.
2.99 Remarks
(a) By the differentiation in the above Definition is meant the strong derivative,
so that the condition is:
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lim
t↓τ|| 1t−τ (Ftψ − Fτψ) + ihτFτψ|| = 0 for each ψ ∈ Fτ∗(D(hτ))
which we shall write as:
s − ddt |t=τFt = −ihτFτ.
(b) Denote the unitary group with infinitesimal generator hτ by
Uτt ≡ exp(−i(t − τ)hτ). By Stone’s Theorem we have:
(i) Uτt is strongly continuous
(ii) s − ddt |t=τUτt = −ihτ.
(c) It is a simple matter to use differentiability of Ft to show that:
(i) F(t, s) is jointly strongly continuous with respect to t and s.
From (a) and (b) it is evident that:
(ii) s − ddt |t=τ(F(t, τ) −Uτt ) = 0.
This expression is analogous to that in Remarks 2.88 (a), so we may interpret the
condition in Definition 2.99 as a requirement that any Q-flow will be, for small
properties, similar to a ‘free flow’.
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2.6 The Measurement Process
(a) Experiments
In Section 2.1 a system was taken to be a theoretical representation of a domain
of experience; we will now be more specific about what constitutes a domain.
By an experiment will be meant some procedure, implemented by means of
apparatus (however rudimentary), for analysing a domain. We contend that
associated to any experiment is the following three-fold division of a domain:
(see Figure 2.1):
1. State Preparation: a selection from all available experience by means of
some piece of apparatus.
2. Interaction: a controlled change of the domain selected by (1). Typically,
an interaction involves an auxiliary domain which, combined with the
selected domain, is separable in the sense of Section 2.1; their joint change
we call an evolution.
3. Measurement: an assignment, by means of some further apparatus, of
results, usually expressed in numerical form, to the domain selected by (1)
and evolved under (2).
If both the state preparation and the interaction are trivial, then the experiment
is just an (unanalysed) measurement, so the substance of the claim is that if a
measurement can be analysed, then such a division may be effected. In practice,
the possibility of this division is usually assumed, albeit only tacitly.
State Preparation → Interaction → Measurement → Results
l l l
Selection
Apparatus
Auxiliary
Domain
Measurement
Apparatus
Numerical Numerical Numerical
Controls Controls Controls
Figure 2.1: The Division of a Domain in a Typical Experiment
The state preparation, interaction and measurement are identified by specifica-
tions which usually include numerical controls of the apparatus associated to
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the selection, the auxiliary domain and the measurement, respectively.
We may now construct a theory of mechanics for the domain of an experiment
by making the Co-ordinative Definitions listed in Table 2.1.
Experimental Notion Abstraction In The Fundamental Model
Domain of Experiment System Σ1
Auxiliary Domain System Σ2
Condition of a Domain (Statistical) State of a system
Condition of a Domain for fixed State
Preparation
State, v1, of Σ1
Interaction Automorphism of combined system Σ1 + Σ2
Numerical Control of a Measurement Element, ∆, of set of values B(R)
Measurement Expected Value functional E(∆,P, ·) associated
to an observable ·P of Σ1.
Table 2.1: Co-ordinative Definitions in a Theory of Mechanics
Notes on the Co-ordinative Definitions:
(a) The State Preparation and Interaction are fixed by means of nu-
merical controls associated to their respective apparatuses.
(b) For convenience, we also use the term ‘Interaction’ for the au-
tomorphism associated to an Interaction. This automorphism of
∑1
+
∑2 often (indeed always in the case of external fields - see Sec-
tion 2.7) admits a weakly conventional alternative description as an
automorphism of
∑1 (see below).
(c) Again for convenience, we shall frequently just refer to the observ-
able property P as the abstraction associated to a measurement. The
use of the expected value functional follows from the construction,
based on probabilistic notions, of properties and statistical states (see
Sections 2.2 & 2.3a)).
(d) It is not the case, in general, that the observable P is independent
of the Interaction.
The aims and uses of a theoretical explanation of an experiment are diverse
and depend upon the ‘knowledge’ available. For example, it might provide a
(perhaps previously unnoticed) correlation of results; a prediction of possible re-
sults from knowledge of an interaction, the observable and the prepared states;
an observable determination from known results, interaction and prepared states;
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a probe of the interaction from known results, observable and states; or a state
determination from known results, observable and interaction. Subsuming cor-
relations under predictions, these alternatives are laid out in Table 2.2 below,
where a ‘ ’ denotes that information for the column is known, and a ‘?’ denotes
that information for the column is derived:
Prepared
States
Interaction Observable Results of
Measurement
Prediction
of Results
?
Observable
Determina-
tion
?
Probe of In-
teraction
?
State Deter-
mination
?
Table 2.2: Some Uses for a Theoretical Explanation of an Experiment
It is most important, however, to note that the uses given in Table 2.2 do not,
in general, provide sufficient information for the theoretical quantities, (state,
interaction or observable), to be determined uniquely. In the ideal of arbitrarily
precise results, they are still only determined up to an equivalence relation; all
the elements in the equivalence class are then strongly conventional alternatives
for that experiment. It is also worth remarking that prescriptions, derived
from the theory, for computing these ‘equivalence classes’ are not, in general,
available, although a significant exception is the determination of the interaction
in (the ‘inverse problem’ of) scattering theory.
A further use of a theoretical explanation is to provide a Calibration of the nu-
merical controls associated to the specification of the apparatus. (A Calibration
need not, of course, involve the theory directly; it could be simply a correla-
tion of results with the specifications of the apparatus). Thus, for example, the
set of states calculated by a state determination may be placed in a correspon-
dence with numerical controls associated to the selection apparatus, such as
oven temperatures, slit widths, magnetic fields, or number of children of the
experimenter. Whichever of these controls can be varied without altering the
results may then be ignored.
The remarks of the last two paragraphs lead us to enquire about the source of
the ‘knowledge’ assumed to be available in the ‘ ’s of Table 2.2. How might
one know the prepared states, interactions, or observables? There appear to be
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two basic alternatives:
1. Theoretical Assumptions: certain quantities in the theory are fixed. The
status of the theoretical explanation is then: “If so-and-so is the case,
then such-and-such is the consequence”. In a prediction of results, for
example, the assumptions might be progressively for: parameters of the
system such as mass and electric charge; the various elementary systems
comprising
∑1; explicit forms of the electro-magnetic potentials relating
to the elementary systems; and, finally, everything else bar the results to
be predicted and some simply parameterised family of states of one of the
elementary systems.
2. Evidence from other Experiments: a certain piece of apparatus has, by
a number of other experiments, been demonstrated to be associated to
a particular state preparation, interaction or observable for the same, or
similar, systems. Thus, for example, a photographic plate is found to
detect electrons in a manner comparable to the expected value, ranging
over (macroscopically) small sets of values, of the position observable
(itself provided by the spatio-temporal analysis of elementary systems).
Usually a combination of these alternatives is used, but it is the evidence from
other experiments we wish to pursue, since this evidence not only justifies many
of the theoretical assumptions, but also suggests an analysis of the measurement
process. Before proceeding along this line, note that there may be alternative
theories, (or recipes associated to a theory, or subtheories with varying propor-
tions of theoretical assumptions), available to provide a ‘theoretical explanation’
of an experiment. Supposing that each of these is in accord with the ‘facts’, then,
in the terminology of Chapter 1, they constitute a set of empirically equivalent
theories for the domain under consideration.
In a given experiment, the particular division of the domain into state prepa-
ration, interaction and measurement typically depends upon three factors: the
quantity, or set of quantities, that is of interest in the experiment; the appara-
tus that is available to assist in the enquiry; and how well understood is the
functioning of each piece of apparatus. Experiments are often designed to in-
vestigate an interaction, so, with the division thereby enforced, we are led to
consider the apparatus associated to state preparation and measurement. But
any analysis of the apparatus necessarily invokes auxiliary theories and exper-
iments - for example, components of the apparatus have usually been checked
and calibrated in ‘independent’ experiments involving standard samples, fields
or detectors. It is just this inter-relation of various theories and experiments
which makes Scientific understanding so comprehensive whilst at the same
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time contributing to the ‘measurement problem of quantum theory’. To circum-
vent this apparent dilemma, consider how the selection apparatus, for example,
came to be designed, used, or understood in the first place. It might have
been on the basis of other experiments involving well-understood interactions
and measurements - for example, with the interaction stage set to ‘free flow’,
and with the measurement stage a set of diffraction gratings and photographic
plates. Or, it could be that the selection apparatus started as an experiment
itself, but, once having determined the evolved states, with the measurement
stage subsequently replaced by a ‘filter’ which allows this characterised portion
of the evolved domain to evolve ‘freely’ thereafter. To ascertain the effect, if any,
of the filter, one could either perform further measurements or analyse the filter
as an experiment in its own right. Overall, therefore, we contend that the state
selection and measurement apparatuses can each, in turn, be subdivided into
state preparation, interaction and measurement stages (see Figure 2.2). The first
possibility mentioned above for the state preparation is then the special case
where this subdivision corresponds to another set of experiments and the State
Determination of Table 2.2.
Figure 2.2: The Hierarchy of Experiments
The hierarchy of experiments given by repeated subdivision, or correspondence
with other experiments, is an idealisation since the domains of each experi-
ment will differ somewhat. Consequently, it either terminates rapidly with a
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‘well understood’ experiment which is not further analysed, or else diverges to
include the whole of Physics! Well, the former is at least the hope, although
in practice it seems that one should read ‘unanalysable’ for ‘well-understood’.
For the measurement stage the ‘unanalysable’ terminating step is usually an
irreversible system with a macroscopic manifestation.
Let us at this point make a few remarks concerning experiments on systems
described by classical mechanics:
The chief feature of classical mechanical systems, and a feature which might,
indeed, have been anticipated from the fundamental model, is that their proba-
bilistic aspects arise solely from limited information about the state preparation.
A number of other circumstances then conspire to trivialise the analysis of ex-
periments given above. Most notable of these is that the interactions associated
to each of the state preparation and the measurement apparatus often have a
negligible effect on the state of the system. Typically the auxiliary system for
these interactions involves light rays. In many cases, therefore, filters and irre-
versible measurements are redundant, as is the hierarchy of experiments, since
the possibility of repeated, non-perturbing, ‘measurement/preparations’ allows
values of properties - in particular, the position and its variation with time -
for the state of an individual system to be determined to arbitrary precision
(for everyday magnitudes). Although these values are strictly only intervals
whose points are indistinguishable by everyday standards, it is customary to
describe the system by a pure state. Avoidable probability is non-trivial if we
consider, for example, a beam of particles prepared by firing a blunderbuss, or,
alternatively, repeatedly firing a revolver, towards a collimating device together
with a shutter which is opened for a certain time interval and then closed (both
at fixed times from the firing of the blunderbuss or revolver). From results
concerning the subsequent positions and velocities of the component particles,
and knowledge of the forces - gravitational, Coriolis and so on - acting on the
system, statistical states for the system after preparation could be computed and
used for prediction of results if the experiment were repeated under the same
conditions. In classical mechanics, therefore, statistical states may be viewed as
ensembles of pure states.
(b) Subsystems in Mechanics
Earlier in this Chapter the notion of a ‘domain’ was introduced as a distinguish-
able set of experiences. Much of our understanding can be viewed in terms
of the identification, and characterisation under various circumstances, of such
domains. This approach is clearly evident in our compartmentalisation of the
everyday material world. Thinking, in particular, of man-made objects another
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feature is notable, namely the hierarchical structure of the compartmentalisation
so that, for example, we talk of a car, the various ‘systems’ within it, and the
working components within these systems.
Given that domains and subdomains are recognised, the theoretical task is to
analyse the corresponding systems and subsystems. Here are a number of points
to bear in mind concerning subsystems:
1. There are basically two types of subsystem: those in which the subsystem
is analysed
(a) as a separated system (the rest of the system being an ‘envi-
ronment’)
(b) in conjunction with other subsystems as part of the overall
system.
2. Subsystems can arise in
(a) Breaking down a system
(b) Building up a system.
3. The identification of and benefit accrued from analysis using a subsys-
tem will generally depend upon the condition of the system. Different
subsystems may be appropriate to different conditions of the system.
4. A fundamental model may be directly applicable to more than one level
in the subsystem hierarchy.
5. As a measure of the diversity of subsystems, consider some examples
from Chemistry: there are fundamental particles (nuclei, electrons and,
sometimes, photons), atoms, molecules, functional groups of atoms in
molecules, liquids; molecules in various environments (e.g. lattice, po-
lar solvent, non-polar solvent, gaseous), macromolecules, liquid crystals,
liquids, various crystal lattices, metals and so on. Theoretical chemists
generally model systems as ‘small perturbations’ of subsystems. The
identification of the relevant subsystems rarely results from mathematical
introspection, mathematics being notably insensitive to orders of magni-
tude, rather it rests on an appeal to some visualisable classical analogue.
For example, consider the mathematically similar cases of the helium atom
and the hydrogen molecule-ion which are analysed on the basis of classical
analogues for heavy nuclei orbited by light electrons (this example is from
Primas in (Pr 1)).
The relations between systems and subsystems will be needed to describe state
Chapter 2: A Theory of Mechanics 95
preparations, interactions and measurements. Throughout, the emphasis will
be on Quantum Mechanics, though we start by considering the general theory
of mechanics.
Recall that the pure states of a system were taken to be the elements of a set
S with an intrinsic probability structure. The general theory of subsystems
is complicated by the need to identity, for given component subsystems, the
intrinsic probability structure relating different subsystems. We have the basic,
but insubstantial definition:
2.100 Definition
Let
∑
1 and
∑
2 be systems, then the composite system, denoted by
∑
=
∑
1 ×∑
2 has a set of pure states, denoted S = S1 ⊗ S2, generated by the intrinsic
probability structure from the Cartesian product of the state spaces S1 and S2 of
the component subsystems
∑
1 and
∑
2.
Where does this definition come from, and what does ‘generated by’ mean?
Given an intrinsic probability structure relating S1 and S2, the state space of the
composite system must be consistent with the lattice description of the super-
position sets, which requires the pure states to be the atoms in a lattice which
contains LS1 × LS2 . Complicated though this may appear, Theorem 2.59 allows
us to break up the general case into composition of systems for classical and
quantum mechanics. The important point is that the pure states of a composite
system need not be just the elements of the Cartesian product of the pure states
of the component subsystems.
There are a number of important results which hold in both Classical and Quan-
tum Mechanics which cannot be conveniently proved in the general theory, so
for the moment we pass to Classical Mechanics.
In Classical Mechanics a pure state in the composite system determines, and is
determined by, pure states of the component system:
2.101 Definition
Let
∑
1 and
∑
2 be C-systems, then the composite system has a pure state space:
S = S1 × S2
that is, the Cartesian product of the state spaces S1 and S2.
For statistical states the relevant spaces are the Banach spaces M(Si) of real
(signed) Borel measures on the Borel spaces Si, with the states being elements
of M1(Si)+, that is, the measures of mass one on the cone M(Si)+ of positive
measures.
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If ρ ∈ V (S1×S2) ≡M1 (S1×S2)+ then the ‘partial state’ of ρ in the system Σ1, say,
is naturally defined as the restriction of the measure to S1 which may be written
as:
(PT1(ρ))(R) = ρ(R × S2), ∀R ∈ DS1
Note that PTi is an affine map from V (S1 × S2) onto V(S1) which will be called
the partial trace.
If ρ1 ∈ V(S1) and ρ2 ∈ V(S2) then, as is well known, there is a unique measure,
denoted ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 such that:
ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 (R × T) = ρ1(R) ⊗ ρ2(T), ∀R ∈ DS1 , T ∈ DS2
Notice, however, that this does not imply that there is a unique statistical state
for the composite system such that its partial states are ρ1 and ρ2. As will be
proved in Proposition 2.109 this non-uniqueness follows from convexity and is
by no means peculiar to Quantum Mechanics. In the sense that various states
of the composite system have the same partial states this feature allows for
‘correlations’ of the states of the subsystems.
Let α be an automorphism of S, then its ‘restriction’ to Si determines an auto-
morphism αi, where (i = 1, 2):
αi : Si → Si; si → αi(s1, s2) = (α(s1, s2))i
If F is a C-flow on
∑
, then the reduced dynamics on
∑
i is simply the restriction of
automorphisms Ft to Si. It should be noted that whilst the reduced dynamics is
a C-flow, it will generally be generated by a time-dependent Hamiltonian even
though the full dynamics could be generated by a time-independent Hamilto-
nian.
For C-systems with symmetry, reduction of the state space is often possible,
allowing ‘separation’ of motions. However, the ‘subsystems’ do not necessarily
correspond to different material entities but rather to symmetry aspects of the
motion. For further details, consult (AM 1) p. 298.
For Quantum Mechanics the relation between a system and its subsystems is
more subtle. No longer is it the case that the set of pure states of the composite
system is given by the Cartesian product of the pure states of the component
subsystems. Indeed, the most remarkable feature of Quantum Mechanics is
that:
A complete description of the composite system does not entail a
complete description of each component subsystem.
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It is important to be clear that it is this, and not some woolly notion of the ‘whole
being greater than the sum of its parts’, which distinguishes Quantum from
Classical subsystems. Results to support these contentions will be provided after
we have elaborated the mathematical side of the Quantum theory of subsystems.
Suppose
∑
1 and
∑
2 are two Q-systems with associated Hilbert spaces H1 and H2,
and lattices of superposition sets L1 and L2. let LS be the lattice of the composite
system. By Theorem 2.59 the centre is either trivial, in which case the Strong
Superposition principle holds throughout S, or non-trivial. Considering the
second possibility first, it is easy to see (cf. (Va 1) Section 8.2) that LS is the direct
union L1 × L2. This case is often described by saying that a superselection rule
operates between S1 and S2. Whether superselection rules need to be invoked
depends on one’s viewpoint. For example, the Bargmann ‘mass superselection
rule’, referring to the inequivalent projective representations of the Galilei group
(See Section 2.7), can be considered a Superselection rule if we view all non-
relativistic (non-zero mass) particles as different states of the same particle.
On the other hand, it can also be considered a criterion for different particles.
Supposing now that the centre is trivial, then we look for a Hilbert space H such
that L1 × L2 ⊆ LH. The smallest such candidate is the Hilbert space generated by
the algebraic tensor products {ψ⊗φ}, ψ ∈ H1, φ ∈ H2, which is the tensor product
of the Hilbert spaces. Note, however, that application of the Pauli principle can
restrict the lattice LS of superposition sets of the composite system to sublattices
of LH with appropriate symmetry under permutations. We do not, however,
pursue this case here. Thus we are led to:
2.102 Definition
Let
∑
1 and
∑
2 be Q-systems, then the composite system has a state space
representable by the rays of the Hilbert space
H = H1 ⊗ H2
where H1 and H2 are the Hilbert spaces representing the state spaces S1 and S2.
Recalling that the statistical states of a Q-system are representable by the convex
set J1(H)+ of positive trace-class operators with trace one, we are led to the partial
state of ρ in the system
∑
1, say, as PT1(ρ) = TrH2[ρ]. Notice that this definition
follows from the abstract definition:
(PT1(ρ))(R) = ρ(R ⊗H2)
where ρ is the probability measure on the lattice of superposition sets of S, and
R is any superposition set in H1.
As a basis for treating the relationship between states of systems and subsystems
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in Quantum Mechanics it is useful to review tensor products and partial traces
in some detail.
We assume the reader is familiar with the construction of the tensor product
H1 ⊗H2 of two Hilbert spaces, H1 and H2, as the completed space of (conjugate)
bilinear functionals on H1 × H2, where Riesz’ Theorem guarantees uniqueness.
There are no unexpected difficulties in defining tensor products of densely
defined operators on H1 ⊗H2.
Recalling L(H) = J(H)∗, the Partial Trace may be defined as:
2.103 Definition
Let {Hi} be Hilbert spaces, (i = 1, ...,N), then the Partial Trace PTi is an affine
contraction
PTi: J(⊗ jH j)→ J(Hi)
determined by the condition:
Tr[
∏⊗.... ⊗∏⊗A ⊗∏⊗... ⊗∏ρ] = Tr[A PTi(ρ)]
for all A ∈ L(Hi), ρ ∈ J(⊗iHi).
By means of the isometries between H1 ⊗H2 and HS(H2∗,H1) we may view any
Φ ∈ H1 ⊗H2 as a Hilbert-Schmidt operator from H2∗ to H1 or, alternatively, as a
conjugate linear map from H2 to H1 for which we have the inner product
〈Φ,Ψ〉 = TrH1[Φ‡Ψ]
where, if θ1 ∈ H1, θ2 ∈ H2, the ‘conjugate adjoint’ is defined by:
〈θ1,Φθ2〉 = 〈θ2,Φ‡θ1〉
Note that if Φ = φ1 ⊗ φ2, then
Φ(θ2) = 〈θ2, φ2〉φ1
Φ‡(θ1) = 〈θ1, φ1〉φ2
This is Jauch’s approach in (Ja 1) and leads to:
2.104 Proposition
Let Φ ∈ H1 ⊗H2, then:
PT1(|Φ〉〈Φ|) = ΦΦ‡
PT2(|Φ〉〈Φ|) = Φ‡Φ
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Proof
See (Ja 1) p. 181 (note: the calculation is much tricker if HS(H2∗,H1) is used).
We can now use this result to obtain from (Ja 1), the normal form of the partial
states of a pure state Φ ∈ H1 ⊗H2:
2.105 Proposition:
Let Φ ∈ H1 ⊗ H2, then there exist orthonormal systems {φ1n}, {φ2m} in H1 and H2
respectively, and positive numbers {ar}with ∑r ar = 1 such that:
Φ =
∑
r
√
arφ1r ⊗ φ2r
and (i = 1, 2):
PTi(|Φ〉〈Φ|) = ∑r ar|φir〉〈φir|
Proof
See Jauch (Ja 1) p. 182. An immediate Corollary is:
2.106 Corollary (‘Schro¨dinger’s Non-invariance Theorem’)
Let Φ ∈ H1 ⊗ H2, and let {ψn} be any orthonormal system in H1. Define the
normalised vectors {θm} in H2 by:
Φ =
∑
n cnψn ⊗ θn
then the following are equivalent:
(i) {θn} is an orthonormal set.
(ii) {ψn} and {|cn|2} solve the eigenvalue problem:
ΦΦ‡ψ = λψ
2.107 Remarks
The above Corollary was considered important for two reasons, both depending
upon von Neumann’s theory of measurement for their significance:
1. Suppose ψr was held to be the state of
∑
1 (corresponding to H1) then, if Φ
was known to be the state of
∑
1 ×
∑
2 (corresponding to H1 ⊗H2), the state
of
∑
2 after ‘measuring’ ψr would be θr. Thus, if {ψr}were the eigenvectors
of an ‘observable’ A, say (as would be the case in von Neumann’s theory),
θr would determine which observables could be ‘measured’ in conjunction
with
∑
2.
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2. The uniqueness of the decomposition of Φ evidently depends upon the
|cn|2 coefficients, and so, therefore, does the set of ‘compatible observables’
in
∑
2. Thus, if the |cn|2 are all different, the {ψr} and {θr} are uniquely
determined, whereas at the other extreme if all the |cn|2 are the same then
the {ψr} and {θr}may be chosen freely.
We now aim to make precise the difference in status of subsystems between
Classical and Quantum Mechanics. As a summary of the position so far we
have:
2.108 Proposition
Let
∑
=
∑
1 ×
∑
2 be a composite C- or Q-system, then:
(a) The statistical state spaces are convex sets whose extreme points
are the pure states.
(b) The Partial Traces are affine and onto
(c) Ifρ1 ∈ V(S1) andρ2 ∈ V(S2) then there exists a uniqueρ ∈ V(S1⊗S2),
denoted ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 such that:
ρ1 ⊗ ρ2(R ⊗ T) = ρ1(R)ρ2(T), ∀R ∈ DS1 , T ∈ DS2
where ‘R ⊗ T’ denotes the Cartesian product and tensor product of
superposition sets for C- and Q-systems, respectively.
Proof
(a) is treated in Remarks 2.67 (see also sections 2.4 and 2.5).
(b) is readily demonstrated from the definitions of Partial Trace above.
(c) for C-systems is a well-known measure-theoretic result. For Q-systems the
result is almost trivial since it amounts to:
〈φ, ρ1 ⊗ ρ2φ〉 = 〈φ, ρφ〉, ∀φ ∈ H⇔ ρ = ρ1 ⊗ ρ2
which is evidently true.
The following Proposition summarises the relation between uniqueness of the
composite state and purity of the states involved:
2.109 Proposition
Let
∑
=
∑
1 ×
∑
2 be a composite C- or Q-system. Let ρ1 ∈ V(S1) and ρ2 ∈ V(S2).
(a) The following are equivalent:
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(i) There exists a unique ρ ∈ V such that PTi(ρ) = ρi, i = 1, 2
(ii) ρ1 or ρ2 is pure.
(b) If ρ1 and ρ2 are both pure then there exists a unique ρ ∈ V(S) such
that PTi(ρ) = ρi and ρ is pure.
Proof
(a) (i) ⇒ (ii). Suppose false, then both ρ1 and ρ2 are non-extreme and we can
find 0 < c < 1 and statistical states µi, λi i = 1, 2 such that:
ρi = cµi + (1 − c)λi.
Then not only does PTi(ρ1 ⊗ρ2) = ρi but (by definition of ⊗ in Proposition 2.108)
convexity allows also:
PTi(cµ1 ⊗ µ2 + (1 − c)λ1 ⊗ λ2) = ρi
which contradicts the hypothesis.
(ii)⇒ (i). The proof for C-systems, which can probably be extended to Q-systems
(although we shall use a different approach), employs the identity:
R × S2 = R × (T ∪ T⊥) = (R × T) ∪ (R × T⊥).
We suppose that (ii) ⇒ (i) is false. Hence there exists ρ′ , ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 such that
PTi(ρ′) = ρi. It follows that there exist Borel sets R ∈ DS1 and T ∈ DS2 such that
ρ′(R × T) , ρ1 ⊗ ρ2(R × T).
But if ρ2, say, is pure then there exists q ∈ S2 such that ρ2 = δq, the Dirac measure
at q. Whence:
ρ1 ⊗ ρ2(R × T) = ρ1 ⊗ ρ2(R × S) =
- ρ1(R) if q ∈ T.
- 0 otherwise (i.e. if q ∈ T⊥).
Hence, if q ∈ T⊥ then 0 < ρ′(R × T) ≤ ρ′(S1 × T) = ρ2(T) = 0; if q ∈ T then using
the identity above we obtain
0 < ρ′(R × T⊥) ≤ ρ′(S1 × T⊥) = ρ2(T⊥) = 0.
Either way there is a contradiction. (Note that the strict inequalities follow from
the assumption ρ′(R × T) , ρ1 ⊗ ρ2(R × T)).
For Q-systems it is simplest to use Proposition 2.105: let ρ be any state such that
PTi(ρ) = ρi, i = 1, 2. Then ρ can be written as:
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ρ =
∑
n cn|Φn〉〈Φn|
However, using Proposition 2.105 on each |Φn〉〈Φn| and letting ρ2, say, be pure
and equal to |α〉〈α|, then there exist ψn ∈ H1 such that Φn = ψn ⊗ α whence
ρ = (
∑
n cn|ψn〉〈ψn|) ⊗ |α〉〈α|
which determines ρ uniquely.
(b) All we need to show here is that ρ is pure. This follows from convexity of
the state spaces and the fact that PTi is affine.
2.110 Remarks
(1) We have proved that correlations are possible in both C- and Q-systems
and, moreover, found necessary and sufficient conditions that the state of the
composite system be uniquely determined by the states of the component sub-
systems.
(2) Part (b) shows that a complete description (≡ pure state) of the component
subsystems entails a complete description of the composite system contrary to
what seems to be claimed by some authors.
(3) We shall shortly consider how knowledge of the state of one of the component
subsystems and the state of the composite system allows us to infer the state
of the other component subsystem. The mathematics will be trivial, but the
claim of knowledge of the state of the component subsystem will be seen to be
the source of all the confusion surrounding the EPR ‘paradox’ and the ‘holistic’
nature of quantum theory.
It remains to delineate the difference between C- and Q-mechanics in their treat-
ment of subsystems. The two theories differ on the ‘heredity’ of the completeness
of a description of a system. Thus, whilst it is true for both theories that if the
states of the component subsystems are pure then the state of the composite
system is also pure, the converse implication fails, in general, for Quantum
Mechanics. Precisely, we have
2.111 Proposition
Let
∑
=
∑
1 ⊗
∑
2 be a composite C- or Q-system.
(i) If ρ1 and ρ2 are pure states of the component systems then the state ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 of
the composite system is:
(a) Pure
(b) The only state, ρ, such that PTi(ρ) = ρi, i = 1, 2
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(ii) If ρ is any pure state of the composite system, then PTi(ρ) will always be
pure states only if
∑
is a C-system.
Proof
(i): follows from Proposition 2.109.
(ii): that it is true for C-systems follows from consideration of Dirac measures. To
find a counterexample for Quantum Mechanics we need only choose ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|
with Ψ = ψ1 ⊗ φ1 + ψ2 ⊗ φ2 and apply Proposition 2.105.
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2.7 Geometry and Mechanics
Having set up the theories of mechanics as abstract state geometries, we now
turn to the incorporation of space-time geometry into these theories. The results
are well-known so this Section will be merely a brief review for the sake of
completeness.
We start with space-time itself. Space and time we view as parameters used in
an individual’s description of the world. As show by Levy-Leblond (LL 1) the
structure of space-time is determined up to a constant by the following three
hypotheses:
1. Space and time are homogeneous in any reference frame.
2. Space and time are isotropic in any reference frame.
3. Reference frames are related by a group structure.
Broadly speaking, the first two express the assumption of a Euclidean reference
frame by any observer, whilst the last requires that observers can talk consis-
tently to one another. If causality is also demanded, the case where the constant
is negative is excluded. This leaves only two types of structure - space-time
either supports Galilean transformations (when the constant is zero) or Lorentz
transformations (when it is positive). The constant can, if we wish, be identified
as the (reciprocal of the) speed of light.
That we can make such hypotheses - is space-time real? - is allowed provided
that we adopt a conventionalist view of geometry. For a discussion of special and
General Relativity in these terms see, for example, (Ro 1).
We have thus arrived at a relativity group acting on space-time. Our aim is to
express this space-time structure in the theory of mechanics. The first step is to
look for representations of the relativity group in the state spaces, in particular,
to find elementary systems (Definitions 2.86 and 2.97) in classical and quantum
mechanics. This programme has already been carried out - for a review of the
Galilean case from a ‘geometric quantisation’ standpoint see Bez (Be 1).
Suppose then that we have a state space S and an irreducible representation
V of a relativity group G defined in space-time X. So what? Well, we can
use this information to determine properties with a space-time interpretation,
namely, the configuration and momentum kinematic properties associated with
the state space. To see what this entails consider two space-time frames linked
by a relativity group transformation. Adopting the ‘passive’ view of (objective)
space-time and states, let ∆ be a portion of space-time as viewed from the first
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frame, with g(∆) the same portion of space-time but as viewed from the second
frame. Similarly, the description s of the state in the first frame is, in the second
frame, given by V(g)s. For a property, P, to be a configuration kinematic property
we require that it be defined on space-time, X, and give rise to expected values
independent of frame; that is, we require covariance:
Pg(∆)(V(g)s) = P∆(s),
or, equivalently:
Pg(∆)(s) = P∆ (V(g−1)s).
This defines what is known in group theory as a system of imprimitivity. For
transitive group actions, such as we have here, the quantum (Hilbert space)
systems of imprimitivity are fully characterised - see, for example, Chapter IX
of (Va 2).
The group structure allows us to go further and identify momentum kinematic
properties as the generators of one-parameter subgroups (symmetries).
At this stage we abandon our development to merely summarise the key points
from a very extensive literature on the subject:
1. An elementary system has all the features of a free particle, in particular, a
‘rest-mass’ parameter.
2. Configuration kinematic properties are, in the Galilean quantum case, the
familiar position operators and time parameter. Embarrassingly, position
does not appear so conveniently in the Lorentz case (see, for example, (Va
2) p. 236).
3. Momentum kinematic properties in the quantum case are familiar opera-
tors such as:
• linear momentum (generating space translations)
• angular momentum (generating space rotations)
• free Hamiltonian (generating time translations).
It should be noted that though these properties may be, and are, used
to describe particles evolving under general flows, their significance rests
with the free (‘straight-line’) particle. Under the conventionalist view of
geometry alluded to above, dynamics can be thought of as a theory of
deviations from straight-line (free particle) motion.
4. Projective (ray) representations are involved in both classical and quantum
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mechanics (cf. the discussions after Definition 2.85 and 2.96 above). As
Levy-Leblond demonstrated (LL 2) this leads to intrinsic spin appearing
for classical and quantum elementary systems.
5. By imposing a limited Galilean ‘covariance’ condition on particles under-
going general flows, the one-particle Hamiltonian, h, is constrained to be
of the form:
h = 12m (p − A)2 + V
where A and V commute with position. See, for example, (Va 1) p.206.
However, the status of this limited covariance condition is unclear and
does not seem to be applicable to the much more demanding Lorentz case.
Chapter 3
Approximation and Localisation
The previous two Chapters laid out fundamental principles for the theories of
classical and quantum mechanics. We now turn to more everyday concerns of
the physicist and chemist - the use of approximations. With the fundamental
models usually too intractable to provide a working basis for applications, useful
results are mostly obtained through various levels of idealisation. For example,
Griffith ((Gr 1) Section 5.6), in discussing the Hamiltonian for atoms in an
external magnetic field, makes the following assumptions (pp 128-130):
1. “We now discuss an atom in a constant external magnetic field...”
2. “We neglect small effects, such as nuclear hyperfine structure...”
3. “Neglecting th?se latter...” (i.e. magnetic interactions between the orbital
and spin magnetic moments of pairs of electrons)
4. “The last term of (5.50) is quite negligible compared with the other terms
depending on H, the ratio between them being about 2.5 × 10−5n−2 for an
electron in an n` orbital of hydrogen.”
5. “The second [diamagnetic] term is very small and for atoms not in S states
is quite negligible compared with the paramagnetic part.”
6. “In weak fields we regard H1 as a perturbation small (energies of the order
of 1 cm−1) compared with the separation between levels of a term...”
7. “In deriving (5.56) we have neglected the matrix elements of LZ between
states of different J. In other words we have supposed those matrix ele-
ments small compared with the multiplet splitting between levels. This
condition is satisfied in practice for most atoms even for macroscopically
strong magnetic fields.”
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It is little wonder that mathematicians, faced with such a sequence of unproved
assertions, prefer to ruminate on more fundamental matters! A common thread
does, however, run through the successive idealisations of the Hamiltonian
made by Griffith. It is the principle that for the states of interest to the physicist
certain parts of the full Hamiltonian are, in an unspecified sense, negligible.
Moreover, these states are somehow related to the low-energy localised states
of a corresponding ‘unperturbed’ system. For instance, though few physicists
would quibble with the idealisation of a ‘constant’ external magnetic field, this
confidence is not based on any mathematical proof but rather on a ‘physical’
view that the spatial localisation of wave functions around an atom is several
orders of magnitude lower than fluctuations in the external magnetic field.
The key question motivating this Chapter is: Can we justify the ‘physical’ view?
This will lead us to a new approach to analysing the idealisations in quantum
mechanics which are based on classical analogues.
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3.1 The Physical Perspective
(1) The Divergence of Mathematics from Physics
It is often said that physics is becoming more mathematical. Certainly theories
are nowadays couched in more abstract language and numerical methods play
an increasing role both in analysing experimental results and in pursuing specific
consequences of a formalism. Yet despite this apparent communality of purpose
we shall argue that mathematics and physics are uneasy bedfellows, paying each
other lipservice as they pursue their separate ends.
A pervasive feature of mathematical physics is modelling - the formulation of a
‘physical’ theory, problem or circumstance in terms of a well-defined symbolic
(contextual) structure, its model. Whether it be a fundamental investigation,
such as that into the existence of quantum field theories, or a specific problem,
say the spatial decay of an eigenfunction, the method is a four-fold process:
1. Select the physics of interest.
2. Abstract the physics into a model.
3. Derive results within the model.
4. Apply these results back to the physics.
But what of the unity, the hypothetico-deductive umbrella, required of a sci-
entific theory in Chapter 1? To conform to a grand scheme, particular models
should evidently be special cases of some fundamental model. This is met in
practice by the choice of mathematical structure in which the model sits. How-
ever, indiscriminate application of a conventionally accepted mathematics may
ignore the full conditions of the ‘physics of interest’ so that the model reflects not
the problem in hand but rather some other, mathematically more convenient,
problem.
Consider, for example, the electronic spectrum of a hydrogen atom in an external
magnetic or electric field. The popular model for this physics, to be found in
any introductory text on quantum mechanics, is the finite-dimensional spectral
theory of the Hamiltonian operator for an electron in a Coulomb potential in a
constant magnetic or electric field. Harmless enough, perhaps, until we reflect
that a different problem has been modelled, namely the properties of a charged
particle in a Coulomb potential in a constant field over all space and time. It is
unclear why this should be relevant to the physics of interest, especially when
more sophisticated spectral theory for the electric field embarrassingly reveals
a continuous rather than a discrete spectrum. The model using simple spectral
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theory ‘works’, but we’re not sure why.
From the example it seems reasonable to propose that a model should either
reflect the conditions of the physics or demonstrably ‘coincide’ with the funda-
mental model for the physics of interest. Either way, we would expect physics
to look to mathematics for expression of its conditions.
For our example, the implicit conditions of physics include:
(a) The electromagnetic field is of sufficiently large wavelength to
be taken as spatially constant over the electronic states of the atom
(‘electric dipole transitions’).
(b1) Electronic states (wave functions) are sufficiently localised for
variations in the external electric or magnetic field to be ignored.
(b2) The external electric or magnetic field is of small magnitude
relative to the Coulomb potential around the nucleus.
Whereas one might have expected conditions (a) and (b) to find expression
within one mathematical structure, what happens in practice is rather different.
These conditions - as ‘approximations’ - generate reformulations of the problem
in different mathematical terms.
In our example the rationale appears to be along the lines:
1. Condition (a) contributes to the demonstration (see, e.g. (Gr 1) p. 49) that
provided the timescale of the interaction is short compared to the ‘natural
lifetime’ (whatever this is!) of the ground state, then the electromagnetic
field induces transitions between states with maximum probability when
these states are (certain) eigenfunctions of the original Hamiltonian.
Conclusion: To analyse the electromagnetic spectrum of an atom or
molecule, use the mathematical spectrum of the relevant unperturbed
Hamiltonian.
2. Condition (b1) facilitates modification of the Hamiltonian by a simple
extra term for which the external field is a constant. The spectrum of this
modified Hamiltonian can, using condition (b2), be analysed by applying
the perturbation theory of operators in a finite-dimensional vector space.
Conclusion: The relevant mathematical structure is a finite-dimensional
vector space based on low-energy eigenstates of the original Hamiltonian.
Proofs to support this kind of reasoning are notable by their absence. Physicists,
to whom such assumptions are many and frequent, treat mathematics as their
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tool not master and dismiss the use of different models with that sleight of
hand known as ‘physical’ reasoning. Nor do mathematicians have much to
offer, pursuing consequences within a model rather than derivations of one
model from another, in essence because mathematicians view empirical results
as numerical values not physical magnitudes.
(2) Physical Approximation and the Use of Limits
A scientific theory eventually makes contact with the empirical world through
measurement of events. The central feature of this contact is the “acceptable
error” within which theory explains the facts. Thus the confirmation of a theory
does not rest on a coincidence of real numbers but on agreement of predictions
within ranges of error (or intervals of imprecision). It seems reasonable, there-
fore, to propose that for a given acceptable error two theories “agree” provided
their predictions are within this error. In the terminology of Chapter 1 such
theories are weakly equivalent.
In more detail, let Pred(T)|D denote the predicted magnitude of a physical event,
D, according to a theory T, then:
3.1 Definition (Criterion for Physical Approximation):
Two theories T1 and T2 will be said to be weakly equivalent for the event D
subject to an acceptable error  if and only if:
|Pred(T1)|D - Pred(T2)|D | < .
This is a pointwise or “eventwise” approximation of one theory or model by
another, but can be readily extended to a set of events or circumstances by
requiring uniform equivalence (over the set with respect to ).
With this background, what techniques do mathematicians bring to bear on
approximations? The typical mathematical approach employs the notion of a
limit. This is a powerful but demanding requirement whereby a family of objects
can satisfy, in an ordered way, any request for closeness. As a simple example,
a one-parameter family {pλ} of points in a metric space converges to a point, p,
in the space provided:
For each  > 0, ∃λ() such that:
d(pλ, p) < , ∀λ ≤ λ().
With the usual metric topology of the real numbers this leads to the disturbing:
3.2 Lemma (formal): A limit is neither necessary nor sufficient to satisfy our
criterion for physical approximation (3.1).
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Proof:
Non-necessity: assume two predictions satisfy the criterion (3.1 above), then
clearly we do not need to require → 0 as some λ→ 0.
Non-sufficiency: suppose a limit exists for some parameterisation, λ. Ask
for coincidence within , then although we know a suitable λ() exists we do
not know which one, that is, we don’t know the actual events or conditions or
circumstances under which the physical approximation holds.
Thus, approximation by a limit is of little use unless something is known about
the rate of convergence. In particular, we need to know how the parameter, λ,
determines the error, ; that is, how the error, , depends on the parameter, λ.
For example, if pλ = p + λ (positive numbers) then the condition:
d(pλ, p) ≤ λ
tells us how to choose the parameter λ in order to be within an acceptable error
:
λ < ⇒ d(pλ, p) < .
To support a physical approximation, therefore, the abstract existence of a limit
(soft analysis) needs to be augmented by a concrete estimate of the convergence
(hard analysis).
The state of affairs in practice is typically even worse. Not only have very few
applicable hard estimates been proved to date but the abstract limit itself may
not exist. Resort is then made to asymptotic approximation, where a function,
f (λ) say, is said to be asymptotically approximated by an asymptotic expansion∑
anφn(λ), (where {φn(λ)} is an asymptotic series, e.g. {λn}) if, for each N:
For each  > 0, ∃λ() such that:
| f (λ) −∑Nn=1 anφn(λ)| <  |φN(λ)| ∀ |λ| ≤ λ().
Asymptotic expansions provide a popular method of analysing physical prob-
lems, yet the definition is so weak that it does not help at all in meeting the
criterion of a physical approximation. To quote Reed & Simon (R & S XII p. 26):
“Saying that f has a certain asymptotic series gives us no information
about the value of f (z) for some fixed nonzero value of z. We know
that f (z) is well approximated by a0 + a1z as z gets “small” but the
definition says nothing about how small is “small”.”
After considering an example, Reed & Simon conclude:
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“Thus, we see the typical behaviour of wandering near the right
answer for a while (and not even that near!) and then going wild.”
In the present author’s opinion the use of asymptotic approximation is a con-
trivance with no basis in the physics. Moreover, the need for asymptotics reveals
that an inadequate mathematical model is under analysis. For example, the Stark
effect requires asymptotic approximation because of two unjustifiable features
of the mathematical model - the spatial behaviour of the electric field at infinity
and the consideration of an infinite time problem. We therefore put forward:
3.3 Conjecture
Asymptotic approximations occur whenever the full conditions (con-
tingencies) of the physical problem have not been taken into account.
Reflection on the nature of mathematical limits reveals a deeper malaise in math-
ematical models. Whereas physics is concerned with magnitudes, mathematics
- including the call-and-response in limits - deals with numerical values. The
result is that models and approximations contain no internal representation of
physical magnitudes and take the same form whether representing, say, high
or low energies, macroscopic or atomic distances. This feature is, of course,
an advantage for all-embracing fundamental models, but shows up as a major
deficiency in analysing physical systems whose behaviour varies according to
order of magnitude.
What can be done? Our approach will be to build physical conditions and weak
equivalence into the analysis according to the following two principles:
(a) Build magnitudes into models - Represent physical magnitudes
within the model. Here we require more than just the basic Galilean
parameters of mass and scalar/vector potentials. Although these may
suffice for eigenvalue problems they cannot handle initial conditions
or durations which reflect spatial and temporal orders of magnitude.
One way to do this is to base a model on bounded ranges of magni-
tudes, representing the ranges of experimental conditions.
(b) Analyse approximations as comparisons of models - view ap-
proximations as possible alternative descriptions, with respect to
acceptable errors, for a range of physical conditions. The success of
an approximation may then be evaluated by call-and-response using
physical magnitudes. Typically here one would consider the differ-
ence between two predictions of some relevant property (e.g. energy
level), with an estimate for this difference as a function of physical
parameters.
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(3) Localisation
A notable feature of the everyday world is the localisation of objects in space and
time. Indeed, so fundamental is the idea of localisation that the mathematical
language of classical mechanics - differential geometry - may be developed from
the notion of a point executing a trajectory.
By contrast, the states (wave functions) of Quantum Mechanics are delocalised.
Even free-particle states of compact support immediately become delocalised as
is demonstrated in Proposition 3M.1.
As a matter of practical fact, however, experiments are conducted in a localised
environment with the condition of the rest of the world irrelevant. For exam-
ple, in a molecular beam experiment molecules are fired through an electric or
magnetic field whose value outside the cylinder of the ‘classical’ trajectory does
not affect the outcome.
Experimental necessity is thus an embarrassment to the fundamental model
of Quantum Mechanics. With knowledge of potentials over the full range of
delocalisation being unachievable it is essential that the theory accommodates
localised behaviour. We therefore require for Quantum Mechanics that:
(a) Localisation be well-defined within the theory.
(b) The theory can demonstrate that behaviour of a localised particle
is independent of reasonable potential fluctuations outside a macro-
scopic region over which an experimenter has control or knowledge.
By ‘independent’ here we mean a weak equivalence relative to some
acceptable error.
(4) Compact Sets and Phase Space Localisation
What is localisation in Quantum Mechanics? Some likely requirements are:
• localisation is a possible attribute of a set of states;
• any one state (and hence any finite collection of states) is localised to some
degree;
• finite time evolution preserves localisation;
• localised states are bounded in position.
An obvious criterion for localisation is compact support in position space yet,
by Proposition 3M.1, this is too strict to be useful. Loosely, localisation could be
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said to be a finiteness in position which, by the requirement that it be preserved
under evolution, is also a finiteness in momentum.
Mathematically, notions of ‘finiteness’ and ‘boundedness’ come together in the
definition of compactness. It is, perhaps, no surprise to find that compactness is
essentially a position-momentum localisation. This is demonstrated in Proposi-
tion 3M.3 where it is shown that a collection of wave functions is compact if and
only if the wave functions get uniformly small (tending to zero) as position and
momentum get large (tending to infinity). In that theorem the ‘largeness’ of po-
sition and momentum is governed by two functions, F(Q) and G(P) respectively,
which are strictly positive tending to infinity as position and momentum tend
to infinity. Besides these conditions, the functions are very general indeed, the
only other requirement being that they be measurable. For instance, they might
both become infinite outside bounded intervals in position and momentum,
although in this case no wave function (except the null wave function) meets
the localisation requirement! Sobolev spaces can be viewed as special cases, F
becoming infinite outside a bounded spatial region with G given by P2.
In proposition 3M.4 the quadratic forms F and G are re-expressed in operator
terms and in Proposition 3M.5 sufficient conditions provided in order to define
the operator sum F + G. Whether these conditions are necessary we have not
been able to determine. Nevertheless, Corollary 3M.6 provides an operator
version of Proposition 3M.3.
For our main result, Theorem 3M.9, it is necessary to define carefully the inverse
of an operator. This is done in Lemma 3M.7, and in Lemma 3M.8 it is shown
how for Hilbert spaces compact operators take bounded sets onto compact, not
just precompact, sets. Theorem 3M.9 itself brings together previous results to
provide comprehensive criteria for compactness of a set in Hilbert space.
Returning from the mathematical development we see that compact sets satisfy
all of the “likely requirements” given at the start of this sub-section. Indeed,
compactness has many more qualifications to recommend it. Quoting from
Sutherland (Su 2):
“(1) It allows us to pass from the local to the global...
(2) The second answer has been very well expressed by Hewitt (1960).
Hewitt remarks that compactness is a substitute for finiteness, ap-
propriate to the analysis of continuity. More explicitly, he points out
that many statements about function f : A→ B are:
(i) true and trivial if A is a finite set,
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(ii) true for continuous f when A is a compact space,
(iii) false, or very hard to prove, even for continuous f ,
when A is non-compact.”
From our point of view, not only can compactness be viewed as the mathematical
expression of localisation but in representing boundedness in general provides
the relevant type of object in which to formulate physical theories, in accord
with the first of our principles set out at the end of Section 3.1.2. above.
We now turn to an “application” - a reformulation of bound and scattering states
in terms of compactness.
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3.2 Topological Bound and Scattering States
In this Section the theory of compact sets in Hilbert space is applied to develop
a classically motivated “phase space” approach to bound and scattering states
in quantum mechanics.
Most of the results are not new but their conceptual significance will, I hope,
be demystified by the context in which they are presented. In particular, the
following ‘topological’ criteria for the spectral subspaces of a Hamiltonian are
presented:
pure point = evolution contained in a compact region
continuous = zero average time spent in any compact region
absolutely continuous = finite transit time across any compact region.
Questions of existence and completeness of wave operators are not attacked
in this section as we only make passing reference to comparison dynamics.
There are good reasons for this omission. Although ‘compactness’ conditions
are usually employed at some stage in the mathematical theory of comparison
dynamics scattering, these conditions do not directly reflect the physical problem
under consideration, which has position and momentum playing essentially
different roles. Typically, (‘potential scattering’), the comparison evolution is free
evolution, generated by the Hamiltonian P
2
2m , and the evolution under analysis
is generated by a Hamiltonian of the form P
2
2m + V(Q), where the potential V
gets asymptotically small as its argument - distance from the scattering centre -
gets large. We need not conclude, however, that definitions using ‘phase-space’
compactness are irrelevant. Far from it, as shown by our results relating to
the spectral subspaces of the Hamiltonian. Indeed, we might hazard the view
that some of the fundamental mathematical problems in scattering theory arise
from reconciling the asymmetric (in phase-space) problem with the symmetric
definitions. That phase-space ideas are useful in scattering theory has been
amply demonstrated by Enss’ work (see, e.g. (RS 3) X1.17), although his methods
bear little relation to those in this Section. For a recent review see also reference
(Pe 1).
1. Classical Ideas
We suppose that we are dealing with a classical evolution Ut in a phase space of
states S. Our starting point is to develop local definitions of bound states, transit
time and average stay.
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Let Ω be a compact region of phase space, and ∆T a compact interval of time,
then:
(a) The bound states BΩ
∆T of an evolution Ut are those states which remain in Ω
during ∆T:
BΩ
∆T ≡ {α ∈ S | Utα ∈ Ω ∀t ∈ ∆T}.
(b) The transit time τΩ
∆T(α) of a state α across the region Ω in the interval ∆T is
the time spent in α by Ω:
τΩ
∆T(α) ≡
∫
∆T
pΩ(α, t)dt
where:
pΩ(α, t) = 1 if Utα ∈ Ω
= 0 otherwise.
(c) The average stay µΩ
∆T(α) of a state α in the region Ω for the interval ∆T is the
mean of the transit time:
µΩ
∆T(α) ≡ 1m(∆T)
∫
∆T
pΩ(α, t)dt =
τΩ
∆T(α)
m(∆T)
where m(∆T) is the Lebesgue measure of ∆T.
Although in reality we may strictly only talk about regions and time intervals
under our control and, therefore, bounded, it seems to be the case that notions
of bound and scattering states are independent of the region and time interval
provided that they are big enough. In anticipation that the definitions we shall
make will be non-trivial, let us try to extend the ‘finite theory’ definitions to
arbitrarily large regions and time intervals.
Considering bound states first, we note that continuity of the evolution implies:
∆T compact⇒ {Utα}t∈∆T contained in compact set in S.
Accordingly, we introduce the future (+) and past (-) bound states for a region
Ω as:
BΩ± ≡ {α ∈ S | Utα ∈ Ω ∀t ∈ R±}.
Extending to arbitrary regions of phase space we obtain:
B± ≡ {α ∈ S | ∃ compact Ω with {Utα}t∈R± ⊆ Ω}.
Non-bound states cannot be termed ‘scattering’ as they might return to a com-
pact region Ω, albeit intermittently. Thus we introduce the scattering states of
Ω, SΩ± as those states which leave Ω forever:
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SΩ± ≡ {α ∈ S | ∃ const < ∞with Utα < Ω ∀ ± t > const}
and extend to arbitrary regions by:
S± ≡ {α ∈ S | for each compact Ω ∃ const < ∞with Ω ∩ {Utα}±t>const =
Ø}.
The states which are neither contained in a compact set, nor fully escape from
all compact sets we shall call exceptional E±:
E± ≡ Bc± ∩ Sc±.
For the future and the past we have categorised states as bound, exceptional,
or scattering. Equivalent, less abstract, definitions may be provided in terms of
phase-space boundedness or transit times and average stay:
(a) Bound and scattering states in terms of phase-space boundedness.
Introduce the phase-space norm ||.||S where, for α = (x, p), ||α||2S = x2 + p2. It is
shown in Proposition 3M.10 that the bound states are those which are uniformly
norm-bounded, and the scattering states those whose phase-space distance from
any fixed point, for example the origin, tends to infinity.
(b) Scattering states in terms of transit times.
We first extend the finite definition to the limits for future (+) and past (-) transit
times of a state α across a region Ω:
τΩ+ (α) ≡ limT→∞
∫ T
0
pΩ(α, t)dt;
τΩ− (α) ≡ limT→∞
∫ 0
−T p
Ω(α, t)dt
where we allow the limit to infinity.
It is shown in Proposition 3M.11 that for reasonable evolutions the scattering
states are precisely those with finite transit times across any compact region.
By ‘reasonable’ is meant, as in the proof, that the phase-space velocity, α˙t, be
bounded over any compact region in phase space. Equivalently, the phase-space
gradient of the Hamiltonian needs to be bounded over any compact region.
The actual condition used was that the Hamiltonian be infinitely differentiable
on S (a familiar requirement). It is possible that the transit time criterion for
scattering states holds almost everywhere on phase space for a much wider class
of evolutions.
(c) Average stay.
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We extend the finite definition of average stay to the limits for future (+) and
past (-) stays by:
µ+(α) ≡ lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
pΩ(α, t)dt;
µΩ− (α) ≡ limT→∞
1
T
∫ 0
−T p
Ω(α, t)dt
where the limits exist.
By Birkhoff’s theorem (see e.g. (Ha 1)) the limits exist almost everywhere. From
our definitions we have that:
α ∈ S± ⇒ µΩ± (α) = 0 ∀ compact Ω.
α ∈ B± ⇒ µΩ± (α) = 1 for some compact Ω.
This leaves the exceptional states E±. Von Neumann’s ergodic theorem (See (RS
1) Section II.5) tells us that µΩ± (α) are invariant under L2 functions (with support
in Ω), which leads us to conjecture that almost everywhere (i.e., except possibly on
a set of Liouville measure zero):
α ∈ E± ⇒ µΩ± (α) = 0 ∀ compact Ω?
Consideration of possible exceptional trajectories indicates that provided the
phase space velocity is uniformly bounded on S, the only states not to have
a zero average stay for a compact set are those which leave the compact set
increasingly infrequently, going increasingly further away each time. It is to
be hoped that for most evolutions the set of such trajectories is of Lebesgue
measure zero.
2. Classical No-Capture theorem
There is an easy result (Schwarzschild’s theorem - see Proposition 3M.12) which
says that capture by or escape from a compact set is impossible.
Precisely, we have that for invertible evolutions (U−1t ≡ U−t) and for compact Ω:
BΩ+ = BΩ− a.e.
That is, the two sets agree except possibly on a set of Liouville measure zero
(a.e. ≡ almost everywhere). Denoting the a.e. equivalence class of a set, X, say,
by X we conclude that
B+ = B− ≡ B.
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The proof of Proposition 3M.12 depends, once again, on the (a.e.) invariance of
the Liouville measure under evolutions. This result, together with our remarks
at the end of Section 2.1, indicate that a useful definition might be total average
stay:
µΩ(α) = lim
T→∞
1
2T
∫ T
−T p
Ω(α, t)dt.
In Figure 3.1 the various results concerning our definitions are summarised.
Figure 3.1 - Definitions of Bound, Scattering and Exceptional States in Clas-
sical Mechanics
* For evolutions with bound phase-space velocity over any compact region
** Follows from Proposition 3M.10
*** Conjecture
Figure 3.2, on the next page, illustrates, for different evolutions, examples of
members from the sets B, E+ and S+. It should be noted that our definition of
scattering states includes those which disappear into a singularity - this is the
price we pay for a uniform treatment in phase space. Such states need to be
eliminated in normal scattering theory.
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3. General Questions
(a) Geometric
(i) Exceptional States - for which evolutions does E± = Ø?
(ii) Geometric Asymptotic Completeness - for which evolutions are the past (in-
coming) and future (outgoing) scattering states the same, that is, when does
S+(U) = S−(U)?
(b) Comparison Dynamics
If Vt is another, standard evolution the V-asymptotic states for the evolution Ut
are states α ∈ S such that there exists α′ ∈ S with:
Utα ∼ Vtα′ as t→ ±∞.
Specifically we define the V-asymptotic states of Ut as those in the sets:
S±(U,V) ≡ {α ∈ S | α = lim
t→±∞U
−1
t Vtα
′ for some α′ ∈ S}.
(i) Existence of Wave operators - under what evolutions and for which states do
wave operators W± exist, where:
W±(U,V)α ≡ lim
t→±∞U
−1
t Vtα?
(ii) Asymptotic Completeness for Comparison Dynamics - for which evolutions are
the incoming and outgoing V-asymptotic states the same:
S+(U,V) = S−(U,V)?
(c) Asymptotic Completeness for Geometric and Comparison Dynamics
Combining (a) (ii) and (b) (ii): for which evolutions Ut and standard evolutions
Vt does:
S+(U) = S−(U) = S+(U,V) = S−(U,V)?
(d) Relation to the Finite Theory
The theory involves limits for arbitrarily large quantities explicitly in time, im-
plicitly in phase space. It is natural to ask how rapidly the limits are approached
and, in particular are there ‘many’ states for which the finite theory categories
do not agree with the limiting categories, where Ω, ∆T, τΩ
∆T and µ
Ω
∆T are of some
laboratory order of magnitude?
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(e) Remarks on the above questions
The geometric questions (a) will be dealt with in the quantum mechanical case by
relating our geometric definitions to the spectral subspaces of the Hamiltonian.
The comparison dynamics questions (b) are a large field of study in themselves.
Much is known in the quantum mechanical case where Vt is the free evolution
- see, for example, (AJS) or (RS 3).
There is a close relation between the geometric and comparison dynamics scat-
tering states (c) by virtue of our answers to (a) and the textbook results for (b).
In the classical case a geometric result is supplied (Proposition 3M.14) for fully
scattering comparison evolutions. Specifically if S±(V) = S (i.e. all states are
scattering states for Vt) then:
S±(U,V) ⊆ B(U)c
that is, the V-asymptotic states of Ut are not bound states. The proof is trivial.
Finally, the questions raised in (d) concerning the real-life applicability of the
limiting theory deserve considerable attention. However, this is a difficult
area and beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless the related problem of
localisation occupies much attention in the last Chapter.
4. Quantum Mechanics - The Finite Theory
(a) The use of compact sets in Hilbert Space
As shown in the first Section of this Chapter there is a close connection be-
tween compact sets in Hilbert space and position/momentum boundedness. It
is well-known that there is no ‘phase space’ projection operator so that compact
operators provide the starting point for expressing phase-space boundedness in
quantum mechanics. The choice of compact operator depends on the problem
under consideration, each compact operator providing its own expression of
boundedness just as would a choice of compact region in the classical case. To
determine how the restrictions which determine a compact set, ω, of vectors in
Hilbert space H should be formulated we note from Section 1 that the following
are equivalent:
(i) ω ⊆ H is precompact
(ii) There exists a positive compact operator, Ω with 0 ≤ Ω ≤ 1 and a
constant R < ∞ such that:
ω ⊆ range of Ω acting on the R-ball of H.
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(iii) With Ω and R as in (ii), and Ω−1 defined as in Section 1:
ω ⊆ {ψ ∈ Ran(Ω) | 〈Ω− 12ψ,Ω− 12ψ〉 ≤ R2}
≡ {ψ ∈ Ran(Ω) | ||Ω−1ψ|| ≤ R}.
Note that this last set is the R-ball of the Hilbert space
HΩ ≡ (Ran(Ω), ||.||Ω), where ||ψ||Ω ≡ ||Ω−1ψ||, which is compact in the
norm topology of Ker(Ω)⊥.
An example of formulation (iii) is the choice Ω−1 = P2 + Q2 where R can be
loosely interpreted as a comparison oscillator energy bound.
In what follows we shall define the principal geometric quantities of bound
state, transit time and average stay in terms of compact operators and compact
sets in Hilbert space. The choice of Hilbert space vectors rather than rays (pure
states) is both for analytic convenience and to tie up with existing results. The
theory in terms of pure states will be presented in Section 3.2.6 below.
(b) Bound vectors, transit time and average stay
We suppose throughout that an evolution Ut is a one-parameter family of unitary
operators in Hilbert space. At this stage we do not require Ut to be a (strongly
continuous) one-parameter group.
Let ω ⊆ H be a compact set, let Ω be a positive compact operator in H and let
∆T be a compact interval of time then:
(i) The bound vectors Bω
∆T of an evolution Ut are those vectors which remain in ω
during ∆T:
Bω
∆T ≡ {ψ ∈ H | Utψ ∈ ω ∀t ∈ ∆T}.
For the case where ω = RanR(Ω) where RanR(Ω) is the range of Ω acting on the
R-ball in H we may equivalently define:
BΩR
∆T ≡ {ψ ∈ H | Utψ ∈ Ran(Ω) & ||Ω−1Utψ|| ≤ R ∀t ∈ ∆T}.
From now on, the condition that Utψ ∈ Ran(Ω) will be assumed since we may
always define ||Ω−1φ|| as a limit (which may be infinity) by the spectral theorem
for positive operators. Note that if Ker(Ω) , 0 then Ω−1φ ∈ Ker(Ω)⊥.
(ii) Transit time
From Chapter 2 we have that if R is a superposition set and s a pure state then
the probability of s being “in” R is given by ps(R). In Hilbert space terms this
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becomes: if PR is the orthogonal projection onto a closed linear manifold R ⊆ H
then if ψ ∈ H with ||ψ|| = 1, the transition probability of ψ with respect to R is:
ps(R) = ||PRψ||2 = 〈ψ,PRψ〉
The classical function pΩ(α, t) of Section 3.2.1 can be interpreted as the probability
that Utα is in Ω (it takes the values 1 or 0). Accordingly we define the transit time
τR
∆T(ψ) of a vector ψ across the closed linear manifold R in the interval ∆T as:
τR
∆T(ψ) ≡
∫
∆T
〈Utψ,PRUtψ〉dt
Although there is no satisfactory way to talk of a transit time across a compact
set in Hilbert space (since the probabilistic interpretation requires closed linear
manifolds), consider an operator which can be written as a sum of mutually
orthogonal projections:
Ω =
∑
n λnPRn where λn > 0
then the transit time τΩ
∆T(ψ) of a vectorψwith respect to operator Ω in the interval
∆T can be defined as the sum of transit times:
τΩ
∆T(ψ) ≡
∑
n λnτ
Rn
∆T(ψ)
=
∫
∆T
〈Utψ,ΩUtψ〉dt
where the {λn} are bounded. By the spectral theorem the transit time can thus
be defined with respect to any positive bounded operator. For example, we
could choose the coherent state POV measure A(Ω) of (Da 1) Theorem 5.2 for a
compact region, Ω, in coherent state phase-space.
(iii) Average Stay
By the arguments used in (b) we define the average stay µR
∆T(ψ) of a vector ψ in
the closed linear manifold during ∆T as:
µR
∆T(ψ) ≡ 1m(∆T)
∫
∆T
〈Utψ,PRUtψ〉dt
and the average stay µΩ
∆T(ψ) of a vector ψ with respect to a positive bounded
operator Ω during ∆T as:
µΩ
∆T(ψ) ≡ 1m(∆T)
∫
∆T
〈Utψ,ΩUtψ〉dt
where m(∆T) is the Lebesgue measure of ∆T.
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5. Quantum Mechanics - Bound Vectors
(a) Basic Definitions and Properties
As in Section 3.2.1 we first extend the finite theory to arbitrarily large times and
introduce future (+) and past (-) bound states for a compact set ω as:
Bω± ≡ {ψ ∈ H | Utψ ∈ ω ∀t ∈ R±}.
Extending next to arbitrarily large compact sets:
B± ≡ {ψ ∈ H | ∃ compact ω with {Utψ}t∈R± ⊆ ω}.
It is shown in Proposition 3M.15 that B± can be alternatively defined as:
B± ≡ {ψ ∈ H | ∃ positive compact operator Ω with ||Ω−1Utψ|| ≤ 1
∀t ∈ R±}.
Notice that in this definition we could equally well require 0 ≤ Ω ≤ 1 with
{Ω−1Utψ} uniformly bounded.
Thus, as in the classical case:
B± =
⋃
ω compact
B± =
⋃
Ω compact
BΩR±
R < ∞
Proposition 3M.16 demonstrates that B± are linear manifolds. We shall see later
(3M.17 and 3M18) that B+ = B− and is, in fact, closed.
(b) Remarks on Other ‘Geometric’ Definitions
The popular ‘geometric’ definition of bound states (see e.g. (AJS) p.262) utilises
a family {Fr} of projections satisfying s− lim
r→∞Fr = 1. The bound states are definedas:
M{Fr}0 = {ψ ∈ H | limr→∞ supt∈R ||(1 − Fr)Utψ|| = 0}.
The choice for Fr is geometric as it is taken to be the projection associated with the
r-ball in position space. This definition suffers, however, from three drawbacks:
(i) There is no ‘finite’ version.
(ii) The set of bound states depends on the choice of the family {Fr}.
(iii) When the position space projections are used it is necessary to re-
quire some ‘compactness’ condition in order to relate this geometric
definition to the usual spectral definition as the pure point subspace.
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In particular the condition is of the form that Fr(h + i)−n be compact
where h is the Hamiltonian. Such compactness conditions, which
occur throughout the ‘position space’ geometric theory, can be un-
derstood as follows. The Hamiltonian is usually of the form P2 + V
with the potential V at our disposal in applying conditions. Let B be
a positive bounded operator of the form (A(Q)+1)−1 where A(x)→∞
as |x| → ∞. Suppose that the Hamiltonian is semibounded with, say,
−1 ∈ ρ(h). Formally we arrive at:
B(h + 1)−1 = (A + 1)−1(h + 1)−1 = (F(Q) + P2A(Q) + P2)−1
= (A + 1)−1(G + 1)− 12 .(G + 1) 12 (h + 1)− 12 .(h + 1)− 12
where G ≡ G(P) = P2. Now A(x) → ∞ as x → ∞ so B(x) → 0 as
x → ∞; similarly G(k) → ∞ as k → ∞ so that (G(k) + 1)− 12 → 0 as
k → ∞. Together these show, by a well-known argument (see e.g.
(AJS 1) Lemma 7.6), that B(G + 1)− 12 is compact. Since 0 ≤ G ≤ h then
(G+1)
1
2 (h+1)− 12 is bounded, and with (h+1)− 12 bounded by definition
the result follows.
The purpose of this manipulation was to indicate how the P2 in h
contributed momentum space (un)boundedness and B (plus, possi-
bly, V) contributed position space boundedness to make B(h + 1)−1
compact.
(c) Quantum No-Capture and Poincare´ Recurrence Theorems
The analogue to Schwarzschild’s No-Capture theorem (Section 3.2.2) is proved
in Proposition 3M.17, and states that:
B+ = B−
The proof used is directly analogous to the classical case, although the idea was
taken from Chernoff (Ch 1). Again we require U−1t = U−t ∀t. In place of the
invariance of phase space volumes (Liouville measure) under evolutions we use
the fact that an isometry of a compact metric space to itself which is into is also
onto.
From now on I shall assume that U−1t = U−t and call B ≡ B+ = B−.
Also from Chernoff we may lift the idea for proving a quantum mechanical
version of Poincare´’s recurrence theorem. Namely that if ψ is a bound vector
then Utψwill return arbitrarily close toψ at some later time. This result is proved
in Proposition 3M.18 by using the simple fact that a compact metric space is
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sequentially compact (i.e., every sequence has a converging subsequence). We
also require that Ut be a one-parameter group.
(d) Bound Vectors and Eigenvectors of the evolution
Suppose φ is an eigenvector of Ut, then for Ω compact:
〈Utφ,Ω−1Utφ〉 = 〈φ,Ω−1φ〉
which is equal to 1 for the choice Ω = |φ〉〈φ|. Similarly if φ ∈ lin (eigenvectors of
Ut), where ‘lin’ denotes the finite linear span, we can always find a compact Ω
such that the above holds.
It follows from this reasoning that:⋂
t∈R
lin (eigenvectors of Ut) ⊆ B.
For simplicity let Ut = e−iht where the Hamiltonian, h, is self adjoint. In Proposi-
tion 3M.19 it is shown that not only are all finite linear combinations of eigen-
vectors of h contained in B but so are all infinite linear combinations. That
is:
clin (eigenvectors of h) ⊆ B
where ‘clin’ denotes closed linear span.
This confirms the popular analogy between eigenvectors and closed orbits. In
fact, the converse is also true as shown by Theorem 3M.20, namely that every
bound vector is composed from eigenvectors. In summary:
B = clin (eigenvectors of h).
B is thus, as promised, closed and actually identical to the pure point spectral
subspace Hpp(h) of h.
The idea behind Theorem 3M.20 is as follows:
We first show that if there is a non-zero invariant compact set in H then there
exists an eigenvector of h. To do this a fixed point theorem for compact sets is
used. Next, we project a bound vector into the continuous spectral subspace
(Hpp(h)⊥) of h and repeat the argument to conclude that the component of any
bound vector in the continuous spectral subspace is zero.
(e) Analogues to Birkhoff’s Theorem and the Ergodic Theorem
In classical statistical mechanics, Birkhoff’s theorem (see, e.g. (Kh 1) Ch. 2) says,
in the notation of Section 3.2.1, that if Ω is any invariant finite-volume region of
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phase space and F ∈ L1(Ω, ds) then:
Fˆ(α) ≡ lim
T→∞
1
2T
∫ T
−T F(Utα)dt exists a.e.
The first part of Proposition 3M.21 provides a quantum mechanical analogue
for operators which are bounded on the bound vectors: for Ut = e−iht:
Fˆ(ψ) ≡ lim
T→∞
1
2T
∫ T
−T〈Utψ,FUtψ〉dt exists for ψ ∈ B.
The Ergodic theorem in classical statistical mechanics says that if Ω has no
invariant subsets of non-zero measure then:
Fˆ(α) = F ≡ 1mL(Ω)
∫
Ω
F(α)dα a.e.
(see (Kh 1) p. 29). That is, the time average is a constant F, independent of the
state α in Ω.
The second part of Proposition 3M.21 provides a partial result along these lines
for quantum mechanics, namely that if ψ ∈ B then:
Fˆ(ψ) = Tr[Fρ]
where
ρ =
∑
n Pn|ψ〉〈ψ|Pn
Pn being the projections onto the eigenspaces Ln of h.
This result (cf. Lemma 5.7 in (Da 2)) indicates that the notion of ‘ergodic’ states
for quantum mechanics depends strongly on the behaviour of the operator F
with respect to the spectral projections of h - note that we could write:
Fˆ(ψ) = Tr[F|ψ〉〈ψ|] where F ≡ ∑n PnFPn.
6. Quantum Mechanics - Bound States
To present the theory in terms of bound states it will suffice to set the scene as
the results essentially carry over from bound vectors.
The continuous mapping:
j: H→ J+(H) ; ψ→ |ψ〉〈ψ|
takes the unit ball of H onto the extreme points of J+1 (H), the positive trace class
operators with unit trace. By Gleason’s theorem these are identifiable as the
pure states of the quantum system whose projective geometry is described by
the closed linear manifolds of H.
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Compactness is preserved by j so we define the bound statistical states BΩR
corresponding to the bound vectors BΩR by:
BΩR = co( j(BΩR1 ))
where BΩR1 are the unit vectors of B
ΩR and co denotes closed convex null. Evi-
dently BΩR is compact and contained in the compact set (see (Ch 1) Prop 2.2 for
proof of compactness):
{ρ ∈ J+1 (H) | Tr[UtρU∗tΩ−2] ≤ R2 ∀t}
where Ω−2 is understood in the sense of Section 1.
It is interesting that extreme points of this set need not be pure states, a possibility
which could have implications for the theory of measurement when the set of
‘physical’ states is taken to be compact. We do not, however, pursue this idea
further here.
7. Quantum Mechanics - Average Stays
Let us first extend the definition of average stay in the finite theory of Section
3.2.4 to arbitrarily large times:
The average stay µΩ(ψ) of a vector ψ with respect to a positive bounded operator
Ω is given by the formula:
µΩ(ψ) ≡ lim
T→∞
1
2T
∫ T
−T〈Utψ,ΩUtψ〉dt.
We have already seen from Proposition 3M.20 that this limit exists for ψ ∈ B.
Proposition 3M.22 shows that for compact operators it exists for all vectors in
H. Moreover, the bound and non-bound vectors of a Hamiltonian evolution
Ut = e−iht can be characterised in terms of the average stay with respect to
compact operators:
B = {ψ ∈ H | µΩ(ψ) > 0 for some compact Ω}
B⊥ = {ψ ∈ H | µΩ(ψ) = 0 for all compact Ω}.
The proof uses Proposition 3M.21 and the RAGE theorem ((RS 3) Th. XI. 115) or
Wiener’s theorem ((RS 3) Th. XI. 114).
We could, in fact, have considered average stays with respect to vectors or finite
dimensional linear manifolds - the ‘compactness’ just gives the fullest expression
of average stay with respect to (phase-space) bounded region.
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8. Quantum Mechanics - Transit Times and Scattering States
We extend the definition of transit times given in Section 3.2.4 to arbitrarily large
future (+) and past (-) times:
The transit time τΩ± (ψ) of a vector ψ with respect to a positive bounded operator
Ω is given by the formulae:
τΩ+ (ψ) ≡ limT→∞
∫ T
0
〈Utψ,ΩUtψ〉dt
τΩ− (ψ) ≡ limT→∞
∫ 0
−T〈Utψ,ΩUtψ〉dt.
The limits obviously exist if the integrals are uniformly bounded - in any other
case we shall set the transit times to∞.
The future (+) and past (-) sets of scattering vectors S± are defined as in the
classical case by:
S± ≡ {ψ ∈ H | τΩ± (ψ) < ∞ for all compact Ω}.
If we define the total transit time τΩ(ψ) as:
τΩ(ψ) ≡ τΩ+ (ψ) + τΩ− (ψ) = limT→∞
∫ T
−T〈Utψ,ΩUtψ〉dt
and the set of total scattering vectors S by:
S ≡ {ψ ∈ H | τΩ(ψ) < ∞ for all compact Ω} = S+ ∩ S−
then Proposition 3M.23 provides a characterisation of S for Hamiltonian evolu-
tions Ut = e−iht as:
S = Hac(h)
that is, the scattering vectors with finite total transit time are dense in the abso-
lutely continuous spectral subspace Hac(h) of the Hamiltonian h.
We may now collect together the relations between our geometric definitions
and the spectral subspaces of the Hamiltonian h when Ut = e−iht.
Call the set of exceptional vectors E those which are neither total scattering nor
bound in the sense that:
E = S⊥ ∩ B⊥
then we have:
H = B ⊕ E ⊕ S.
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If h is a Hamiltonian with Hpp(h), Hsc(h) and Hac(h) denoting its pure point,
singular continuous and absolutely continuous spectral subspaces, then we
know ((RS 1) Th. VII. 4):
H = Hpp(h) ⊕Hsc(h) ⊕Hac(h).
Our results (see Corollary 3M.24) allow us to characterise the spectral subspaces
by vectors with the following geometric features:
(a) Bound in some compact set for all time:
B = Hpp(h)
(b) Zero average stay w.r.t. any compact operator:
B⊥ = Hsc(h) ⊕Hac(h)
(c) Exceptional:
E = Hsc(h)
(d) Finite transit time w.r.t. any compact operator:
S = Hac(h).
Thus, the categories of Fig 3.1 remain essentially valid in the quantum case.
9. Quantum Mechanics - Comparison Dynamics
What little we can say about comparison dynamics is summarised in Proposition
3M.26. This result mimics Proposition 3M.14 and we define, as for the classical
case, the V-asymptotic vectors S±(U,V) of an evolution Ut with respect to a
comparison evolution Vt by:
S±(U,V) ≡ {ψ ∈ H | ψ = lim
t→±∞U
−1
t Vtψ
′ for some ψ′ ∈ H}.
S±(U,V) are better known as the ranges of the wave operators W±(U,V) where:
W±(U,V) = s − lim
t→±∞ Ut
∗Vt.
The questions raised in Section 3.2.3 concerning the relation between the ge-
ometric theory and comparison dynamics remain open. (See, however, the
remarks at the very start of Section 3.2).
The proof of Proposition 3M.26, which asserts that:
S±(U,V) ⊆ B(U)⊥ ≡ E(U) ⊕ S(U)
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uses a set of vectors D± which includes scattering vectors but not necessarily all
exceptional vectors. The definition and properties of D± are given in Lemma
3M.25.
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Mathematics Section of Chapter 3
This section develops the various mathematical results to support the main text
of Chapter 3.
3.1 The Physical Perspective
3. Localisation
3M.1 Proposition
If Ut denotes the free-particle evolution in quantum mechanics and ψ(x) is a
smooth wave function of compact support, then (Utψ)(x) does not have compact
support for any t > 0.
Proof
(This result is well-known; we provide a proof here based on the Paley-Wiener
theorem).
By the Paley-Wiener theorem, f ∈ C∞0 (Rn) with support in a ball of radius R < ∞
if and only if its Fourier transform, fˆ , satisfies for all N:
| fˆ (z)| ≤ CNe
R|Im(z)|
(1 + |z|)N ∀z ∈ C
n.
For the free-particle evolution we have:
(U∧t ψ)(k) = e
−ik2t
2m ψˆ(k).
(U∧t ψ)(z) cannot satisfy the required condition when t > 0 since for fixed Im(z) > 0
|(U∧t ψ)(z)| → ∞ as Re(z)→∞.
4. Compact Sets and Phase Space Localisation
3M.2 Definition ((RS 4) p. 247)
Let F > 0 be a measurable function, then we say F→ ∞ if and only if for every
N > 0 there is an RN such that F(x) ≥ N ∀ |x| ≥ RN.
3M. 3 Proposition
Let ω ⊆ unit ball of L2(Rk) then the following are equivalent:
(i) ω is compact
(ii) ∃ F,G→∞ such that ω is contained in the compact set:
{ψ ∈ L2(Rk) | 〈ψ,ψ〉 ≤ 1, 〈ψ,F(Q)ψ〉 ≤ 1, 〈ψ,G(P)ψ〉 ≤ 1}
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where Q and P are the position and momentum operators, and the
inner products are to be interpreted as quadratic forms.
Proof
(ii)⇒ (i): This is Rellich’s criterion for compactness ((RS 4) Theorem XIII.65).
(i) ⇒ (ii): For this we use Riesz’s criterion for compactness ((RS 4) Theorem
XIII.66) to construct the functions F and G. Inspection of Riesz’s criterion reveals
that compact S is equivalent to a uniform convergence at infinity in both position
and momentum space. It suffices, indeed, to construct just one of the functions,
F say for position, as construction of the other is analogous.
From Riesz’s criterion we have that for any n > 0 ∃ a bounded set Kn ⊂ Rk such
that: ∫
RkrKn
|ψ(x)|2dx ≤ 2n.
Choose the sequence n = 2−n for n = 1, 2... and define:
F(x) = 2(m−2) where m = min{n | x ∈ Kn}.
Then, for ψ ∈ S:
〈ψ,F(Q)ψ〉 = ∫
K1
F(x)|ψ(x)|2dx+∑∞n=1 ∫Kn+1rUm=nm=1 Km F(x)|ψ(x)|2dx ≤ 2−1 ∫K1 |ψ(x)|2dx+∑∞
n=1 2(n−1)
∫
RkrKn
|ψ(x)|2dx ≤ 2−1 + ∑∞n=1 2(n−1)2−2n = 1
It is readily seen that F→∞ as per Definition 3M.2.
3M.4 Proposition
Let F,G→∞ and let f , g be the quadratic forms on H = L2(Rk) given by:
f (ψ) =
∫
F(x)|ψ(x)|2dx
g(ψ) =
∫
G(k)|ψˆ(k)|2dk
where ˆ denotes the Fourier transform, then f and g are quadratic forms of the
operators F ≡ F(Q) and G ≡ G(P) where Q and P are the position and momentum
operators and where:
(i) F and G are self-adjoint on the Hilbert subspaces Quad( f ) and
Quad(g) respectively;
(ii) The quadratic form and operator domains are related by:
Quad( f ) = D(F
1
2 ); Quad(g) = D(G
1
2 ).
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Proof
It suffices to consider one of the functions, F say. Define:
F′(x) = F(x) if F(x) is finite
= 0 otherwise.
By the spectral theorem, F′(Q) is self-adjoint on H, hence also self-adjoint on the
Hilbert subspace Ker(F′)⊥. Also, by (Da 2) Theorem 4.12,
D(F′ 12 ) = Quad( f ′) is dense in H
where f ′ denotes the quadratic form on H associated to the function F′.
As we shall shortly demonstrate, Quad( f ) is dense in Ker(F′)⊥, and we may
define F ≡ F′ as the unique self-adjoint operator on Quad( f ) = Ker(F′)⊥ such
that:
f (ψ) = 〈F 12ψ,F 12ψ〉 ∀ ψ ∈ Quad( f ).
Evidently, Quad( f ) = D(F
1
2 ).
To prove that Quad( f ) is dense in Ker(F′)⊥ consider the measurable set in Rk
given by:
M = {x | F(x) is non-finite}.
We have, by definition that:
f ′(x) > 0 if x ∈ Rk rM
= 0 if x ∈M
and:
f ′(x) =
∫
f ′(x) |ψ(x)|2dx.
Hence if f ′(ψ) = 0 then ψ has support almost everywhere in M and, conversely,
if ψ has such support then f ′(ψ) = 0. Expressed symbolically:
Ker(F′) = {ψ | ψ has support a.e. in M}
= L2(M).
Hence: Ker(F′)⊥ = L2(Rk rM).
Now let ψ ∈ Quad( f ), then evidently ψ ∈ Quad( f ′) and ψ has support where F(x)
is finite. Thus:
Quad( f ) ⊆ Quad( f ′) ∩ Ker(F′)⊥.
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Conversely, if ψ ∈ Ker(F′)⊥ then we have just seen ψ has support in Rk rM so if
also ψ ∈ Quad( f ′) the integral∫
F(x)|ψ(x)|2dx
converges and ψ ∈ Quad( f ). Overall, therefore:
Quad( f ) = Quad( f ′) ∩ Ker(F′)⊥.
Denseness of Quad( f ′) now allows us to conclude that Quad( f ) is dense in
Ker(F′)⊥.
3M.5 Proposition
Let F,G, f and g be as in Proposition 3M.4 and suppose further that:
L = D(F 12 ) = D(G 12 ),
and D(F
1
2 )∩D(G 12 ) is dense in L, then there exists a unique self-adjoint operator
(the quadratic form sum), F + G, on L such that:
(i) Quad(F + G) = D((F + G)
1
2 ) = D(F
1
2 ) ∩D(G 12 )
(ii) 〈(F + G) 12ψ, (F + G) 12φ〉 = 〈F 12ψ,F 12φ〉 + 〈G 12ψ,G 12φ〉
∀ψ, φ ∈ D((F + G) 12 ).
Proof
With the additional conditions we may apply (Da 2) Corollary 4.13 to deduce
the result for the Hilbert space given by L.
3M.6 Corollary
Let ω ⊆ unit ball of L2(Rk) then the following are equivalent:
(i) ω is compact
(ii) ∃ F,G → ∞ satisfying the conditions of Proposition 3M.5, and a
constant K < ∞ such that ω is contained in the compact set:
{ψ ∈ D((F + G) 12 ) | ||ψ|| ≤ 1, ||(F + G) 12ψ|| ≤ K}.
Proof
(ii)⇒ (i) follows from Propositions 3M.5 and 3M.3.
(i)⇒ (ii): Let F, G be functions such that by Proposition 3M.3 ω is contained in:
{ψ | 〈ψ,ψ〉 ≤ 1, 〈ψ,F(Q)ψ〉 ≤ 1, 〈ψ,G(P)ψ〉 ≤ 1}.
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Define:
F(x) = min(x2,F(x))
G(x) = min(x2,G(x)).
Then F(Q)+G(P) is a densely-defined quadratic form sum and on D(F
1
2 )∩D(G 12 ):
||(F + G) 12ψ||2 = 〈F 12ψ,F 12ψ〉 + 〈G 12ψ,G 12ψ〉 ≤ 2.
3M.7 Lemma
Let A ∈ L(H) be a self-adjoint bounded operator then:
(i) Ker(A) = Ran(A)⊥.
(ii) A−1 is a self-adjoint operator on Ker(A)⊥.
Proof
(i): see e.g. (Ru 1) Theorem 12.10.
(ii) A is a one-to-one mapping in Ker(A)⊥:
A: Ker(A)⊥ → Ran(A) ⊆ Ker(A)⊥
Thus A is self-adjoint on Ker(A)⊥ and A−1 is well-defined on Ran(A). A−1 is
clearly also symmetric Ran(A) and hence closeable on Ker(A)⊥. We have that:
Ran(A) = D(A−1) ⊆ D(A−1∗).
Hence it will suffice to show that:
D(A−1∗) ⊆ Ran(A).
To see this let ψ ∈ D(A−1∗) then by the definition of an adjoint on Ker(A)⊥ we
have that ∃ θ ∈ Ker(A)⊥ such that:
〈ψ,A−1φ〉 = 〈θ, φ〉 ∀ φ ∈ Ran(A).
But A is one-to-one so ∃! Φ ∈ Ker(A) such that A−1φ = Φ, hence:
〈ψ,Φ〉 = 〈θ,AΦ〉 ∀ Φ ∈ Ker(A)⊥
⇒ 〈ψ,Φ〉 = 〈Aθ,Φ〉 ∀ Φ ∈ Ker(A)⊥.
Hence, since Ker(A)⊥ is a Hilbert space: ψ = Aθ and ψ ∈ Ran(A) as required.
3M.8 Lemma
Let RanK(A) denote the range of an operator A acting on the K-ball of a Hilbert
space, then the following are equivalent:
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(i) A is a compact operator.
(ii) RanK(A) is a compact set.
Proof
(i) ⇒ (ii): follows from the well-known facts that a compact operator takes
weakly convergent sequences into strongly convergent ones ((RS 1) Theorem
VI.11); that any Hilbert space is sequentially weakly compact ((K 1) Chapter 5
Lemma 1.5) and the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem ((RS 1) Theorem IV.3).
(ii)⇒ (i): follows from the definition of a compact operator as taking bounded
sets into precompact sets.
3M.9 Theorem
Let ω ⊆ unit ball of L2(Rk) then the following are equivalent:
(i) ω is compact
(ii) ∃ F,G → ∞ satisfying the conditions of Proposition 3M.5 and
K < ∞ such that ω is contained in the compact set:
{ψ ∈ D((F + G) 12 ) | ||ψ|| ≤ 1 and ||(F + G) 12ψ|| ≤ K}.
(iii) ∃ F,G → ∞ satisfying the conditions of Proposition 3M.5 and
K < ∞ such that (F + G)− 12 defined on D((F + G) 12 ) is compact and ω
is contained in the compact set:
RanK((F + G)−
1
2 ), acting on the K-ball in Ker((F + G)− 12 )⊥.
(iv) ∃ a positive compact operator Ω and K < ∞ such that ω is
contained in the compact set:
{ψ ∈ Ran(Ω) | ||ψ|| ≤ 1 and ||Ω−1ψ|| ≤ K}.
(v) ∃ a positive compact operator Ω and K < ∞ such that ω is con-
tained in the compact set:
RanK(Ω) acting on the K-ball in Ker(Ω)⊥.
Proof
By Corollary 3M.6 we have (i)⇔ (ii). We shall prove (ii)⇔ (iii), (iii)⇒ (v), (iv)
⇔ (v). (v)⇒ (i) is obvious. (ii)⇔ (iii): follows from (RS 4) Theorem XIII.64 and
the fact that F + G is a strictly positive operator on D((F + G) 12 ). Compactness in
(iii) follows from Lemma 3M.8. Notice that:
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D((F + G) 12 ) = Ker((F + G)− 12 )⊥
and
D((F + G)
1
2 ) = Ran((F + G)− 12 ).
(iii)⇒ (v): is now trivial.
(iv) ⇔ (v): follows from Lemma 3M.7 where the relevant Hilbert space is
Ker(Ω)⊥. Compactness again follows from Lemma 3M.8.
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3.2 Geometric Bound and Scattering States
1. Classical Ideas
3M.10 Proposition
Let B± and S± be defined as in Section 3.2.1, then:
(a) B± = {α ∈ S | ||Utα||S < ∞ ∀t ∈ R±}
(b) S± = {α ∈ S | for each β ∈ S ||β −Utα||S →∞ as t→ ±∞}
= {α ∈ S | ∃ β with ||β −Utα||S →∞ as t→ ±∞}.
Proof
For (a) we need only notice that for a set Ω ⊆ R2n:
Ω precompact⇔ sup
α∈Ω
||α||S < ∞.
For (b) it suffices to note that if α is a scattering state it permanently escapes
from every k-ball in S for large enough time.
3M.11 Proposition
Let τΩ± (α) and S± be defined as in Section 3.2.1. Let Ut be a Hamiltonian evolution
and suppose that the Hamiltonian h ∈ C∞(S), then:
S± = {α ∈ S | τΩ± (α) < ∞ ∀ compact Ω ⊆ S}.
Proof
⊆: if α ∈ S+ then for each Ω ∃T < ∞ such that {Utα}t>T ∩Ω = Ø, but then:
τΩ± (α) =
∫ ∞
0
pΩ(α, t)dt ≤ ∫ T
0
pΩ(α, t)dt < ∞.
Similarly for S−.
⊇: We shall show that if α ∈ Sc± and the phase-space velocity is bounded on
compact sets then τΩ± (α) cannot be finite for all compact sets, Ω. Again we prove
only for future (+) as past (-) is analogous. Bound states cannot have finite
transit times for all compact sets, hence we consider only exceptional states.
Suppose that our claim is false - that is, for some α ∈ E+ τΩ+ (α) < ∞ for every
compact Ω. Since α ∈ E+ then there exists some compact set (which without
loss of generality we take to be an R-ball ΩR) and a non-terminating sequence
of intervals ∆n ⊆ [0,∞) during which the state returns to ΩR. That is:
τΩR+ (α) =
∑
n m(∆n)
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The transit time is finite, so lim
n→∞m(∆n) = 0.
Now consider the ball ΩR+ 12 . Let ∆
′
n denote the interval ∆n extended to include
the time spent inside ΩR+ 12 . The phase space distance travelled in each ∆
′
n must
be greater than or equal to 1. However, this distance is given by:∫
∆′n
||α˙t|| dt
where
||α˙t||2 = ||x˙t||2 + ||p˙t||2
the dot denoting time derivative and the norm on the tangent space lifted from
phase space.
Supposing that the phase space velocity α˙t is bounded on any compact set, that
is
||α˙t|| ≤ const for t such that Utα ⊆ compact set
then the phase space distance travelled in each ∆′n satisfies:
1 ≤ ∫
∆′n
||α˙t|| dt ≤ const. m(∆′n)→ 0.
This contradiction shows the transit time to be non-finite.
The Proposition follows by noting h ∈ C∞(S) implies that the phase space deriva-
tives of h are bounded on any compact set. For a Hamiltonian flow so, therefore,
is the phase space velocity.
2. Classical No-Capture Theorem
3M.12 Proposition (Schwarzschild)
Let Ut be an evolution such that U−1t = U−t and suppose that Ω is a phase-space
region of finite Liouville measure, then:
For almost every point α ∈ Ω, if the trajectory Utαwill remain in Ω in the future
it must always have been in Ω in the past. Conversely, if it was always in Ω in
the past it will remain in Ω in the future.
Proof
See (Th 1) Volume 1 Theorem 2.6.14.
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3M.13 Corollary
Let Ut be an evolution such that U−1t = U−t and let B
Ω± , B± be defined as in Section
3.2.1, then:
(i) BΩ+ = BΩ− a.e.
(ii) B+ = B− a.e.
3. General Questions
3M.14 Proposition
Let Ut be an evolution. Let Vt be another evolution with only scattering states
(i.e. S±(V) = all of phase space S). Let the V-asymptotic states S±(U,V) be defined
as in Section 3.2.3. Let the bound states B(U) be defined as in Section 3.2.2, then:
S±(U,V) ⊆ B(U)c.
Proof
In what follows, convergence is meant in phase space norm.
Let α ∈ S±(U,V) then for some α′ ∈ S:
α = lim
t→±∞ Ut
−1Vtα′.
Suppose α is in B(U), then Utα is bounded. However α′ is in S±(V) so Vtα′ is
unbounded. But Utα − Vtα′ → 0, hence α cannot be in B(U).
5. Quantum Mechanics - Bound Vectors
Note: If Ω is a positive compact operator on H then, as in Section 3.1 we
understand its “inverse” Ω−1 to be the operator on RanΩ such that:
Ω−1Ω = P(Ker(Ω)⊥)
where P(L) denotes the orthogonal projection onto the closed linear manifold L.
ΩΩ−1 is defined as the adjoint of Ω−1Ω so that
ΩΩ−1 P(Ker(Ω)⊥) = P(Ker(Ω)⊥).
3M.15 Proposition
The following sets are the same:
(i) {ψ ∈ H | ∃ compact ω ⊆ H with {Utψ}t∈R+ ⊆ ω}
(ii) {ψ ∈ H | ∃ positive compact operator Ω with {Utψ}t∈R+ ⊆ Ran(Ω)
and ||Ω−1Utψ|| ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ R±}.
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Proof
(i) ⊆ (ii): {Utψ} ⊆ compact set ω. In Section 3.1.1 it was shown how to construct
a positive compact operator Ωω such thatω ⊆ range of Ωω acting on the unit ball
in H.
(ii) ⊆ (i): Choose ω as the range of Ω acting on the unit ball.
3M. 16 Proposition
B±, defined in Section 3.2.5 are linear manifolds.
Proof
Suppose ψ,φ ∈ B+ then there are compact sets S and T, say, such that
Utψ ∈ S and Utφ ∈ T ∀t ∈ R+
But then, by the continuity of vector addition, the set
S + T = { f + g | f ∈ S and g ∈ T}
is compact. From the linearity of Ut:
Ut(ψ + φ) = Utψ + Utφ ∈ S + T ∀t ∈ R+.
We conclude that the vector ψ + φ is in B+, which is sufficient to prove the
Proposition.
3M.17 Proposition (No Capture Theorem)
Let Ut be an isometry with Ut−1 = U−t ∀t ∈ R then:
B+ = B−
Proof
Let ψ ∈ B+ and call
S = {Utψ | t ∈ R+}.
Then it is easy to see that S is a compact set satisfying:
Ut(S) ⊆ S ∀t ∈ R+.
From the fact that any isometry of a compact metric space to itself which is into
is also onto we conclude that the inclusion is an equality. So, by our hypothesis
on Ut:
S = U−t(S) ∀t ∈ R+
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so that S ⊆ B− hence ψ ∈ B−. Similarly, we prove that B− ⊆ B+.
Note that the method of proof can be used to show that Bω+ = Bω− and
BΩR+ = B
ΩR− .
3M.18 Proposition (Poincare´ Recurrence Theorem)
Suppose Ut is a one-parameter unitary group.
Let ψ ∈ B then for any T < ∞ and any  > 0 ∃T ≥ T such that:
||UTψ − ψ|| < .
Proof
For ψ ∈ B and T < ∞ consider the sequence ψn = UnTψ.
Since {Utψ} lies in a compact set in H, and compact metric spaces are also
sequentially compact ((Su 2) Ch. 7), then there exists a converging subsequence,
say {ψm}. Hence, for any  > 0 ∃m,m′ with m′ > m such that:
||Um′Tψ −UmTψ|| < 
⇒ ||U(m′−m)Tψ − ψ|| < 
so we choose T = (m′ −m)T ≥ T.
3M.19 Proposition
Let Ut = e−iht then
clin (eigenvectors of h) ⊆ B.
Proof
Eigenvectors of h are obviously bound vectors and so, by Proposition 3M.16,
are finite linear combinations of eigenvectors. Suppose ψ is an infinite linear
combination of eigenvectors, φn, of h, then:
ψ =
∑∞
n=1 αnφn; αn = 〈φn, ψ〉 and
Utψ =
∑∞
n=1 e−iλntαnφn; hφn = λnφn.
Noticing that {e−iλnt} is in `∞(Z+) with norm = 1, consider the mapping:
T : `∞(Z+)→ H; {Zn} → T({Zn}) = ∑∞n=1 Znαnφn
Since ψ ∈ range of T acting on the unit ball of `∞(Z+) it will suffice if we can
show T to be a compact operator. To see this, notice that TN defined by:
TN({Zn}) = ∑Nn=1 Znαnφn, N < ∞
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is finite rank and that
||(T − TN)({Zn})||2 = ||∑∞n=N+1 Znαnφn||2
=
∑∞
n=N+1 |Znαn|2
Hence, for all {Zn}with ||{Zn}||∞ ≤ 1 we have:
||(T − TN)({Zn})||2 ≤ ∑∞n=N+1 |αn|2 → 0 as N→∞
the convergence following from ψ ∈ H({αn} ∈ `2(Z+)).
The uniformity of this convergence over the unit ball of `∞ allows us to conclude
that the operator norm converges:
||T − TN|| → 0 as N→∞.
Thus T is the norm-limit of a sequence of finite rank operators and is thereby
compact.
3M.20 Theorem
Let Ut = e−iht then
B = clin(eigenvectors of h).
Proof
By Proposition 3M.19 we need only show B ⊆ clin(eigenvectors of h). Our first
claim is that if ψ ∈ B then h possesses an eigenvector (has a non-empty point
spectrum) in H.
So let ψ ∈ B, then the closure S of the set
{Utψ | t ∈ R}
is compact. Suppose, without loss, that ||ψ|| = 1 then by the continuity of the
mapping:
j : H→ J+(H); ψ→ |ψ〉〈ψ|
the set j(s) is compact in trace norm, hence so is its closed convex hull ((Pr 2)
Th.4.15) co( j(S)). Now
co( j(S)) ⊆ {ρ ∈ J+(H) | ρ ≥ 0 Tr[ρ] = 1}.
S is invariant under Ut, hence j(S) and co( j(S)) are invariant under
ut : ρ→ ut(ρ) = UtρUt∗.
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So, by the Leray-Schauder-Tychonoff theorem ((RS 1) Th.V.19), ut has a fixed
point in co( j(S)). Denote this fixed point by σ, then
ut(σ) = σ⇔ Utσ = σUt
We claim that σ can be written in terms of the eigenvectors of h:
σ =
∑
n,i λn|φn,i〉〈φn,i|
where
hφn,i = an,iφn,i an,i ∈ R.
By the spectral theorem:
σ =
∑
n λnPn
where Pn is the orthogonal projection onto the finite dimensional subspace
Ln = {ψ ∈ H | σψ = λnψ}
and Ln⊥Lm if n , m. From this mutual orthogonality and the fact that Ut
commutes with σ we conclude that
UtLn = Ln.
So, by the spectral theorem:
hLn = Ln
Ln is finite dimensional so we may diagonalise h on Ln to obtain eigenvectors
φn,i of h such that
Pn =
∑
i |φn,i〉〈φn,i|
which proves our assertion. In particular, we have shown that if there is a non-
zero ψ ∈ B then h possesses an eigenvector, which was our first claim. In fact
the conclusion is true if there exists any non-zero invariant compact set.
To complete the proof, let Pc denote the projection onto the continuous spectral
subspace Hc(h) where:
Hc(h) = (clin(eigenvectors of h))⊥.
Consider PcB then, as Ut commutes with Pc, we have:
UtPcB = PcB ⊆ Hc(h).
Hence, suppose there is a non-zero ψ ∈ PcB. We may repeat the above argument
to show that h must have an eigenvector in Hc(h). But this is impossible, so:
Chapter 3: Approximation and Localisation 149
Pc(B) = 0
⇔ B ⊆ clin(eigenvectors h).
3M.21 Proposition
Let F be any operator such that P F P is bounded, where P is the orthogonal
projection onto the pure point spectral subspace (i.e. B) of the Hamiltonian h
and Ut = e−iht. Then for ψ ∈ B:
(i) Fˆ(ψ) ≡ lim
T→∞
1
2T
∫ T
−T〈Utψ,FUtψ〉dt exists
(ii) Fˆ(ψ) = Tr[Fρ] where ρ ∈ J+(H) with:
ρ =
∑
n Pn|ψ × ψ|Pn; Pn the projection onto the eigenspace Ln of h:
Ln = {φ | hφ = anφ}.
Proof
Let Ln be the eigenspaces of h, i.e.,
hφn = anφn ⇔ φn ∈ Ln
and let Pn denote the projection onto Ln. If P denotes the projection onto the
pure point spectral subspace of h then:
P = w-lim
N→∞
∑N
n Pn = s-limN→∞
∑N
n Pn = uw-limN→∞
∑N
n Pn
where ‘uw-lim’ means ultraweak limit. These results follow from the fact that∑N
n Pn is an increasing norm-bounded sequence of positive operators. Call:
ψN =
∑N
n=1 Pnψ
then:
〈UtψN,FUtψN〉 = ∑Nn,m ei(an−am)t〈Pnψ,FPmψ〉
Hence:
Fˆ(ψN) =
∑N
n,m〈Pnψ,FPmψ〉 limT→∞
1
2T
∫ T
−T e
i(an−am)tdt.
The cross-terms vanish by the Riemann-Lebesgue Lemma, leaving:
Fˆ(ψN) =
∑N
n 〈Pnψ,FPnψ〉 = Tr[FρN]
where:
ρN =
∑N
n Pn|ψ〉〈ψ|Pn.
Noting that P F P is norm-bounded and writing for φ ∈ B:
Chapter 3: Approximation and Localisation 150
〈Utφ,FUtφ〉 = 〈UtψN,FUtψN〉+〈UtψN,FUt(φ−ψN)〉+〈Ut(φ−ψN),FUtψN〉+
〈Ut(φ − ψN),FUt(φ − ψN)〉
we obtain for φ such that Fˆ(φ) exists:
|Fˆ(φ) − Fˆ(ψN)| ≤ ||φ − ψN|| {Tr[(FPF + F∗PF∗)ρN] + ||φ − ψN|| ||PFP|| }
Choosing φ = ψM, M > N we see that Fˆ(ψN) is Cauchy so that Fˆ(ψ) exists.
The ultraweak convergence of
∑N
n Pn enables us to conclude that:
lim
N→∞Tr[FρN] = Tr[Fρ] = Fˆ(ψ)
where:
ρ =
∑
n Pn|ψ〉〈ψ|Pn.
(Note Tr[ρ] = 1 and ρ > 0).
7. Quantum Mechanics - Average Stays
3M.22 Proposition
Let µΩ(ψ) be defined as in Section 3.2.7. Let Ut = e−iht then:
(i) B = {ψ ∈ H | ∃ positive compact operator with µΩ(ψ) > 0}
(ii) B⊥ = {ψ ∈ H | µΩ(ψ) = 0 for all positive compact operators}.
Proof
(i) Follows directly from Proposition 3M.21 by choosing Ω = F = |φn〉〈φn|where
φn is an eigenvector of h such that |〈φn, ψ〉| > 0. Such a φn must exist if B is non
zero.
(ii) is proved in the RAGE theorem ((RS 3) Th. XI. 115).
8. Quantum Mechanics - Transit Times & Scattering States
3M.23 Proposition
Let S be defined as in Section 3.2.8 then, for Ut = e−iht:
S = Hac(h)
where Hac(h) is the absolutely continuous spectral subspace of h.
Proof
See Lemma 1 and the remarks before it in Section XI.3 of (RS 3).
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3M.24 Corollary
Let Ut = e−iht. Let Hpp(h), Hsc(h) and Hac(h) denote the pure point, singular
continuous and absolutely continuous spectral subspaces of h (H = Hpp(h) ⊕
Hsc(h) ⊕Hac(h)). Let S,B and E be defined as in Section 3.2.8, then:
(i) Hpp(h)
= B ≡ {ψ ∈ H | evolution Utψ is contained in some compact set }
(ii) Hsc(h) ⊕Hac(h)
= {ψ ∈ H | average stay µΩ(ψ) w.r.t any compact Ω is zero }
(iii) Hac(h)
= S ≡ {ψ ∈ H | transit time τΩ(ψ) w.r.t. any compactΩ is finite}
(iv) Hsc(h) = E ≡ S⊥ ∩ B⊥
Proof
From previous results. Note that µΩ and τΩ are for all (past and future) times.
9. Quantum Mechanics - Comparison Dynamics
3M.25 Lemma
Define the sets D± as follows:
D± = {ψ ∈ H | ||ΩUtψ|| → 0 as t→ ±∞ ∀ compact operators Ω}
then:
(i) D± = {ψ ∈ H | w-lim
t→±∞ Utψ = 0}
(ii) D± are closed linear manifolds
(ii) S± ⊆ D±
(iv) D±⊥B
(v) If Ut = e−iht then Hac(h) ⊆ D±.
Proof
(i) ⊆: Use Ω = |φ〉〈φ| for each φ ∈ H.
⊇: a compact operator takes weakly convergent sequences into strongly
convergent sequences.
(ii) Linearity is obvious; for closure suppose ψn ∈ D± and ψn → ψ. Then:
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||ΩUtψ|| ≤ ||Ω|| ||ψn − ψ|| + ||ΩUtψn|| → 0.
(iii) First note that any positive compact operator may be written as Ω2 (or,
indeed, as Ω
1
2 ), where Ω is another positive compact operator. Next note that
||ΩUtψ|| is a continuous function of t. Finally, suppose ψ ∈ S±, then for any Ω:
τΩ
2
± (ψ) =
∫
R± ||ΩUtψ||2 dt < ∞
so ||ΩUtψ|| is a non-negative square-integrable continuous function. Hence
||ΩUtψ|| → 0 as t→ ±∞.
(iv) Let ψ ∈ D± and φ ∈ B. Then there exists a positive compact operator Ω such
that ||Ω−1Utφ|| ≤ 1 ∀t ∈ R. Hence:
〈ψ,φ〉 = 〈Utψ,Utφ〉 = 〈ΩUtψ,Ω−1Utφ〉
and:
|〈ψ,φ〉| ≤ ||ΩUtψ|| ||Ω−1Utφ|| ≤ ||ΩUtψ|| → 0.
(v) Follows directly from (ii), (iii) and Proposition 3M.23.
3M.26 Proposition (Chernoff)
Let the V-asymptotic vectors S±(U,V) of the evolution Ut be defined as in Section
3.2.9. Let Vt be an evolution with S±(V) = H and let B(U) be the bound vectors
of Ut. Then:
S±(U,V) ⊆ B(U)⊥.
Proof
Let ψ ∈ S±(U,V). By assumption ∃ψ′ such that:
ψ = lim
t→±∞Ut
∗Vtψ′.
Let φ ∈ B(U) and consider:
〈φ,ψ〉 = lim
t→±∞〈φ,Ut
∗Vtψ′〉 = lim
t→±∞〈Utφ,Vtψ
′〉.
Since φ ∈ B(U) then {Utφ} ⊆ compact set. Also, ψ′ is in D±(V), so by using
Lemma 3M.25 (i) in the form:
〈φ,Vtψ′〉 → 0 uniformly for φ in a compact set,
we conclude that 〈φ,ψ〉 = 0 as required.
Chapter 4
The Relation Between Classical and
Quantum Mechanics
This Chapter draws on ideas and results presented in previous Chapters to
address the key question of the thesis: in what sense are classical and quantum
mechanics related?
To place the question in context the Chapter starts with a critique of previous
approaches - quantisation and classical limits. It concludes that serious flaws
exist in these approaches, most importantly at the highest level of stating the
problem to be solved. Accordingly, resort is made to the analysis of inter-
theoretic reduction, introduced in Chapter 1, in order to formulate the analytic
problem of reduction of classical mechanics to quantum mechanics. This leads
to statement of the problem of reduction in the following form:
Given a classical mechanical system, a set of physical circumstances, a set of
empirical propositions and an “acceptable error”, find a quantum mechanical
description of a system with predictions indistinguishable, within the acceptable
error, from those of the classical propositions.
In this way the onus is placed on quantum mechanics to provide a subtheory
weakly equivalent to the classical description of a system.
Choice of a theory within quantum mechanics is constrained by the requirement
of identifying symbols in the empirical propositions of the secondary theory
(classical mechanics) with symbols in the primary theory (quantum mechanics).
The analysis of Chapter 2 provides two such identifications:
• Identification of basic abstractions in the theory of systems (e.g. pure state,
property, expected value).
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• Identification of kinematic properties and propositions arising from a com-
mon space-time geometry (e.g. evolution of expected values of kinematic
properties).
Incorporating these constraints leads to a much more precise statement of the
problem in which essentially the only variable is the choice of state in quantum
mechanics. Results from geometric quantisation and the work of Hagedorn (Ha
2) are applied to determine suitable states.
Overall, therefore, this Chapter provides a procedure for testing whether a
reduction of classical mechanics to quantum mechanics is acceptable. Although
particular cases or examples are not examined, these could provide the content
of future research.
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4.1 Review
Ever since the Old Quantum Theory there have been attempts to relate the
formalisms of classical and quantum mechanics. This Section reviews some of
these attempts, which fall into two broad categories:
• quantisations: derivation of quantum mechanics from classical mechanics;
• classical limits: derivation of classical mechanics from quantum mechan-
ics.
1) Quantisations
Quantisations date back to the prescriptions of the Old Quantum Theory. In
more recent times there have been basically two approaches, quantisation of
observables and quantisation of states.
a) Observables
Dirac successfully used the analogy between Poisson brackets and commuta-
tors to provide quantum mechanical descriptions for the simpler Hamiltonian
systems with symmetry. Effort was directed to raising this analogy to the sta-
tus of a Lie algebra homomorphism between certain functions on phase space
(with Poisson bracket as Lie product) and certain operators on Hilbert space
(with commutators as Lie product). That this homomorphism does not exist
was demonstrated by Van Hove (see AM 1) Section 5.4).
We note four points in conclusion to this “Dirac problem”:
(i) The analogy depends for its success on the symmetry of the problem. This
is not surprising in view of the ambition of Lie algebra homomorphism. For
‘kinematic observables’ the relativity group ensures success (see Chapter 2).
(ii) For Riemannian configuration space manifolds the analogy breaks down
even for kinetic energy and momentum (see (AM 1) page 242).
(iii) In the usual phase space S ≈ R2n, the Lie algebra homomorphism fails for
polynomials in position and momentum of degree greater than or equal to three
(see (AM 1) Theorem 5.49).
(iv) The Weyl-Wigner-Moyal correspondence between the ‘Moyal bracket’ and
commutators achieves a modified form of quantisation. See, for example, (AW
1) for some details of this and similar correspondences in the ‘phase-space’
formulations of quantum mechanics.
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b) States
The Souriau-Kostant program is to construct the quantum dynamics on a Hilbert
space from a Hamiltonian flow on a symplectic manifold. It comprises three
stages, the first two of which provide a Hilbert space:
(i) Prequantisation - the prequantisation Hilbert space is the space of square-
integrable sections of the complex line bundle of a suitable (‘quantisable’) sym-
plectic manifold.
(ii) Polarisation - selection of a Lagrangian foliation of the symplectic manifold
and identification of a quantum Hilbert space as those prequantisation functions
which are constant on the leaves of the foliation.
(iii) Dynamics - construction of unitary operators on this Hilbert space corre-
sponding to the classical flow.
Unfortunately there are, in general, unitarily inequivalent polarisations of a
symplectic manifold so that the quantum system is not uniquely determined.
Moreover, analysis of the dynamics has not been carried out except in special
cases. See (Vo 2) Section 6.3 for discussion of these points.
In conclusion, quantisation programmes have failed to provide an abstract con-
nection between classical and quantum mechanics. Where they have succeeded
the success is attributable to a common kinematic group structure.
2) Classical Limits
Classical limits also date back to the Old Quantum Theory in the form of the
‘Correspondence Principle’. Nowadays the classical limit refers to the behaviour
of some quantum mechanical object of interest as Planck’s constant tends to zero.
Before attempting to interpret this limit we review the two principal approaches
to classical limits:
a) Asymptotic Expansions
This approach involves making asymptotic expansions of relevant mathematical
objects in powers of Planck’s constant. There are two types of this theory.
(i) WKB-Maslov asymptotic solutions to the Schro¨dinger equation.
This method provides eigenstates, or solutions to the Cauchy prob-
lem, as asymptotic expansions for the time-independent, or time-
dependent, Schro¨dinger equation. The zeroth order terms in Planck’s
constant are the Hamilton-Jacobi equations of classical mechanics.
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Maslov regularised the traditional WKB method by formulating it in
phase space. See (ES 1) for an accessible account of Maslov’s work.
(ii) Phase-space formulations of quantum mechanics. In this method,
algebras of pseudo-differential operators are applied to the Weyl-
Wigner-Moyal formulation of quantum mechanics. Semi-classical
states are defined as ‘asymptotic functionals’ on these algebras. See
(Vo 1) for further details.
The asymptotic expansion techniques have enjoyed considerable success, no-
tably in the computation of ‘semi-classical’ eigenvalues which are often in good
agreement with experiment. Their theoretical status is not, however, at all clear,
not least because error estimates for the expansions are rarely provided. Fur-
thermore, whilst useful for ‘stationary state’ problems the methods are difficult
to apply to finite-time evolution problems.
b) Evolution of Coherent States
It has long been a folk-lore that coherent states provide the most classical-
like quantum states. Dating back to Schro¨dinger’s minimum-uncertainty wave
packets, coherent states have more recently found application in the area of
quantum optics. The extensive literature on coherent states partly arises from
the variety of definitions in use, depending on which abstract feature is being
emphasised. In this thesis we shall mean Gaussian coherent states (cf. Appendix
4.2).
In the ‘coherent state’ method the basic idea is to approximate the quantum evo-
lution with an evolution generated by a time-dependent quadratic Hamiltonian
which is the full Hamiltonian expressed to second order around the classical
trajectory.
Amongst those with contributions in this line are Hepp (He 1), Hagedorn (Ha
2) and Heller (He 2, 3, 4).
Hepp’s work is discussed in Appendix 4.2 as it exemplifies the problems associ-
ated with ~ (Planck’s constant)→ 0 limit. His scope is the one-dimensional case.
Hagedorn treats the multi-dimensional case and provides the relative phase of
the approximating evolution (which cancels out in Hepp’s approach), and it is
this work which provides the basis for our analysis in Section 4.3. Hagedorn
also treats scattering theory as does Yajima (Ya 1), although Yajima uses sta-
tionary phase methods quite different from Hagedorn. Heller, notably in (He
2), analyses quadratic approximation dynamics for Gaussian wave packets and
provides some computations as well as dealing with scattering theory.
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Other approaches to the classical limit using coherent states include Davies in
(Da 3) and Simon in (Si 1), the latter for statistical mechanical applications.
c) Analysis of the Classical Limit ~→0
Everyone agrees that in the real world Planck’s constant, ~, is a fundamental
constant; that is, it has a fixed magnitude. Besides devotees of hidden-variable
theories everyone also agrees that for certain phenomena quantum mechanics
makes different predictions to classical mechanics. Finally it is agreed that the
empirically relevant propositions of both theories refer to physical quantities
which have magnitude (physical dimensions).
In light of these principles, ~ →0 could mean either that the magnitude of ~ →0
or that the numerical value (relative to a family of physical units) of ~→0. Let us
examine these in turn:
(i) Magnitude of ~ →0. This approach makes statements about a family of
possible quantum theories, parameterised by ~, of which the real world is one.
From Chapter 3 we know that existence of a limit is neither necessary nor
sufficient for an approximation to hold. In particular, sufficiency additionally
requires estimates of convergence in order to determine the error incurred when
the asymptotic parameter has a fixed non-zero value. Thus, just because the
magnitude of ~ is small relative to everyday magnitudes we cannot conclude
that merely the existence of a limit solves the reduction problem.
(ii) Numerical value of ~ →0. This approach aims to show that by rescaling
physical quantities the ‘quantum effects’ become relatively, indeed numerically,
small. The drawbacks of using limits just discussed apply in a similar way.
However, this approach is distinguished from (i) by the ability to go arbitrarily
near to the limit by means of suitable scaling. It is therefore important to examine
the ideas behind scaling. Mathematical physics typically treats all quantities as
dimensionless relative to a fixed choice of physical units. The rescaling of units
requires careful attention to the consistent use of symbols. For example, the
dilation which transforms position and momentum to the form ((He 1) equation
(1.6)):
“ph =
√
~p; q~ =
√
~q where p = −i ddx and q = x”
is, as it stands, meaningless in terms of physical quantities. Appendix 4.1
presents a consistent theory of scaling which is applied in Appendix 4.2 to the
work of Hepp (He 1) on the classical limit. The conclusion of Appendix 4.2 is that
in terms of scaling a classical limit holds for a family of suitably scaled Hamiltonians
and for large magnitudes of position and momentum. The interpretation of ~→0
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as simply a change of scale is therefore unacceptable as it involves a concurrent
change in the form of the Hamiltonian.
In conclusion, not only is the idea of ‘classical limit’ flawed but additionally the
lack of clear concepts can lead to ‘proofs’ which are attacking a different physical
problem.
Chapter 4: The Relation Between Classical and Quantum Mechanics 160
4.2 Formulation of the Approach
With neither ‘quantisations’ nor ‘classical limits’ providing a sound basis for
relating classical mechanics to quantum mechanics, we return to the principles
of intertheoretic reduction already considered from a philosophical angle in
Section 1.4.
Identifying the primary theory as quantum mechanics and the secondary theory
as classical mechanics it is necessary to specify:
(a) Fundamental models - for classical and quantum mechanics.
(b) Empirically relevant propositions - in classical mechanics.
(c) Identifications - between the symbols in the empirically relevant
propositions of classical mechanics and certain symbols in quantum
mechanics.
(d) Criteria of identity - in order to accept that certain propositions
in quantum mechanics are (weakly) equivalent to those identified
- using (c) - from the empirically relevant propositions in classical
mechanics.
(e) Conditions of deducibility - in quantum mechanics such that
propositions satisfying the criteria of identity are true.
(a) to (e) constitute a solution to the Analytic Problem of Reduction; for this to
be acceptable it is also necessary to apply:
(f) Co-ordinative definitions - for both classical and quantum me-
chanics to test the applicability, connectivity and indistinguishability
of the reduction.
To build up a statement of what needs to be proved we examine each of these
in turn.
a) Fundamental models
These were developed and stated in Chapter 2. With that in mind, the scope
of this analysis will be a single elementary Galilean system in an external field.
Moreover, spin will be ignored.
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b) Empirically Relevant Propositions
Candidates for the empirically relevant propositions in classical mechanics in-
clude:
(i) ‘Infinitesimal’ propositions: For a system specified by a Hamil-
tonian function, h, on some set, Ω, in phase space, then any state
α ≡ (ξ, pi) ∈ Ω satisfies Hamilton’s equations:
α˙ ≡ (ξ˙, p˙i) = (∇pih,−∇ξh).
(ii) ‘Finite’ propositions: For a system specified by a Hamiltonian function, h,
and for some time T, and some set, Ω, in phase space, then:
There exists a solution α(t) ≡ (ξ(t), pi(t)) of Hamilton’s equations for
0 ≤ t ≤ T and initial data α(0) ≡ (ξ(0), pi(0)) ∈ Ω.
Notes:
1. The infinitesimal propositions could have been phrased in more geometric
terms but we choose this form to connect them with Ehrenfest’s theorem
in Appendix 4.3.
2. In the finite propositions α(t) can be viewed as a ‘state trajectory’ or a
‘kinematic properties trajectory’ or an ‘expected value trajectory’ (of the
kinematic properties of a state), these being degenerate in classical me-
chanics.
The infinitesimal propositions were considered early in the development of
quantum theory, a ‘solution’ to the problem of reduction being Ehrenfest’s the-
orem which is presented in Appendix 4.3. From there it is evident that the
‘solution’ is unsatisfactory, and it will not be pursued further. We shall instead
concentrate on the finite propositions.
Although the reader may feel that there are features of classical mechanics
which have been overlooked, the finite propositions are the core of classical
mechanics, being the basic statement of classical particle dynamics. A solution
of the Analytic Problem of Reduction will therefore be taken with respect to the
finite propositions.
c) Identifications
Up to this point the problem of reduction according to Chapter 1 still leaves
us free to formulate any sub-theory of quantum mechanics which is weakly
equivalent to classical mechanics. It is the identification of symbols in the
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propositions of classical mechanics with certain symbols in quantum mechanics
which now constrains the form of the quantum sub-theory. By their nature, such
identifications reflect the common ground of the two theories which we know
from Chapter 2 to comprise the abstractions, such as pure state, in the theory of
systems and the propositions arising from a common space-time structure.
From the empirically relevant propositions chosen in (b) it is necessary to iden-
tify:
(i) Classes of objects for (pure) states, properties and expected values.
(ii) Time T.
(iii) Expected values of position and momentum (see Note 2 in (b)
above).
(iv) Hamiltonian h.
For (i), formulation of the fundamental models already provides the identifica-
tions. Thus, for example, we are clear from Chapter 2 on what a pure state is in
both theories.
Time is straightforward from its status in the Galilei group together with the
definition of flow.
For the expected values of position and momentum we again use the Galilei
group to link the theories, this time through the kinematic properties as gen-
erators of symmetry transformations. If the classical state is α ≡ (ξ, pi) and the
classical kinematic properties of position and momentum are ac ≡ (qc, pc), the
expected values in the classical case are:
E(ac, α) ≡ (E(qc, α),E(pc, α)) = (ξ, pi) ≡ α.
In the quantum case, with a pure state represented by a unit vector, Ψ, in Hilbert
space, and a ≡ (q, p) denoting the quantum kinematic properties of position and
momentum, we have for suitable Ψ:
E(α,Ψ) ≡ (E(q,Ψ), E(p,Ψ)) = (< Ψ, qΨ >,< Ψ, pΨ >) ≡ a.
We therefore choose the identification, I, of kinematic propositions in the two
theories as the association (denoted by the symboly):
α ≡ (ξ, pi) Iy (< Ψ, qΨ >, < Ψ, pΨ >) ≡ a.
I is not a mapping as the identification merely specifies which categories of object
are to be related by the criteria of identity.
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Finally we need to consider the Hamiltonian. From Chapter 2, Section 2.7,
Galilean space-time leads in both classical and quantum mechanics to generators
of evolution (Hamiltonians) of the form:
1
2m (p − A)2 + V.
The identification we therefore choose for Hamiltonians is an identical specifi-
cation of the ‘free variables’ - the vector potential, A, and the scalar potential,
V.
(d) Criteria of Identity
Following the discussion of Chapter 3, Section 3.1, the criteria of identity are that
propositions must agree to within an acceptable error,  say, which is specified
for each required reduction. The criterion for identity is therefore the condition:
|α(t) − a(t)| < .
(e) Conditions of Deducibility
These are conditions, in solely quantum-mechanical terms, for which the reduc-
tion can be proved. Note that to solve the Analytic Problem of Reduction only
one such condition, subject to the identifications, need be found even though
others may exist.
The only remaining free quantum ‘parameter’ is the choice of state, so our final
phrasing of the Analytic Problem of Reduction is therefore:
The Analytic Problem of Reduction is solved relative to the classical
parameters (Ω, h,T) and acceptable error  if for each α(0) ∈ Ω and
for each t ∈ [0,T] there exists Ψ ∈ Ω, where Ω is a set of quantum
states, such that |α(t) − a(t)| < .
(f) Co-ordinative definitions
The co-ordinative definitions will not trouble us much as we are analysing the
behaviour of expected values of kinematic properties under non-relativistic dy-
namics, and the significance of these is guaranteed by the representation of
space-time structure. Note, however, that co-ordinative definitions could be a
problem if the empirically relevant propositions were at a lower level of abstrac-
tion, such as the analysis of a particular experiment. In general, propositions
involving exotic ‘observables’ would be difficult to interpret by themselves.
However, as argued in Chapter 2, we take the view that ‘observables’ in an
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experiment arise from the more fundamental dynamical behaviour (albeit in a
non-trivial way!).
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4.3 A Solution to the Analytic Problem of Reduction
Our problem is to find quantum states such that the magnitude |α(t) − a(t)| is
less than an asserted acceptable error . Note that α, a and  are 6-dimensional
vectors corresponding to position and momentum.
Our overall strategy in solving this problem will be to
• Find an ‘approximating evolution’ W(t, 0) and state ψ such that:
α(t) = 〈ψ,W(t, 0)∗aW(t, 0)ψ〉
• Use a ‘comparator’ operator Ω to control the possibly erratic behaviour
of quantum states outside the region of physical significance. This oper-
ator acts as a sort of phase-space projection and converts the unbounded
operators, a, into a more friendly form.
1. Abstract Estimate of the Error
For the first part of the development assume that an ‘approximating evolution’
W(t, 0) and state ψ have been found. With these given the argument is based on
the following formal result:
4.1 Proposition (Formal)
Suppose there exists a propagator W(t, 0) and a state ψ such that:
α(t) = 〈ψ,W(t, 0)∗aW(t, 0)ψ〉.
Then formally:
|α(t) − a(t)| ≤ ||(W(t, 0) −U(t))ψ|| . ||a(W(t, 0) + U(t))ψ||.
Proof
Use the following formula applicable to bounded operators A, B, C:
2(B∗AB − C∗AC) = (B∗ − C∗)A(B + C) + (B∗ + C∗)A(B − C).
Then set A = a, B = W(t, 0) and C = U(t) and apply the Schwartz inequality to:
|α(t) − a(t)| = |〈ψ,W(t, 0)∗aW(t, 0)ψ〉 − 〈ψ,U(t)∗aU(t)ψ〉|.
An interpretation of Proposition 4.1 is that the difference between the classical
and quantum evolutions of expected values is dominated by the product of two
terms:
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(i) The norm difference ||(W −U)ψ|| between the approximating and
full quantum evolutions of the state, AND
(ii) The approximate phase-space position ||a(W + U)ψ|| of the state.
Most work on the relation between classical and quantum mechanics has hith-
erto focussed on estimating (i) so our immediate objectives are to:
• Make the formal Proposition 4.1 rigorous.
• Estimate the approximate phase-space position arising from the rigorous
version of Proposition 4.1.
Throughout, we assume the classical evolution α(t) is given.
4.2 Proposition
Suppose there exists a propagator W(t, 0) and a state vector ψ in a Hilbert space
H ≈ L2(R3) such that:
α(t) = 〈ψ,W(t, 0)∗aW(t, 0)ψ〉.
Suppose further that U(t)ψ ∈ D(a) for all t ∈ [0,T].
Let Ω be a bounded operator such that Ω∗aΩ are bounded operators, then:
|α(t) − a(t)| ≤ ||(W(t, 0) −U(t))ψ|| . 2||Ω∗aΩ||
+ |〈W(t, 0)ψ, (a −Ω∗aΩ)W(t, 0)ψ〉|
+ |〈U(t)ψ, (a −Ω∗aΩ)U(t)ψ〉|.
Proof
Apply the result quoted in the proof of Proposition 4.1 and the Schwartz in-
equality to:
|〈ψ,W∗aWψ〉 − 〈ψ,W∗Ω∗aΩWψ〉
+〈ψ,W∗Ω∗aΩWψ〉 − 〈ψ,U∗Ω∗aΩUψ〉
+〈ψ,U∗Ω∗aΩUψ〉 − 〈ψ,U∗aUψ〉|.
4.3 Remarks
Notice that by this Proposition the term representing approximate phase-space
position has changed to ||Ω∗aΩ|| which depends on the ‘comparator’ opera-
tor Ω. Dependency on the state has transferred to the two terms 〈W(t, 0), (a −
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Ω∗aΩ)W(t, 0)ψ〉 and 〈U(t)ψ, (a − Ω∗aΩ)U(t)ψ〉 which represent the error in re-
stricting a to Ω∗aΩ.
4.4 Definition
Define, for a compact self-adjoint operator Ω, the set of states within magnitude E
by:
ΩE ≡ {ψ ∈ Ran(Ω)| ||Ω−1ψ|| ≤ E }.
4.5 Proposition
Let B be a self-adjoint operator. Let Ω be a positive compact operator with dense
range such that B is Ω−1-bounded, then for any ψ ∈ ΩE:
|〈ψ, (B −ΩBΩ)ψ〉| ≤ (E + 1) ||BΩ|| ||(1 −Ω)ψ||.
Proof
Recall first that if B is A-bounded for some operator A then D(A) ⊂ D(B) and
there exist constants a, b ≥ 0 such that:
||Bψ|| ≤ a||Aψ|| +b||ψ|| ∀ψ ∈ D(A)
Since D(Ω−1) = Ran(Ω) then ΩE ⊂ D(B). Also, we have that BΩ is bounded
since:
||BΩφ|| ≤ a||Ω−1Ωφ|| +b||Ωφ||.
These results justify the manipulations in the following argument:
|〈ψ, (B −ΩBΩ)ψ〉| ≤ ||B(1 + Ω)ψ|| ||(1 −Ω)ψ||
≤ ||BΩ(Ω−1 + 1)ψ|| ||(1 −Ω)ψ||
≤ ||(Ω−1 + 1)ψ|| ||BΩ|| ||(1 −Ω)ψ||.
The result follows from noting that ψ ∈ ΩE.
4.6 Remarks
Proposition 4.5 expresses the idea that the difference in expected value between
an operator B and its Ω-restricted form ΩBΩ is given by the product of three
terms:
• The order of magnitude threshold.
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• The bound of the operator when dominated by the bounding inverse Ω−1
of the comparator.
• The error in ‘projecting’ with Ω; that is, the difference between Ω and the
identity as far as ψ is concerned.
As shown by the Proposition, the operator Ω fulfils two principal functions:
• As an appropriate comparator for the physics of interest. Typically, Ω
might be chosen as a measure of the energy range applicable to a problem.
• Providing an approximate identity for states of interest, effectively acting
as a phase-space projection even though no true phase-space projection op-
erators exist. The phase-space aspect follows from the analysis of compact
operators in Chapter 3.
Finally, we note that the condition that Ran(Ω) is dense is only included to tie
up with the usual definition of relative boundedness.
4.7 Theorem
Suppose there exists a propagator W(t, 0) and a state vector ψ in a Hilbert space
H ≈ L2(R3) such that:
α(t) = 〈ψ,W(t, 0)∗aW(t, 0)ψ〉.
Let Ω be a positive compact operator such that the operators in a are each
Ω−1-bounded.
Suppose finally that U(t)ψ ∈ ΩE and W(t, 0)ψ ∈ ΩE for all t ∈ [0,T], then:
|α(t) − a(t)| ≤
||aΩ|| {{2||Ω|| +(E + 1) ||1 −Ω|| } ||(W(t, 0) −U(t))ψ||
+2(E + 1) ||(1 −Ω)W(t, 0)ψ|| }.
Proof
The result follows from Propositions 4.2 and 4.5.
4.8 Remarks
(1) The right-hand side of the inequality in the theorem resembles that in Propo-
sition 4.1 with the additional terms deriving from the ‘comparator’ operator Ω.
Specifically, the conclusion of the Theorem has the form:
|α(t) − a(t)| ≤ ω{m1∆1 + m2∆2}
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where:
ω ≡ ||aΩ|| is the approximate phase-space position.
m1 ≡ 2||Ω|| +(E + 1) ||1 −Ω|| is a fixed magnitude determined by the
operator Ω and set of states ΩE.
∆1 ≡ ||(W(t, 0) −U(t))ψ|| is the difference between the approximating
and full quantum evolutions of the particular state.
m2 ≡ 2(E + 1) is another fixed magnitude determined by the set of
states ΩE.
∆2 ≡ ||(1 − Ω)W(t, 0)ψ|| represents the difference between the com-
parator Ω and the identity for the particular state.
(2) Concerning the conditions:
• The supposition that W(t, 0) and ψ exist, and an example choice for the
operator Ω as well as the requirement that W(t, 0) ∈ ΩE will shortly be
examined.
• The major problem with the theorem is the requirement that U(t)ψ ∈ ΩE.
We are unable to offer a satisfactory solution to this problem in the thesis. The
aim is to determine conditions on Hamiltonian h, rather than the evolution
U(t), so that a suitable Ω could be found for some E, t ∈ [0,T]. For instance,
would a condition based on h being Ω−1-bounded be appropriate? Apart
from this notable deficiency, Theorem 4.7 solves the Analytic Problem of
Reduction in a manner we shall now make clear.
With Theorem 4.7 the first part of our development is complete. It remains to find
suitable Ω, W(t, 0) and ψ and then estimate the right-hand side of the inequality
in the theorem. As we shall see, however, the equations whose solution is needed
for the estimates are very complicated and a closed-form estimate is unrealistic.
So, furthering the call-and-response approach already adopted, our aim will
not be an explicit error estimate but rather a procedure within which numerical
methods may be applied to evaluate the error for particular circumstances.
Overall, therefore, our solution to the Analytic Problem of Reduction will be
a method for determining whether the reduction holds. If the reader doubts
that this is a solution let him provide particular classical circumstances and an
acceptable error. Although we cannot provide the answer we can show the
reader how to go about determining an answer.
We look first at the form of the approximating evolution W(t, 0) and the choice
of state ψ, and then at the comparator operator Ω.
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2. The Approximating Evolution and Choice of State
The first task is to find aψ and W(t, 0) such that they yield the classical evolution
α(t) in the form:
α(t) = 〈ψ,W(t, 0)∗aW(t, 0)ψ〉.
The most obvious candidate is a unitary automorphism Tα of the Weyl algebra
{a, 1} ≡ {Q,P, 1} such that:
Tα(a) = a + α; a =
(
Q
P
)
; α =
(
ξ
pi
)
and Tα(a) = U(α)∗aU(α) for some unitary operator U(α).
The solution to this problem is well-known (see, for instance, (Vo 1)) and pro-
vided by the Weyl operators. The next Lemma collects together some pertinent
features of the Weyl operators which we shall need.
4.8 Lemma
Let U(α) ≡ e−iω(α,a) ≡ U(ξ, pi), where ω(α, a) ≡ ξ.P − pi.Q, then:
(i) (U(α)ψ)(x) = exp( i2piξ) exp(ipi.(x − ξ)) ψ(x − ξ).
(ii) U(α)U(β) = exp(− i2ω(α, β)) U(α + β).
(iii) U(α)aU(α)∗ = a − α.
Proof
For (i) see (Da 1) Equation (5.1). (ii) and (iii) may be proved by direct computation
from (i).
Of particular interest to us is the case where α(t) is a continuous trajectory in the
classical phase-space. The next Lemma looks at U(α(t)) as a propagator:
4.9 Lemma
Let α(t) ∈ C1(R,R6) then the strong derivative of U(α(t)) is given by:
i ddtU(α(t)) = {ω(α˙(t), a) − 12ω(α˙(t), α(t))} U(α(t)).
Proof
We give only a formal proof - for a rigorous treatment of domain questions see
(GV 1).
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d
dtU(α(t)) = limδt→0
1
δt {U(α(t + δt)) −U(α(t))}
= lim
δt→0
1
δt {U(α(t + δt))U(α(t))∗ − 1} U(α(t))
= lim
δt→0
1
δt {U(α(t+δt)−α(t)) . exp( i2ω(α(t+δt), α(t)))−1}U(α(t))
= {−iω(α˙(t), a) + i2ω(α˙(t), α(t))} U(α(t)).
4.10 Corollary
Let α(t) be Hamiltonian; that is, there exists a Hamiltonian function h(α) such
that:
α˙(t) = J.h(1)(α(t))
where J ≡
(
0 1
−1 0
)
; h(1)(α(t)) ≡
(
δξh
δpih
)
|α(t)
.
Then:
i ddtU(α(t)) = {〈h(1)(α(t)), a〉 − 12〈h(1)(α(t)), α(t)〉} U(α(t))
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product on R6.
Proof
Follows from Lemma 4.9 if we notice that ω(α, β) = 〈α, J.β〉.
Now, to satisfy the initial condition 〈ψ, aψ〉 = α(0) we may choose
ψ ≡ U(α(0))Γ where the state vector Γ satisfies 〈Γ, aΓ〉 = 0.
It follows that any W(t, 0) of the form
U(α(t))V(t, 0)U(α(0))∗
where V(t, 0) is some propagator, satisfies:
〈ψ,W(t, 0)∗aW(t, 0)ψ〉 = 〈V(t, 0)Γ, aV(t, 0)Γ〉 + α(t).
So, provided 〈V(t, 0)Γ, aV(t, 0)Γ〉 = 0 we have found a suitable W(t, 0) and state
ψ ≡ U(α(0))Γ.
We round-off our preliminary results by a set of notational definitions and a
Proposition providing a general propagator.
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4.11 Definition
(1) Let h(a) denote the self-adjoint quantum Hamiltonian operator corresponding
to the classical Hamiltonian function h(α).
(2) h0(t) ≡ h(α(t))
h1(t) ≡ 〈h(1)(α(t)), a〉
h2(t) ≡ 12〈a, h(2)(α(t)).a〉
h(1)(α(t)) ≡
(
δξh
δpih
)
|α(t)
h(2)(α(t)) ≡
(
δ2ξξh δ
2
ξpih
δ2piξh δ
2
pipih
)
|α(t)
.
(3) hquad(t) ≡ h0(t) + h1(t) + h2(t).
(4) Let U(t) denote the one-parameter unitary group generated by h(a).
(5) Let X(t, 0) denote the propagator generated by:
h(α(t)) − 12〈h(1)(α(t)), α(t)〉.
4.12 Proposition
Introduce an operator f (t) which has the useful property that any manipulation
it is used in is valid.
Let W(t, 0) be the propagator generated by:
U(α(t))g(t)U(α(t))∗
where g(t) ≡ h0(t) + h1(t) + f (t).
Let Z(t, 0) be the propagator generated by f (t), then:
W(t, 0) = X(t, 0)U(α(t))Z(t, 0)U(α(0))∗
Proof
Again ignoring domain questions (which are somewhat irrelevant given the
magical power of f (t)!), the result can be verified by obtaining the generator of
the right-hand-side. Differentiation gives:
h0(t)−12〈h(1)(α(t)), α(t)〉+ 〈h(1)(α(t)), a〉−12〈h(1)(α(t)), α(t)〉+ U(α(t)) f (t)U(α(t))∗
= U(α(t)) {h0(t) + h1(t) + f (t)} U(α(t))∗
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= U(α(t))g(t)U(α(t))∗.
This generator together with the correct value at t = 0 provides the result.
Clearly this W(t, 0) has the required form since X(t, 0) is only a phase. It remains
to find Z(t, 0) - that is to say, our magical operator f (t) - and a state Γ such that:
〈Z(t, 0)Γ, aZ(t, 0)Γ〉 = 0.
Before doing this let us suppose that such Z(t, 0) and Γ exist and, following Hepp
(He 1), estimate the difference in state evolution ||(W −U)ψ|| using the Duhamel
formula:
4.13 Proposition
Let U,W,X,Z be as in Definition 4.11 and Proposition 4.12. Suppose Z(t, 0) and
Γ ≡ U(α(0))∗ψ exist such that:
〈Z(t, 0)Γ, aZ(t, 0)Γ〉 = 0 ∀t ∈ [0,T].
Define a ‘remainder’ operator R(s) as the difference between the quantum Hamil-
tonian centred around the classical trajectory and the generator of the approxi-
mating evolution:
R(t) ≡ h(α(t) + a) − g(t).
Provided U(t − s)W(s, 0)ψ is strongly differentiable in s, then:
||(W(t, 0) −U(t))ψ|| ≤ ∫ t
0
ds ||R(s)Z(s, 0)Γ||.
Proof
Given that the strong derivative of U(t − s)W(s, 0)ψ exists then the Duhamel
formula is valid:
(W(t, 0) −U(t))ψ = ∫ t
0
ds ddsU(t − s)W(s, 0)ψ.
Now:
d
dsU(t − s)W(s, 0)ψ = U(t − s) {ih(a) − iU(α(s))g(s)U(α(s))∗}W(s, 0)ψ.
So, taking the norm:
||(W(t, 0) −U(t))ψ|| ≤ ∫ t
0
ds ||{h(a) −U(α(s))g(s)U(α(s))∗}W(s, 0)ψ||
=
∫ t
0
ds ||{h(a + α(s)) − g(s)} Z(s, 0)Γ||.
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Remarks
(1) To meet our aim of providing a means to compute the error it will be necessary
to find expressions for R(s), Z(s, 0), Γ and, hopefully, the state Z(s, 0)Γ.
(2) In the case where the Hamiltonian is h(a) = 12mP
2 + V(Q) and V is twice-
differentiable the ‘remainder’ R(t) takes the form (using Taylor’s theorem):
R(t) = P
2
2m +
∫ Q
0
(Q − y)V(2)(αt + y) dy − f (t).
It would seem appropriate that f (t) should at least include a term to cancel the
quantum kinetic energy P
2
2m .
The form we choose for the propagator Z(t, 0) derives from the following abstract
group theoretical result concerning the metaplectic group:
4.15 Proposition
Let g ∈ Sp(n) denote the symplectic group and let sp(n) denote its Lie algebra,
then:
(1) There exists a projective representation, U, of Sp(n) in the Hilbert space
L2(Rn) generated by quadratic operators of the form 〈a,Ga〉 where G ∈ sp(n).
This representation is known as the metaplectic representation of Sp(n) and is a
faithful realisation of the metaplectic group Mp(n).
(2) Each U(g) generates an automorphism of the Weyl algebra {a, 1} according
to:
U(g)aU(g)∗ = g ◦ a.
For example, if
g =
(
α β
γ δ
)
then g ◦ a =
(
αQ + βP
γQ + δP
)
Proof
See, for example, Section 4 of (Vo 2).
This result tells us a great deal if we choose f (t) to be quadratic of the form
〈a,Ga〉, because then Z(t, 0) = U(g) for some g ∈ Sp(n) and:
〈ψ, aψ〉 = 0
⇒ 〈ψ,Z(t, 0)aZ(t, 0)ψ〉
= g ◦ 〈ψ, aψ〉 = 0.
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That is, any such Z(t, 0) meets our requirement. Recalling Definition 4.11 it makes
obvious sense to choose the generator of f (t) as h2(t). Hence, for a Hamiltonian
of the form:
h(a) = 12mP
2 + V(q)
we may apply Taylor’s theorem to determine the remainder as:
R(t) = 12
∫ Q
0
(Q − y)2V(3)(αt + y)dy.
This leaves the state Γ ≡ U(α(0))∗ψ as the only ‘unknown’ in the error term
||R(t)Z(t, 0)Γ||. For this error we can anticipate a dependency on the ‘dispersion’
of Γ. For example, if Γ is widely spread over space the remainder term threatens
to be large. As we shall see, there is a play-off between the position-space and
momentum-space dispersions in choosing a suitable Γ.
The following result provides an appropriate class of states together with the
equations necessary to determine their evolution under Z(t, 0).
4.16 Proposition
Let g =
(
α β
γ δ
)
∈ Sp(n) and define in L2(Rn):
Γ(x) = pi
−n
4 exp(− 12〈x, x〉).
Let U(g) be the metaplectic representative of g, then:
U(g)Γ ≡ ΓM(g)
where:
M(g) = B(g)−1A(g)
A(g) = α + iγ
B(g) = δ − iβ
ΓM(g)(x) = pi
−n
4 |B(g)|− 12 exp(−12〈x,M(g)x〉).
Moreover, if g(t) is the symplectic transformation generated by h(2)(α(t)) and
Z(t, 0) is the corresponding metaplectic transformation generated by h2(t) (see
Definition 4.11), then:
Z(t, s)ΓM(s) = ΓM(t)
where the equation of motion for M is:
M˙ = iδ2ξξh − (M.δ2ξpih + δ2piξh.M) − iM.δ2pipih.M.
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Proof
The first part of the proof follows Hepp’s analysis in (He 1). It is easy to see that:
(Q + iP)Γ = 0.
Hence:
U(g)(Q + iP)U(g)∗U(g)Γ = 0.
That is, if A = α + iγ, B = δ − iβ then:
(A.Q + iB.P)U(g)Γ = 0.
It is then elementary to show that:
U(g)Γ ≡ ΓM(g) = K exp(− 12〈x,B−1Ax〉)
satisfies this equation (note that M = B−1A is symmetric). The phase |B(g)− 12 | is
chosen in accord with the second part of the proof, to which we now turn.
From the first result we know that
Z(t, 0)Γ = ΓM(t)
for some symmetric complex matrix M.
Taking the time derivative of the left-hand side gives:
i ddtZ(t, 0)Γ =
1
2 {Tr[δ2pipih.M − iδ2piξh] +
〈x, (δ2ξξh + i(M.δ2ξpih + δ2piξh.M) −M.δ2ξξh)x〉}. Z(t, 0)Γ.
Taking the time derivative of the right-hand side and noting that a determinant
|B| = exp(Tr `nB) gives:
− i2Tr[δ2piξh + iM.δ2pipih] − i2〈x, M˙x〉.
Equating terms provides the required result.
4.17 Remarks
(1) These results are well-known in a variety of guises. See, for example, Hage-
dorn in (Ha 1) who also investigates the abstract behaviour of the matrices A,
B.
(2) The state ΓM is a Gaussian coherent state and it is evident from the Proposition
that we are free to choose any such ΓM as our initial state. Thus, for instance we
may choose a dilated family of Gaussians and see how they affect our error.
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(3) To tie up to previously derived results (e.g. (Ha 1)) notice that the equation
of motion for M is compatible with the coupled first-order matrix equations:
A˙ = iB.δ2ξξh − A.δ2ξpih
B˙ = B.δ2piξh + iA.δ
2
pipih.
(4) Our analysis has not needed to concentrate on rigorous consideration of
operator domains as the results are essentially group-theoretical.
(5) It may well be asked if the approach can be extended beyond quadratic
generators of an approximating evolution. To answer this question notice that
we have relied upon Lie algebras - first the Weyl algebra, then the metaplectic
Lie algebra. It is easy to see that any power of a greater than or equal to 3
does not lead to an algebra of finite order. It would seem, then, that using the
metaplectic group is as far as one can go in providing approximating evolutions
along the lines adopted in this thesis.
To summarise the results on the approximating evolution we present a straight-
forward Corollary:
4.18 Corollary
Let W(t, 0) be an approximating evolution generated by hquad(t). Let ΓM(α) ≡
U(α(0))ΓM where ΓM is as given in Proposition 4.16, then:
||W(t, 0) −U(t)) ΓM(α)|| ≤ ∫ t
0
ds ||R(s)ΓM(s)||
where:
R(s) ≡ h(α(s) + a) − hquad(s), and
M(s) is a solution of the differential equation of motion in Proposition
4.16.
3. The Comparator Operator
In this Section we look at a particular choice of comparator operator both to
show that such objects exist and also provide some estimates for the error terms
in Theorem 4.7.
The choice we make is the family of compact operators ΩS described in the
following Lemma:
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4.19 Lemma
Let A denote the ‘annihilation’ operator 1√
2
(Q + iP).
Let Γ(α) ≡ U(α)Γ be a coherent state.
Define:
Ω˜s = σse−sA
∗A; s ∈ R+; σs = 1 − e−s; Ωs = σ−1s Ω˜s
then:
(i) 0 < Ω˜s < 1
(ii) ||Ω˜s|| = σs
(iii) Tr[Ω˜s] = 1
(iv) Ω˜s
−1
is well-defined.
(v) Ω˜s = λs
∫
d2α
pi e
−λs|α|2 |Γ(α)〉〈Γ(α)|
Ω˜s
−1
= 1λs
∫
d2α
pi e
σs|α|2 |Γ(α)〉〈Γ(α)|
where λs = es − 1 and the integrals converge weakly in the sense of
distributions (see (AW 1)).
(vi) 〈Γ(α), Ω˜sΓ(α)〉 = σse−σs|α|2
(vii) ||Ω˜s−1Γ(α)||2 = σs−2eλ2s|α|2
(viii) ||(1 − Ω˜s) Γ(α)|| ≤ 1 − σse−σs|α|2
(ix) ||a Ω˜s||2 ≤ 1sσ2s es−1 where a is any one of the operators Q,P.
Proof
We use the well-known properties of the ‘number operator’
A∗A = 12 (Q
2 + P2 − 1).
(i) & (ii): The function f (n) = σse−sn for n = 0, 1, 2, .... has range in (0, σs].
(iii): Use the orthonormal eigenvectors of A∗A in the trace:
Tr[Ω˜s] =
∑∞
n=0 σse−sn = 1.
(iv) Use the spectral theorem.
(v) See (AW 1).
(vi) See (AW 1).
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(vii) Since 〈Γ(α), Ω˜s−1Γ(α)〉 = 1σs eλs|α|
2 (see (AW 1)) then:
||Ω˜s−1Γ(α)||2 = σ2sσ2s 〈Γ(α), Ω˜2s
−1
Γ(α)〉
= σ−2s eλ2s|α|
2 .
(viii) ||(1 − Ω˜s)Γ(α)|| ≤ ||(1 − Ω˜s) 12 || ||(1 − Ω˜s) 12 Γ(α)||
and so the result follows from (vi).
(ix) For any a, a∗a ≤ 2A∗A + 1, hence if ψn denote the eigenfunctions
of A∗A:
||a Ω˜s||2 = sup
n
〈Ω˜sψn, a∗aΩ˜ψn〉
≤ sup
n
〈Ω˜sψn, (2A∗A + 1)Ω˜sψn〉
But Ω˜sψn = σse−snψn and A∗Aψn = n, so:
||a Ω˜s||2 ≤ sup
n
(2n + 1)σs2e−2sn.
Now the function x→ (2x + 1)e−bx has a maximum at 1b − 12 ,
hence for b = 2s we find:
||a Ω˜s||2 ≤ 1sσs2es−1.
4.20 Remarks
We provide here some heuristic remarks on the choice of Ωs = σs−1Ω˜s.
(1) The following ‘operator’ is a projection:∫
d2α
pi δ(α − β) |Γ(α)〉〈Γ(α)| = |Γ(β)〉〈Γ(β)|.
(2) Consider a family { fµ(α)} of functions such that:
fµ(α)→ δ(α − β) as µ→∞.
Such a family is:
fµ(α) = µe−µ|α|
2
where for a test function, F, the following limit exists:
lim
µ→∞
∫
d2α
pi fµ(α)F(α) = F(0).
(3) Note that the family:
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gµ(α) = e
− 1µ |α|2
satisfies:
lim
µ→∞
∫
d2α
pi gµ(α)F(α) =
∫
d2α
pi F(α).
(4) Hence as µ→∞:∫
d2α
pi fµ(α) |Γ(α)〉〈Γ(α)| → |Γ(0)〉〈Γ(0)|∫
d2α
pi gµ(α) |Γ(α)〉〈Γ(α)| → 1.
(5) For our operator Ωs where
Ω˜s =
∫
d2α
pi λse
−λs|α|2 |Γ(α)〉〈Γ(α)|
we have, since λs →∞ as s→∞ that:
Ωs ≡ σs−1Ω˜s
→ |Γ(0)〉〈Γ(0)| as s→∞→ 1 as s→ 0
(6) Thus, the chosen comparator Ωs is not only a compact operator representing
a phase-space localisation (see Chapter 3) but additionally acts, for small s, as a
coherent-state projection.
4.21 Proposition
With the assumptions of Theorem 4.7 and choosing ψ as Γ(α) and Ω as Ωs we
have:
|α(t)−α(t)| ≤ ( esse )
1
2 {(E+3)||(W(t, 0)−U(t))Γ(α)||+2(E+1)||(1−Ωs)W(t, 0)Γ(α)||}.
Proof
Use the results in Lemma 4.19.
4. Warning Example
In the case where the Hamiltonian
h(a) = 12mP
2 + V(Q)
the estimate for ||(W(t, 0)−U(t))ΓM(α)|| in Corollary 4.18 shows that the difference
between approximate and true quantum state evolution can be made arbitrarily
small by concentrating ΓM(α) around the classical position. (This behaviour
should be compared to the critique of Hepp’s paper in our Appendix 4.2).
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So it would appear from this that the problem is solved simply by making ΓM(α)
as concentrated as need be in position-space.
However, as illustrated by Proposition 4.21 this fails to take into account the
comparator Ω, since as ΓM gets more concentrated in position-space so it dis-
perses in momentum-space, accordingly making the term
||(1 −Ω)W(t, 0)ΓM||
increasingly significant.
4.22 Remarks
The centering, and the value of s, in the definition of the comparator operator Ωs
may be chosen to minimise the right-hand side of the inequality in Proposition
4.21. Note that we have, for simplicity, only considered the case where Ωs is
centred around the origin in phase-space.
Were it not for the term ( e
s
se )
1
2 - the approximate radius of the phase-space region -
it would be best to set s = 0. The size of the error terms depends on the dynamics
- the Hamiltonian, the initial state, and the interval of time under consideration.
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Appendices to Chapter 4
Appendix 4.1
Theory of Scaling
The magnitude of a physical quantity is independent of the choice of units - thus,
Plack’s constant, ~, has the magnitude:
6.625 × 10−34 js = 6.625 × 10−27 erg s.
The numerical value of a physical quantity does, however, depend on the units
in which that quantity is measured.
Let [ ] denote a choice of units. In particular we shall be interested in:
[M] - unit of mass
[L] - unit of length
[T] - unit of time.
Let ( ) denote the magnitude of a physical quantity.
Let [ ] denote the units (or physical dimensions) of a physical quantity.
If g is a physical quantity we have the following equation relating the magnitude
to the value of g:
(g) = g[g]
where g is the numerical value in the units [ ]. If [ ]’ is another choice of units,
the invariance of magnitude is expressed by:
g′[g]′ = (g) = g[g]
where g′ is the numerical value of g in the units [ ]’.
In Table 4.A1.1 we give the physical dimensions of some physical quantities and
the symbols by which we shall denote them in these appendices. Throughout
we refer to a mass, length, time system of units.
Of particular interest to us will be a change in units (a ‘scaling’) in which the
numerical value of Planck’s constant gets smaller.
To this end we introduce the parameter λ ∈ R+ and consider the systems of
units [ ]λ. To specify this family of systems of units, let ~λ denote the numerical
value of Planck’s constant in [ ]λ units. We require:
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~λ = λ~1
⇔ [~]λ = λ−1[~]1
⇔ [M]λ[L]λ2[T]λ−1 = λ−1[M][L]2[T]−1.
We choose the following additional conditions as an example:
(a) Fix mass and time units once and for all:
[M]λ = [M]; [T]λ = [T]
so that mass and time numerical values remain proportional to their physical
magnitudes irrespective of the scaling chosen.
(b) Choose [M]1, [L]1, [T]1 such that
~1 = 1
that is, the numerical value of Planck’s constant is chosen as one in the case
λ = 1.
Overall, therefore we have
[L]λ = λ−
1
2 [L]
and ~λ = λ.
In Table 4.A1.2 the effect on the numerical values of our physical quantities
under a λ-scaling (i.e. in these [ ]λ units) is summarised.
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Table 4.A1.1 - Physical dimensions of Physical quantities
Quantity Symbol Dimensions
Position ξ [ξ] = [L]
Momentum pi [pi] = [M] [L] [T]−1
Time t [t] = [T]
Mass m [m] = [M]
Energy h or V [V] = [M] [L]2 [T]−2
Planck’s Constant ~ [~] = [M] [L]2 [T]−1
Table 4.A1.2 - Effect on numerical values under a λ-scaling
Quantity Value in [ ]1 units Value in [ ]λ units
Position ξ1 ≡ ξ ξλ = λ 12ξ
Momentum pi1 ≡ pi piλ = λ 12pi
Time t1 ≡ t tλ = t
Mass m1 ≡ m mλ = m
Energy V1 ≡ V Vλ = λV
Planck’s Constant ~1 ≡ 1 ~λ = λ
Representation of Physical Quantities as Functions
Let (g) denote a physical quantity (e.g. energy) which takes magnitudes for
various values of position, (ξ), and momentum, (pi).
Let [ ] be a choice of units. If (g) denotes the mapping of physical position and
momentum magnitudes to the g-magnitude:
(g) ≡ (g)((ξ), (pi))
we introduce the numerical function g as:
(g)((ξ), (pi)) = g(ξ, pi)[g]
where g is a function of the numerical values ξ1 and pi in the [ ] units.
Now let [ ]λ be another choice of units. Again we introduce a numerical function,
the λ-scaled function gλ as:
(g)((ξ), (pi)) = gλ(ξλ, piλ)[g]λ.
Since magnitudes are independent of scaling, we have:
gλ(ξλ, piλ)[g]λ = g(ξ, pi)[g].
As an example, let us take g as the energy h and choose [] ≡ []1 and []λ as before.
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Using Table 4.A1.2 we immediately conclude that the λ-scaled energy function,
hλ, is given as:
hλ(λ
1
2ξ, λ
1
2pi)λ−1[h] = h(ξ, pi)[h]
or:
hλ(x, k) = λh(λ−
1
2 x, λ− 12 k).
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Appendix 4.2
Hepp’s Analysis of the Classical Limit
In this Appendix we describe the work of Hepp in his paper (He 1) on the
classical limit of quantum mechanics. In accord with our analysis in Section 4.1,
his results may be interpreted as describing either:
(a) A family of quantum theories with decreasing magnitude of
Planck’s constant.
(b) A family of evolutions with respect to fixed numerical energy and
position/momentum under the scaling described in Appendix 4.1.
Option (a) is rejected and option (b) evaluated.
To introduce the methods used we consider the case of no time evolution and
explicate Hepp’s equations (1.8) and (1.9):
1. No time evolution
We introduce the vacuum vector Γ~(0) as:
(Γ~(0))(x) = (~pi)− n4 exp(−x
2
2~ )
and the coherent state Γ~(α) as:
Γ~(α) = U~(α)Γ~(0)
where: U~(α) ≡ exp(−iω(α,a~)
~
)
α ≡
(
ξ
pi
)
; a~ ≡
(
q~
p~
)
≡
(
x
−i~ ddx
)
; ω(α, a~) ≡ ξp~ − piq~.
Apart from our notation for coherent states, the notation used is essentially
Hepp’s. Note, however, that our a , (q+ip)√
2
but is to be viewed as a vector of
operators.
The principal object implicit in the theory is the dilation operator D(~) defined
by:
(D(~)ψ)(x) = ~
n
4ψ(~
1
2 x).
It is readily seen that:
D(~)Γ~(0) = Γ(0) where (Γ(0))(x) = (pi)
−n
4 exp(−x
2
2 )
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D(~)a~D(~)∗ = a~ = ~
1
2 a
where a~ ≡
(
q~
p~
)
≡ ~ 12
(
x
−i ddx
)
≡ ~ 12
(
q
p
)
≡ ~ 12 a.
Thus the dilation removes the ~-dependence from the vacuum vector and gen-
erates the ‘symmetric’ representation of the CCR (Hepp’s equation (1.6)).
A little calculation gives us:
D(~)Γ~(α) = U(~− 12α)Γ(0) ≡ Γ(~− 12α) ≡ Γ~(α)
where
U(~− 12α) ≡ exp(−iω(~− 12α, a)).
We also have that
U(α)aU(α)∗ = a − α
The object of interest in its ‘full’ version is the expectation:
〈Γ~(α), (a~ − α)Γ~(α)〉
= 〈Γ~(α), (a~ − α)Γ~(α)〉
= ~
1
2 〈Γ(0), aΓ(0)〉
= 〈Γ~(0), a~Γ~(0)〉.
These equations include Hepp’s equations (1.8) and (1.9). The argument is then
that as ~→ 0 we have
〈Γ~(α), a~Γ~(α)〉 → α.
Thus, in a family of quantum theories with decreasing magnitude of ~, the
expectation value of position/momentum in coherent states tends to the coherent
state parameters (interpreted as classical position/momentum).
Let us now rephrase this result in terms of the scaling theory of Appendix 4.1:
(i) We treat the vacuum vector as an invariant under scale changes, noting that
what was ‘- x
2
2~ ’ in Γ
~(0) must be invariant (has no physical dimensions). Thus we
choose:
(Γ(0))(x) = pi
−n
4 exp(−x
2
2 )
so that ‘x’ is also treated as an invariant.
(ii) We consider the following physical magnitude:
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(a) ≡ 〈Γ((α)), (a)Γ((α))〉
in various scales, but keep the numerical value of the classical position/momentum
vector, α, constant.
In magnitude terms we are interested in:
〈Γ((α)), (a)Γ((α))〉 = 〈Γ(0), (a)Γ(0)〉 + (α).
Let [ ] be a system of units. In this system this equation may be written in
numerical values as:
a = 〈Γ(α), aΓ(α)〉 = 〈Γ(0), aΓ(0)〉 + α.
Choose [ ] ≡ [ ]1 and consider the system of units [ ]λ as in Appendix 1.
In the new scale, the magnitude (a) has numerical values:
aλ = 〈Γ(αλ), aλΓ(αλ)〉.
Now a transforms under the scale change as a position and momentum numer-
ical value, hence
aλ = λ
1
2 a
and:
aλ = λ
1
2 〈Γ(0), aΓ(0)〉 + αλ.
By fixing the numerical value, αλ, as the scale changes we see that as λ→ 0:
〈Γ(αλ), aλΓ(αλ)〉 → αλ.
This result may be equivalently expressed by saying that the relative error
between the expectation and the coherent state parameters tends to zero as
these parameters get large in a fixed scale. Hardly a remarkable result in view of
the equation for a. However, we note the following changes in numerical values
under λ-scaling:
a→ aλ = λ 12 a
U(α)→ Uλ(αλ) = exp(−iw(αλ,aλ)~ )
= exp(−iw(λ− 12αλ, a))
≡ U(λ− 12αλ)
Γ(α)→ Γλ(αλ) = Uλ(αλ)Γ(0)
= Γ(λ− 12αλ)
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which may be directly compared to the transformation of the ~-dependent for-
mulae under the dilation D(~).
2. Time Evolution - Hepp’s Version
Hepp’s stated aim is equation (1.11) (for t in a compact set [0, T]). In the form
presented it is somewhat confusing, but may be written in our notation as:
lim
~→0
~− 12 〈Γ~(α), (U~(t)∗a~U~(t) − α(t))Γ~(α)〉
= ~− 12 〈Γ~(0),W~(t, 0)∗a~W~(t, 0)Γ~(0)〉
= 〈Γ(0),W(t, 0)∗aW(t, 0)Γ(0)〉
where:
α(t) are solutions of classical equations of motion (α ≡ α(0)).
U~(t) ≡ exp(−ih~t
~
); h~ = (p
~)2
2m + V(q
~).
W~(t, 0) is the propagator with generator given by:
i~ ddtW
~(t, 0) = (p
~)2
2m + V
(2)(ξ(t)) (q
~)2
2
W(t, 0) is the propagator with generator given by:
i ddtW(t, 0) =
p2
2m + V
(2)(ξ(t)) q
2
2 .
Transforming using the dilation D(~) as before, this equation then takes Hepp’s
form (1.11):
lim
~→0
~− 12 〈Γ(~− 12α), (U~(t)∗a~U~(t) − α(t))Γ(~− 12α)〉
= 〈Γ(0),W(t, 0)∗aW(t, 0)Γ(0)〉
where:
U~(t) ≡ exp(−ih~t~ ); h~ = (p~)
2
2m + V(q~).
Noting that:
U~(α(t))a~U~(α(t))∗ = a~ − α(t)
we may write the stated aim in the form:
lim
~→0
〈Γ(0), (V~(t, 0)∗aV~(t, 0) −W(t, 0)∗aW(t, 0))Γ(0)〉 = 0
where:
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V~(t, 0) ≡ U~(α(t))∗U~(t)U~(α(0))
= U(~− 12 a(t))∗U~(t)U(~−
1
2α(0)).
Apart from a phase, our V~(t, 0) is the W~(t, 0) defined by equation (2.10) in
Hepp’s paper.
In order to avoid domain questions it is convenient to use the Weyl operator:
U(η) = e−iω(η,a); η ≡
(−s
r
)
instead of a. In this form the stated aim finally becomes:
lim
~→0
〈Γ(0), (V~(t, 0)∗U(η)V~(t, 0) −W(t, 0)∗U(η)W(t, 0))Γ(0)〉 = 0.
What is actually proved is considerably more, namely equation (2.1) which in
our notation is:
s-lim
~→0
V~(t, 0)∗U(η)V~(t, 0) = W(t, 0)∗U(η)W(t, 0).
In other words, Hepp proves the stated aim not just for the vacuum vector, but
for every vector in Hilbert space!
To see what is happening here choose, as Hepp does, the dense set of Gaussians
(one dimensional case):
ψa(x) = pi−
1
4 exp(− (x−a)22 ) ∀a ∈ R.
Now for any ψ ∈ L2(R):
[ψ~(α)](x) = [U~(α)D(~)∗ψ](x)
= exp( ipi(x−
1
2ξ)
~
)~− 14ψ(~− 12 (x − ξ)).
Hence:
|ψ~a(α)|2(x) = (pi~)− 12 exp(− (x−ξ−~
1
2 a)2
~
)
so:
|ψ~a(α)|2 → |Γ~(α)|2 for each a as ~→ 0.
Thus, irrespective of the vector, the~-dependence guarantees localisation around
the classical trajectory as ~ → 0. The reason why each vector is in this way
‘sucked into’ a neighbourhood of the classical trajectory is the ~-dependence
caused by the dilation D(~). The effect of this dilation is also seen in the time
evolution. For a small time, δt:
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U~(δt) ∼ 1 − iδt(− ~22m d
2
dx2 +
1
~
V(x)).
This affects Γ~(α) in the following way:
U~(δt)Γ~(α) ∼ (1 − iδt( 1
~
( pi
2
2m + V(ξ)) +
1
2V
(2)(ξ) + 0(~)))Γ~(α)
where we have calculated the Gaussian integrals in 〈Γ~(α),U~(δt)Γ~(α)〉 and as-
sumed V(x) can be written as a Taylor series about ξ:
V(x) =
∑∞
n=0 V(n)(ξ)
(x−ξ)n
n! .
Here we see that the evolution picks up the classical evolution plus a quadratic
correction. The asymptotic formula here holds primarily because of the ~-
dependence in the vacuum state:
[Γ~(0)](x) = [D(~)∗Γ(0)](x) = (pi~)− 14 exp(− x22~ ).
In the ‘dilated’ form of the quantities used in Hepp’s proof of Theorem 2.1 the
evolution again picks out the classical term plus a quadratic correction - both of
which are eliminated by a comparison evolution. This time, however, we view
from a fixed vector as ~ → 0. The circumstances are depicted in Figure 4.A2.1,
which shows how, as ~→ 0:
(i) A neighbourhood (∝ ~− 12 ) of the classical trajectory expands to
encompass any vector (ψa). This neighbourhood represents a region
of fixed continuity of the potential energy function V, hence:
(ii) The potential energy dilates so that the region of applicability
of the quadratic approximation gets larger. The vector being fixed
means that the approximation thereby gets better.
I believe we can draw two conclusions from this analysis of Hepp’s result
(Theorem 2.1):
(a) In a family of theories parameterised by the magnitude of ~,
Planck’s constant, the quadratic (classical) approximation gets better
as ~→ 0. This is achieved by holding the mass and potential energy
parameters fixed and ‘condensing’ the vectors around the classical
trajectories.
(b) For a given magnitude of ~, a coherent state with the same posi-
tion/momentum parameters as used in the quadratic approximation
provides a better approximation than a vector delocalised away from
the classical trajectory.
The arguments of Section 4.1 lead us to reject the ‘family of theories’ parame-
terised by the magnitude of ~, since the latter is fixed and not at our disposal
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to vary. We can, however, vary the value of ~ by changing the units (scaling)
- to this we turn shortly and it will be seen that Hepp’s type of result may be
obtained by changing the magnitude of the evolution parameters as the scale
changes.
The difference between Hepp’s claim and his result - namely that the limit holds
for all vectors as a strong limit - can be attributed to the dilation D(~). By
enabling a strong limit to be concluded it is apparent that the problem has been
poorly phrased as what is needed is some estimate of how ‘classical’ a quantum
state is for a fixed magnitude of ~.
3. Time evolution - in terms of scaling
As in the case of no time evolution (see 1. above) the quantum state is taken as
an invariant under scale changes - in particular, we choose a fixed representation
of a vector ψ as ψ(x) so that ‘x’ is an invariant and not to be viewed as position
space. Again we consider the scale change associated with the change in units
from [ ]≡ [ ]1 to [ ]λ introduced in Appendix 4.1 and used in the no time evolution
case above.
The plan is to reproduce the formulae used by Hepp in his Theorem 2.1 but with
~ replaced by the scaling parameter λ. We already have the transformations of
the operators:
a→ aλ = λ 12 a
U(α)→ Uλ(αλ) = U(λ− 12αλ)
where everything is treated as a numerical quantity.
As before, we are therefore interested in the behaviour of the formulae for fixed
numerical values of position and momentum.
Let (h) be the Hamiltonian physical quantity. We shall consider it both as a
function of classical position/momentum quantities and as a function of quan-
tum position/momentum operator quantities. Let h(ξ, pi) be the value of h as a
function of position and momentum in the scale [ ]. In the scale [ ]λ we have,
from Appendix 4.1, that:
hλ(ξλ, piλ) = λh(ξ, pi).
Consider now the parameterised family of functions:
gλ(ξ, pi) = λ−1h(ξλ, piλ)
then
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gλλ(ξλ, piλ) = h(ξλ, piλ).
That is, in the λ-scale gλ has the same numerical value for the fixed numerical
value of position and momentum. Thus gλ provides a family of Hamiltonians
such that under the λ-scaling gλ is the same function of ξλ and piλ as h was of ξ
and pi.
Figure 4.A2.1: Scaling of the Potential energy in Hepp’s Proof
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where V~(x) ≡ V(ξt + ~− 12 x)
ψa(x) ≡ pi− 14 exp(−(x − a)2/2).
This diagram should be compared to the equation (2.18) in Hepp’s paper (He 1).
Note that V(ξt + x) is C2+δ for all |x| ≤ σ.
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It is, however, only the classical values of position and momentum which we
wish to keep fixed. In terms of the quantum operators:
gλλ(qλ, pλ) =
(pλ)2
2m + V(qλ)
= − λ2m d
2
dx2 + V(λ
1
2 x)
and Uλ(t) = exp(− ig
λ
λ
t
λ ).
These are equivalent to Hepp’s formulae for H~ and U~(t). We immediately
conclude Hepp’s results (2.1) and (2.2) noting that the linearised Hamiltonian
has the form:
H(t) = (pλ)
2
2m + V
(2)(ξλ(t))
(qλ)2
2 = λ(
p2
2m + V
(2)(ξλ(t))
q2
2 )
the λ cancelling in the evolution generated by H(t)λ . (This is thereby analogous to
Hepp’s equation (2.3)). All the other ~-dependence in Theorem 2.1 and its proof
may be similarly derived as λ-dependence.
There are a number of ways of expressing this result:
(1) For fixed numerical values of classical position and momentum, and fixed
value of the Hamiltonian (energy) as a function of these values, the quadratic
approximation of the evolution gets better as the units get larger in magnitude.
(1)’ The quadratic approximation gets relatively better as the magnitudes of po-
sition and momentum get larger, provided that the Hamiltonian of the evolution
is altered as:
gλ(q, p) = λ−1h(qλ, pλ)
=
p2
2m +
1
λV(λ
1
2 q)
where ξ and pi increase as λ− 12 . (All in a fixed scale).
The formulation in (1)’ corresponds most closely to the expression of Hepp’s
result in Theorem 2.1.
In the ‘scaling theory’ form of Hepp’s approach we can see more clearly why
the result holds - such as, for example, the ‘expansion’ of the potential to en-
compass any vector. We must ask, however, if the result is useful. It would be,
provided we could use it to give criteria on quantum states and Hamiltonians
such that the quadratic (classical) approximation is ‘good’. Or, conversely, for a
given state and Hamiltonian estimate the error incurred in making the quadratic
approximation. Hepp’s theory, as it stands, fulfils neither of these objectives.
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The pedagogical goal of this critique has been to demonstrate that Hepp’s the-
ory is not ‘so simple that it could belong to an elementary course on quantum
mechanics’!
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Appendix 4.3
Ehrenfest’s Theorem
What is usually called Ehrenfest’s Theorem is really just a statement of the
Heisenberg equations of motion. We shall derive these in a sequence of Lemmas
below. However, everything in this Appendix is formal in that we do not discuss
existence or domain questions at all. Only sketch proofs are given.
3A.1 Lemma (formal)
Let
h = 12m (pi − A)2 + V
be a time-independent Hamiltonian function on R6, with the vector potential
A and scalar potential V both functions of position ξ only. The momentum is
denoted by pi. Then:
(i) p˙i = 1m ((pi − A) ∧ (∇ ∧ A) + ((pi − A).∇)(A)) − ∇(V)
= 1m
∑3
i=1 ∇(Ai)pii − 12m∇(A2) − ∇(V)
(ii) ξ˙ = 1m (pi − A)
(iii) mξ¨ = 1m (pi − A) ∧ (∇ ∧ A) − ∇(V)
= ξ˙ ∧ B − ∇(V)
where the magnetic potential B is given by ∇ ∧ A.
Proof
For (i) and (ii) use Hamilton’s equations and vector identities. (iii) follows from
(i) and (ii) and vector identities.
3A.2 Lemma (Formal)
Let
h = 12m (p − A)2 + V
be the time-independent Hamiltonian operator on L2(R3), with p ≡ −i~∇ and A,
V both operator functions of the position operator q ≡ x. In the Coulomb gauge
(∇.A = 0) we have:
(i) p˙ = 1m
∑3
i=1 ∇(Ai)pi − 12m∇(A2) − ∇(V)
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(ii) q˙ = 1m (p − A)
(iii) mq¨ = 12 (q˙ ∧ B − B ∧ q˙) − ∇(V).
Proof
Use the Heisenberg formula:
Ω˙t =
i
~
[h,Ωt] + δtΩt
for the evolution of an operator Ωt = e
iht
~ Ωe
−iht
~ .
3A.3 Lemma (Formal Ehrenfest Theorem)
Let
h = 12m (p − A)2 + V
as in Lemma 3A.2. Let ψ ∈ L2(R3) and
ψt ≡ exp−iht~ ψ.
For any operator Ω let Ω denote 〈ψt,Ωψt〉, then:
(i) p˙ = 1m
∑3
i=1 ∇(Ai)pi − 12m∇(A2) − ∇(V)
(ii) q˙ = 1m (p − A)
(iii) mq¨ = 12 (q˙ ∧ B − B ∧ q˙) − ∇(V)
where q˙ ≡ 1m (p − A).
3A.4 Remarks
The equations of Lemmas 3A.1 and 3A.3 should be compared to yield the spirit of
Ehrenfest’s theorem - namely that expectation values of the quantum operators
satisfy the classical equations of motion. We are, however, far from proving this
since, for example:
∇(V) , ∇(V)
indeed, we cannot even make sense of the second ∇!
Note, for equation (iii), that:
1
2 (q˙ ∧ B − B ∧ q˙) = q˙ ∧ B + i~2∇ ∧ B = q˙ ∧ B − i~2 ∆(A).
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